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Verification and Validation (V&V) is a critically important phase in the development life cycle of a
simulation model. In the context of network simulation, traditional network simulators perform well
in using a simulation model for evaluating/predicting the performance of a network protocol but
lack the capability of verifying the “correctness” of the simulation model being used. To address this
problem, we have extended J-Sim — an open-source component-based network simulator written
entirely in Java — with a state space exploration (SSE) capability that explores the (entire) state
space created by a network simulation model in order to find an execution (if any) that violates an
assertion; i.e., a property that must always hold true in all states.
In this thesis, we present the design and implementation of the state space exploration framework
in J-Sim. Furthermore, we demonstrate its usefulness and effectiveness in verifying complicated
simulation models. Specifically, we verify the simulation models of two widely used and fairly
complex routing and data dissemination protocols: the Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)
routing protocol for wireless ad-hoc networks and the directed diffusion data dissemination protocol
for wireless sensor networks. Moreover, we verify the simulation model of a reliable unicast protocol:
the Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) protocol.
To enable the verification of these fairly complex network simulation models, we make use of
protocol-specific properties along two orthogonal dimensions: state similarity and state ranking.
State similarity determines whether a state is “similar to” another in order to enable the implemen-
tation of stateful search. On the other hand, state ranking determines whether a state is “better
than” another with respect to the implementation of best-first search (BeFS). Specifically, we de-
velop protocol-specific search heuristics to guide state space exploration towards finding assertion
violations in less time. In particular, we report findings on how to devise good search heuristics for
routing/data dissemination protocols similar to AODV and directed diffusion.
We evaluate the efficiency of our state space exploration framework by comparing its performance
to that of a state-of-the-art model checker for Java programs, namely Java PathFinder (JPF). The
ii
results of the comparison show that the time needed to find an assertion violation by our state
space exploration framework in J-Sim can be significantly less than that in JPF unless a significant
amount of programming effort is done in JPF to make its performance close to that of our SSE
framework.
Finally, we present incremental state space exploration (ISSE), a technique that aims to provide
a speedup in the state space exploration time of evolving simulation models; i.e., simulation models
whose code changes from one version to another. A code change may or may not lead to a behavioral
change. We analytically obtain necessary conditions for the ISSE technique to provide a speedup in
the state space exploration time when compared to a traditional (non-incremental) SSE technique.
We applied the ISSE technique to our case studies. In two case studies (namely AODV and directed
diffusion), ISSE provided a speedup whereas in one case study (namely ARQ), it did not provide a
speedup because the necessary conditions were violated.
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A simulation is the imitation of the operation of a real-world system over time [9]. The behavior
of the system is studied by developing a simulation model that usually involves making a set of
assumptions on the operation of the system. A “correct” simulation model can be extremely valuable
for answering a wide variety of what-if questions about the behavior of the real-world system. In
fact, a simulation model can be effectively used both as an analysis tool for explaining the behavior
of, or predicting the effect of proposed change(s) to, an existing system and as a design tool for
predicting the performance of a new system under various scenarios and refining the design of the
system if necessary.
The applications of simulation vary widely and span a lot of civilian and military applications.
Examples of the various applications of simulation include: computer networks and communications
systems, operating systems, databases, transaction processing systems, manufacturing and material
handling applications, transportation systems such as airports and freeways, construction engineer-
ing and project management, business processes, service organizations such as restaurants and post
offices, inventory analysis, logistics and supply chain applications, health care, future combat sys-
tems (FCS), 3D military-based interactive simulation of a battlefield, training environments and
flight simulators.
A thorough simulation study systematically consists of a set of steps (or phases). These steps
include: problem formulation, identification of the alternative feasible solutions, setting the overall
plan and the objectives of the study (e.g., selecting the solution with the highest benefits/cost ratio),
construction of the model and collecting the required input data, implementing the simulation model
using a programming language and/or simulation software, verification and validation of the model,
design of the relevant experiments (also called simulation runs), experimentation and producing the
simulation results, analysis of the output obtained from the simulation runs, and documenting the




One of the most difficult and important problems that a model developer has to encounter is the
verification and validation (V&V) of the simulation model. A model is, by definition, an abstract
representation of a real (existing or proposed) system built for the purpose of studying the system
according to certain objectives. In particular, the conceptual model is a mathematical/logical/verbal
representation of the system. In the conceptual model, we determine the assumptions on each system
component, structural assumptions on the interactions between components, and data assumptions
on the input data. In order to conduct simulation experiments on a model of a real-world system,
the model is usually implemented using a programming language and/or simulation software on a
computer; i.e., turning the conceptual model into a computerized model. Validation addresses the
question of “Are we building the right model?” and verification addresses the question of “Are we
building the model right?” [9]. In particular, verification focuses on the transformational accuracy
when the model is transformed from one form into another [6].
The analysts who make use of the outputs of the simulation model to help in making important
design recommendations and the managers who use these recommendations to make decisions (e.g.,
to compare between different systems or different designs of the same system) usually look upon
a simulation model with some level of skepticism. After all, the model is just an abstraction. It
is the job of the model developer(s) to work with the analysts and/or the managers to reduce this
skepticism and enhance the objective credibility of the model. This makes verification and validation
an important and integral part of the development life cycle of a simulation model. Computer-aided
tools that can help the model developer(s) verify and validate their models thus become invaluable.
Some of the V&V methods are informal subjective comparisons between the output of the (com-
puterized) model and the output of the real system; some are formal objective procedures based
on statistical techniques such as hypothesis testing or confidence intervals. Examples of V&V tech-
niques are:
1. Driving the simulation model with historical input data or samples generated from distribu-
tions and comparing the model input-output transformations to corresponding input-output
transformations for the real system,
2. Face validity; i.e., domain experts and knowledgeable persons evaluate model output for rea-
sonableness,
3. Checking the model assumptions (both structural assumptions on how the system operates
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and data assumptions on the input data),
4. Sensitivity analysis; i.e., studying how the model output behavior is affected by systematically
changing the values of the model input data over a certain range of interest,
5. Turing tests; i.e., domain experts and persons knowledgeable about system behavior are asked
to compare, and determine if they can differentiate, between the model output and the system
output under the same input conditions,
6. Using a simulation trace; i.e., a detailed computer printout that shows how the state of the
simulation model changes over time,
7. Fault/failure insertion testing; i.e., inserting a fault (incorrect model component) or a failure
(incorrect behavior of a model component) into the simulation model and testing whether the
model generates the expected invalid behavior,
8. Regression testing; i.e., testing whether changes made to the simulation model have caused
previously fixed errors to re-emerge,
9. Extreme or invalid input testing, and
10. Static and dynamic testing of the computerized model.
See [3–7,58] for several verification and validation techniques at the different stages of the develop-
ment life cycle of a simulation model.
Verification and validation is not an afterthought. Rather, the process of building, verifying and
validating a simulation model is iterative and may have to be repeated several times over multiple
versions of the simulation model until a certain level of credibility in the model (and the information
derived from it) is achieved. Feedback and insights gained from the identification of the initial model
deficiencies help improve the simulation model as it evolves over time.
In this thesis, we focus on the computer-aided verification of simulation models of network
protocols with particular interest in evolving simulation models whose code changes from one version
to another.
1.2 Motivation
The motivation of our work is that network simulators have been used for decades to build a model
of a network protocol and evaluate its performance under different scenarios. One major deficiency
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of traditional network simulators, however, is that they only evaluate/predict the performance of
network protocols in the scenarios provided by the user (e.g., a network protocol designer or a
simulation modeler) but can not exhaustively analyze all possible scenarios for correctness in terms
of whether or not the simulation model satisfies certain assertions that the network protocol satisfies.
For instance, a network simulator can use a simulation model of a routing protocol to conduct
experiments and evaluate the performance of this protocol (e.g., in terms of the control message
overhead), but cannot check whether the simulation model being used may suffer from routing loops.
If the assertion violations in the simulation model do not appear (and hence cannot be inves-
tigated) in the scenarios studied, they may not be identified as early as possible. If an assertion
violation exists in the simulation model, the results obtained from the simulation experiments may
be incorrect and may lead to wrong decision making. Furthermore, if the simulation model models a
nonexistent system, undiscovered assertion violations in the simulation model may eventually man-
ifest themselves only after the system has been implemented and deployed. In the light of recent
research [85] that creates a physical implementation of a network protocol from existing simulation
code without much modification, the consequence of leaving assertion violations undiscovered in the
simulation code is especially severe.
Although there are hundreds of tools and utilities that are available in either the academic
communities or the commercial markets and that can be used to provide computer-aided support
for software testing, we agree with Balci et al. [7] that software tools specifically created for the
verification of simulation models would provide much more effective computer-aided support. Design
of special-purpose verification tools for simulation models of network protocols enjoys several benefits
over using general-purpose verification tools for programming languages such as C/C++ or Java
(e.g., [20, 25, 36, 111]). First, verifying the code of the simulation model along with the code of
the simulation environment and its libraries might likely be intractable due to the complexity of
the simulator libraries. Second, in many cases, the verification tool specifically designed for the
simulation model of a network protocol can conveniently ignore the call stack and heap during the
verification process, and this can lead to a more tractable analysis.
In the light of this motivation, we believe that building an integrated environment [95], which
allows the user to both verify a simulation model of a network protocol and use it to evaluate/predict
the performance of the protocol, is an important task.
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1.3 Problems and Suggested Solutions
As indicated by Sargent in [86], there is no set of specific tests that can be easily applied to determine
the “correctness” of a simulation model and that no algorithm exists to determine what techniques
or procedures to use. As pointed out by Balci et al. in [7], computer-aided support for verification,
validation, and accreditation (VV&A) is one of the strategic directions to achieve VV&A. In this
thesis, we elaborate on a computer-aided technique that is complementary to existing verification
and validation techniques and can be used in combination with them.
Specifically, we present the design, implementation and evaluation of a software framework that
aids in the verification of a simulation model of a network protocol. Our framework facilitates
this computer-aided support by providing the assertion checking V&V technique [6] along several
execution paths in the state space created by the model. An assertion is a property that must always
hold true (e.g., the absence of routing loops in the simulation model of a routing protocol).
We have implemented our framework in J-Sim [50,88,89,108–110]—an open-source component-
based network simulation environment written entirely in Java. Precisely, we have extended J-Sim
with the state space exploration (SSE) capability that directly executes the simulation model, which
is also written in Java, along several execution paths and systematically explores the (entire) state
space created by the model up to a configurable maximum depth in order to check whether the
model satisfies certain assertions that the network protocol satisfies and to find violations of these
assertions if any exists. However, the challenge is how to enable the state space explorer to take
control of the network simulation model to explore the (entire) state space, rather than simply
exploring one single execution path (i.e., sequence of events) as J-Sim traditionally does. Moreover,
this has to be done without requiring the core design and implementation of J-Sim to be altered and
without degrading the execution time of the J-Sim simulation model if the user is only interested
in using the model for performance evaluation purposes. In Chapter 3, we explain how we have
overcome that challenge.
As mentioned above, simulation models do evolve over time. Consequently, the verification and
validation process may have to be repeated several times over multiple versions of a model. Some
code changes may lead to changes in the output of a model (e.g., bug fixes, eliminating model
deficiencies, adding a new functionality to the model, removing an existing functionality from the
model, or modifying the implementation of an existing functionality in the model). We call these
code changes behavioral changes. On the other hand, some other code changes may not lead to
changes in the output of a model (e.g., refactorings and code optimizations such as replacing a for
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loop by a while loop). We call these code changes non-behavioral changes.
Evolution of a simulation model over multiple versions can pose a challenge for verification.
A traditional state space explorer would take one version of the simulation model at a time and
explore the (entire) state space created by each version separately to find assertion violations. This
repeated verification may take an excessively long time. We notice, however, that evolution of a
simulation model can also provide an opportunity for reducing the total verification time of all
versions. Specifically, consecutive versions of a simulation model can have (significant) similarities
that a traditional state space explorer does not take advantage of. In order to address this problem,
we present incremental state space exploration (ISSE), a technique that aims to provide a speedup in
the state space exploration time of evolving simulation models. Incremental state space exploration
considers several versions of the simulation model and reuses the results of verifying one version
to speed up the verification of a subsequent one. However, the challenge is to identify when an
incremental state space explorer cannot provide a speedup in state space exploration (e.g., when
the similarities between consecutive versions of a simulation model are not significant enough). In
Chapter 7, we explain how we have overcome that challenge.
In the following section, we give a brief summary of our research achievements.
1.4 Research Summary and Contributions
This section summarizes the research activities and the contributions of this thesis.
1.4.1 State Space Exploration Framework
As a first step towards realizing our goals, we have implemented the state space exploration (SSE)
framework in Java as a component in the component-based architecture of J-Sim for the purpose of
seamless integration with J-Sim. We made use of J-Sim features, whenever possible, to enable the
interaction between the state space explorer component and the simulation model of the network
protocol in a way that enables the state space explorer to take control of the execution of the model,
systematically explore the (entire) state space created by dynamically executing the model along
several execution paths and report assertion violations if any exists. We implemented the SSE
framework in a way that satisfies two major design goals: (i) the core design and implementation
of J-Sim must not be modified, and (ii) any modifications to the J-Sim simulation model of the
network protocol must be minimal and must not degrade the execution time of the model if a user
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is only interested in using the model for performance evaluation purposes.
The SSE framework provides an explicit-state stateful search that can prune a path in the search
space based on either the most recently visited state or its hash code. The SSE framework can employ
several search strategies such as breadth-first (BFS), depth-first (DFS) and best-first (BeFS). To
allow for variations in the search order across several executions of the SSE framework, we implement
randomized versions of these search strategies. In Chapter 3, we provide the implementation details
of our SSE framework and list what the user needs to do in order to verify the simulation model of
a network protocol in J-Sim.
This contribution is unique because this is the first effort to integrate state space exploration
with simulation in a unified J-Sim framework. This allows the user to both verify the simulation
model and use it to evaluate the performance of a network protocol.
1.4.2 Case Studies
After the state space exploration framework is laid, we demonstrate the usefulness, effectiveness, and
generality of our framework in verifying the simulation models of two widely used and fairly complex
network protocols: the Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [77, 78] for
wireless ad-hoc networks and the directed diffusion data dissemination protocol [48] for wireless
sensor networks. These are reasonably complex network protocols whose J-Sim simulation models
(not including the J-Sim library) have about 1200 and 1400 lines of code, respectively. (As a third
case study [93], we also verify the simulation model of an automatic repeat request (ARQ) protocol,
also known as the alternating bit protocol.) Our choice of AODV and directed diffusion is motivated
by their potential to become representative routing and data dissemination protocols, respectively,
in ad-hoc networks and sensor networks. We investigate whether these simulation models satisfy
the loop-free assertion; i.e., data packets are not routed through loops.
Our discoveries [94], reported in detail in Chapters 4-5, illustrate the practical utility of our
state space exploration framework. First, we find a previously unknown assertion violation in the
J-Sim simulation model of AODV. This shows that even if the network protocol specification [77] is
correct, the simulation model could violate some assertions that might eventually lead to inaccurate
simulation results. Second, we identify previously unknown behaviors, which might happen in a
wireless sensor network that is using the directed diffusion protocol. Specifically, our state space
exploration framework produces scenarios leading to the corruption of data caches due to timeouts
and/or node reboots in a sensor network. These scenarios would result in data packets being routed
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in a loop. Third, we also demonstrate the ability of our state space exploration framework to find
manually injected errors in the simulation models.
1.4.3 Protocol-specific Properties
One of the major challenges of state space exploration is the well-known state space explosion prob-
lem; i.e., the state space of the system can be so prohibitively large that a state space explorer may
run out of memory. To handle this problem and enable the analysis of such large simulation models
of real network protocols, we make use of algorithms and heuristics that exploit structural proper-
ties salient in the state space of message passing systems in general, and some network protocols in
particular.
The first technique exploits the existence of a non-trivial simulation relation between states
to reduce the search space. The idea is as follows. A traditional state space exploration tool
performs a classical search algorithm (like depth-first or breadth-first search) on the directed graph
of states and transitions defined by the protocol, choosing to prune certain branches of the search
when it visits a state previously encountered. We observe that this basic algorithm is sound even
when branches of the search are pruned whenever a state s is visited that can be simulated by
another state s′ that has been explored before, not just when the same state is re-encountered, i.e.,
whenever there is some previously visited state s′ that can exhibit every behavior of s; the formal
definition of simulation is deferred to technical sections (Section 3.3.1). This can drastically reduce
the search space, if the simulation relation is good. Next, we observe that, when the communication
between network entities is unreliable (i.e., when message delivery is neither guaranteed nor ordered),
which is typically the case for end-to-end protocols for wireless networks, there is a very simple
and natural simulation relation. Note that the state space of such protocols will consist of states
comprising of a protocol state (encoding information needed in modeling the specific protocol) and
an unordered collection of messages that have been sent but not yet delivered. For states s and s′
with identical protocol states, and with the additional property that every undelivered message in s
is also undelivered in s′ (s′ could have more undelivered messages), we observe that s′ simulates s.
We exploit this simulation relation in our experiments in Chapters 4-5. In Appendix A, we argue
that each of the simulation relations that we used is indeed a simulation relation.
Our second technique, called state ranking, is used to direct the state space exploration more
effectively towards finding assertion violations quickly. State ranking, as the name suggests, orders
states based on which state is more “likely” to have an incorrect execution starting from it. The state
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space exploration framework then uses a best-first search (BeFS) algorithm that biases the search
towards states with higher ranks; more specifically, the algorithm after visiting a state, always picks
successor states to visit in the order of their ranks. To obtain a ranking of states, we exploit properties
inherent to the network protocol and the assertion being checked. However, unlike the simulation
relations that we exploit, the state ranking that we present for the examples is not provably correct.
In other words, we cannot statically prove that states with higher ranks in our schemes have more
incorrect executions. Best-first search, though a heuristic, does not affect the soundness of our search
engine (since it only changes the order of the search) and can find assertion violations several orders
of magnitude faster than classic breadth-first and depth-first search strategies, as our experiments
demonstrate.
One interesting and important research question is how to determine a suitable BeFS heuristic
for a specific network protocol. We make an attempt towards answering this question by studying
the performance of several BeFS heuristics for both AODV and directed diffusion, and providing
design guidelines based on our results.
1.4.4 Comparison with the State of the Art
We evaluate the efficiency of our state space exploration framework in J-Sim by comparing its
performance to that of a state-of-the-art model checker for Java programs, namely Java PathFinder
(JPF) [52,111]. JPF is implemented in Java as a special Java Virtual Machine (JVM) that runs on
top of a host JVM. The main difference between JPF and a regular JVM is that JPF implements
a backtrackable JVM; i.e., JPF can (quickly) backtrack the program execution by restoring a state
that was previously encountered during the execution. Backtracking allows exploration of different
executions from the same state.
We compare between our SSE framework in J-Sim and that in JPF in the cases where the
explicit-state stateful search prunes a path in the search space based on either the most recently
visited state or its hash code. In order to ensure a fair comparison between the two tools, we used the
same definition of the simulation relation that enables the stateful search, the same implementations
of BeFS heuristics for state ranking, and the same hash code computation function in both J-Sim
and JPF. This ensures that the number of transitions executed and the number of states visited is
the same in both tools.
The results of the comparison [90], reported in detail in Chapter 4, show that our SSE framework
can be significantly faster than JPF in terms of the time needed to find an assertion violation unless
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a significant amount of programming effort is done in JPF to make its performance close to that
of our SSE framework. This result justifies the need for building a framework that is specifically
created for the verification of network simulation models instead of using a general-purpose model
checking tool since we believe that network protocol designers and simulation modelers will feel more
comfortable using J-Sim as a single integrated environment for both building a simulation model
and verifying its correctness than using J-Sim for building a simulation model and using another
tool (JPF) for verifying its correctness.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research effort to compare JPF with a state space
explorer for the simulation models of network protocols.
1.4.5 Incremental State Space Exploration Framework
In Chapter 7, we provide the implementation details of the incremental state space exploration
(ISSE) framework that aims to speed up the verification time of evolving simulation models in J-
Sim. The basic idea is to make use of the results of verifying one version of the model to speed up the
verification of a subsequent one by avoiding redoing certain operations such as re-executing certain
transitions and/or re-checking the assertions and recomputing the hash codes in certain states. We
implemented the ISSE technique in J-Sim as a general case of one of the (non-incremental) SSE
procedures in our SSE framework (Section 1.4.1). Specifically, the non-incremental SSE procedure
is just one mode of four possible modes of operation of ISSE. This generalization enables applying the
ISSE idea to other explicit-state model checkers in a straightforward manner. In fact, our work [92]
on ISSE in J-Sim is a part of a larger work [57] on incremental state space exploration for model
checking programs with dynamically allocated data, including the implementation and evaluation
of the ISSE technique in Java PathFinder (JPF).
An interesting research question is whether or not the ISSE technique can backfire (i.e., make the
time needed for verifying a model using ISSE longer than that using the traditional, non-incremental
SSE technique). In order to identify when the ISSE technique cannot provide a speedup in state space
exploration of several versions of the simulation model, we analytically obtain necessary conditions
for the ISSE technique to provide a speedup in the state space exploration time when compared to the
non-incremental SSE technique. The necessary conditions depend on (i) the degree of the similarities
between successive versions of the simulation model, (ii) properties related to the state space created
by the model, and (iii) the times spent in the different operations during state space exploration in
our framework. Our implementation dynamically checks whether or not these necessary conditions
10
are satisfied. Hence, the user may run a pilot study to determine whether the ISSE technique
backfires.
In Chapter 8, we apply the ISSE technique to our case studies and compare its performance with
that of the non-incremental SSE technique. To ensure a fair comparison in all our experiments, we
check that the state spaces explored by both techniques are the same; i.e., both techniques have the
same “workload”. We consider both behavioral and non-behavioral changes. In two case studies
(namely AODV and directed diffusion), ISSE provided a speedup whereas in one case study (namely
ARQ), it did not provide a speedup because the necessary conditions were violated. The speedups
in state space exploration time come at a reasonable cost of memory overhead.
1.5 Thesis Organization
After this introduction, the rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide
background information and give a brief overview of network simulation in J-Sim. In Chapter 3, we
elaborate on the state space exploration (SSE) framework that we implemented in J-Sim. Chapters 4-
6 present the case studies and the performance results using the SSE framework. In Chapter 7, we
elaborate on the incremental state space exploration (ISSE) framework that we also implemented
in J-Sim. Chapter 8 presents the performance results using the ISSE technique. In Chapter 9, we





In this chapter, we provide background information. Section 2.1 defines some basic concepts. Sec-
tion 2.2 gives a brief overview of formal reasoning in general and explicit-state model checking by
state space exploration in particular. Finally, Section 2.3 explains network simulation in J-Sim.
2.1 Basic Concepts
First, we review some basic concepts of discrete-event system simulation [9].
A system is a group of objects that are joined together in some regular interaction or interdepen-
dence toward the accomplishment of some purpose (e.g., a wireless network). A simulation model is
a representation of the system for the purpose of studying the behavior of the system with respect to
certain performance evaluation criteria (e.g., network throughput). An entity is an object of interest
in the system (e.g., a wireless node). An entity is described or characterized by its attributes (e.g.,
routing table, MAC address, etc.). Each attribute has a type, which may be either simple (e.g.,
boolean, integer, etc.) or composite (e.g., an array of integers, an object, an array of objects, etc.).
The type of an attribute indicates the domain over which the attribute ranges.
The state of the system is a complete description of the system and includes values of all attributes
of entities that are relevant to the objective of the study (e.g., the routing table entries of all the
wireless nodes and the number/contents of the messages being sent over the wireless channel). A
state s can be regarded as a function that assigns to each attribute a value over its domain. The
state space, denoted by S, is the set of all possible system states. It should be noted that although
the set of attributes is finite, S may be infinite (or prohibitively large) because the domains over
which the attributes range may be infinite (or prohibitively large).
An event is an instantaneous occurrence that might change the state of the system (e.g., message
sending and message receiving); i.e., assign new values to (some of) the attributes. An event may
be either conditional or unconditional. An unconditional event is an event that can always occur
12
(e.g., an unpredictable crash of an active wireless node). A conditional event is an event that can
occur only if a certain enabling condition is true (e.g., a wireless node can receive a message only if
another node has sent a message to it).
An assertion is a property that must always hold true in all states (e.g., the absence of routing
loops in a routing table). The meaning of the assertion depends on the network protocol itself.
For example, if the protocol is a reliable unicast/multicast protocol, the assertion may be that the
receiver(s) receive all the packets that the sender believes to have been received. In the case of a
security protocol, the assertion may be that unauthorized users do not get access to the system.
2.2 Formal Reasoning and State Space Exploration
Next, we give a brief overview of formal reasoning in general and explicit-state model checking [21]
by state space exploration in particular.
In general, there are two basic approaches towards formal reasoning of software and hardware
systems: theorem proving and model checking. In theorem proving, a formal technique (e.g., deduc-
tive methods and induction) is used to prove a property of a system. On the other hand, model
checking checks a finite state machine model of the system in order to verify whether a temporal
property (e.g., safety or liveness) holds. In the finite state machine model, vertices correspond to
states of the system and edges or transitions correspond to events that might change the state of
the system.
In particular, explicit-state model checking [21] by state space exploration starts from an initial
state of the system and recursively generates successor system states by executing the transitions of
the system. This process continues, usually while pruning the search when a previously visited state
is encountered, until either the entire state space is explored or a property violation is discovered.
(Hence, in systems of infinite state space, model checking by state space exploration is practically
used for locating property violations, rather than proving correctness.)
As compared to theorem proving, model checking by state space exploration has several impor-
tant advantages. First, it can be built into existing tools and automated. Second, it does not require
a deep understanding of complex mathematical concepts; hence, a network developer or a computer
engineer can find it easy to use. Third, when the desired property fails to hold, a model checker
provides a counterexample; i.e., a trace of the sequence of events that starts from the initial state
and leads to the property violation. This counterexample usually helps in understanding why the
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property violation occurred and how it can be fixed. For these reasons, we choose to incorporate
explicit-state model checking by state space exploration in J-Sim. It should also be mentioned that
our state space exploration framework checks assertions only. In our framework, the user specifies
the assertion as a Java method whose output is true/false.
However, one of the major challenges of model checking is the well-known state space explosion
problem, i.e., the state space of the system can be so prohibitively large that a model checker may
run out of memory. Several approaches to handling the state space explosion problem (e.g., partial
order reduction, symmetry, abstraction, just to name a few) can be found in [21]. In Chapter 9, we
give a brief overview of some of these techniques.
Before explaining the design and implementation of our SSE framework in J-Sim, it is mandatory
to first give a brief overview of network simulation in J-Sim.
2.3 Network Simulation in J-Sim
Modern data communication networks are extremely complex and do not lend well to theoretical
analysis. With computer/network entities and techniques interacting and interfering with one an-
other, theoretical network analysis can be rigorously made only after leaving out several (sometimes
subtle) details that cannot be easily captured in the mathematical analysis [19, 65, 75, 87]. As a
result, it may be more feasible to carry out simulation to study and evaluate the performance of
network entities and protocols, and interaction among them. Several existing network simulators
have been used for decades by network protocol designers, researchers and modelers to build simula-
tion models of network protocols, evaluate their performance with respect to pre-selected networking
metrics (e.g., system throughput, packet delivery ratio, and end-to-end delay) and re-design/refine
them if needed.
Most notable research efforts on network simulation include: NEtwork Simulation Testbed
(NEST) [28], The REalistic And Large (REAL) [54], ns-2 (ns version 2) [103], SSFNet [105], Glo-
MoSim [101], OPNET [104] and J-Sim [50, 108]. In this section, we explain network simulation in
J-Sim.
2.3.1 J-Sim Software Architecture
As indicated by Balci et al. in [7], developing modeling and simulation applications using the
component-based technology [18] is one of the strategic directions to achieve VV&A. J-Sim [50,108]
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is an open-source network simulation and emulation environment that is developed entirely in Java
on top of a component-based software architecture, called the autonomous component architecture
(ACA) [108], that closely mimics the integrated circuit (IC) design. The basic entities in the ACA
are components, which communicate with one another via sending/receiving data at their ports.
When data arrives at a port of a component, the component processes the data immediately in an
independent execution context (e.g., thread in Java).
We believe that the reason software design cannot achieve the same level of modularity as IC
design is because the object-oriented (OO) programming paradigm is fundamentally different from
hardware design in component binding. Specifically, in OO programming, a class makes direct
references to other class instances and makes function calls to those exposed by other class instances.
This implies that the binding is too strong in the sense that the caller has to know the exact names
of the callees. Because of that, it is difficult to develop and maintain an OO software system with
a large collection of functions and classes. In the course of debugging, one cannot obtain a clear
view of binding relations without delving into the implementation details and tracing codes line by
line. This yields unpredictability in software development and high maintenance cost, and is usually
termed as software crisis.
On the other hand, in IC design, an IC chip is a blackbox fully specified by the function speci-
fication and the input/output signal patterns in the databook. Changes in input signals trigger an
IC chip to perform certain function, and change, after a certain delay, its outputs according to the
chip specification. The fact that an IC chip is interfaced with other chips/modules/systems only
through its pins (and is otherwise shielded from the rest of the world) allows IC chips to be designed,
implemented, and tested, independent of everything else. In other words, at design time, an IC chip
is bound with a certain specification in the databook, instead of being bound to components that
interact with it. Component binding is thus deferred to the time when a system (e.g., ALU) is being
composed.
Following the same line of design principles of IC chips, how components in the ACA behave
(in terms of how a component handles and responds to data that arrives at a port) is specified at
the system design time in contracts, but component binding does not take place until the system
integration time when the system (e.g., a simulation model of a computer network) is being “com-
posed.” A contract specifies how an initiator (caller) and a reactor (callee) fulfill a certain function;
i.e., the causality of information exchange between components but not the components that may
participate in information exchange. Two components, acting respectively as the initiator and the
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reactor, are bound at the system integration time to fulfill the contract. A system with all the
components bound to one another is said to be complete, if the initiators of all involved contracts
are fulfilled. In some sense, the ACA realizes the notion of software IC [10] where an IC corresponds
to a component, pins correspond to ports, signals correspond to data that arrives at a port of a
component, and an IC specification corresponds to a contract.
2.3.2 J-Sim Features
With the separation of contract binding (at system design time) from component binding (at system
integration time), J-Sim provides a loosely-coupled component architecture, i.e., a component can be
individually designed, implemented and tested independently [50,108]. By closing the gap between
hardware and software ICs, the ACA realizes the objectives of composability [110]. Similar to
composing an electronic system (e.g., ALU) by interconnecting ICs via pins, building a simulation
model of a network protocol in J-Sim requires designing and implementing a set of components (e.g.,
senders, receivers, routers, links, and protocols that run within each router/host) and interconnecting
them via ports. Furthermore, the ACA realizes the objectives of extensibility and loose coupling
between individual components [108], which enable new components (e.g., a state space explorer)
to be included into J-Sim in a plug-and-play fashion.
On top of the ACA, a generalized packet-switched internetworking framework (called INET ) has
been laid based on common features extracted from the various layers in the network protocol stack.
Both the ACA and the INET have been implemented in Java, and the resulting code, along with
its scripting framework and GUI interfaces, is called J-Sim. Finally, an essential suite of wired and
wireless network components and protocols have been implemented in J-Sim. In [88, 89], we have
implemented, and evaluated the performance of, a simulation framework for wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) in J-Sim. Cross-layered approaches can be realized using the autonomous component
architecture by appropriately connecting the ports of a protocol class to those of another protocol
class (not immediately above/beneath the former protocol class). This allows information to be
used (and decision to be made) in a cross-layered manner.
J-Sim possesses several other desirable features. The fact that J-Sim is implemented in Java,
along with its ACA, makes J-Sim a truly platform-independent simulation environment. J-Sim
provides a script interface that allows its integration with different script languages such as Perl,
Tcl, or Python. In particular, the latest release of J-Sim (version 1.3) has been fully integrated
with a Java implementation of Tcl interpreter, called Jacl, with the Tcl/Java extension. Therefore,
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similar to ns-2 (ns version 2) [103], J-Sim is a dual-language simulation environment in which classes
are written in Java (for ns-2, in C++) and “wired” together using Tcl/Java1. However, unlike ns-2,
classes/methods/fields in Java need not be explicitly exported in order to be accessed in the Tcl
environment. Instead, all the public classes/methods/fields in Java can be accessed (naturally) in
the Tcl environment.
Interested readers are referred to [108] for a detailed qualitative comparison between J-Sim and
other network environments (such as ns-2 [103] and SSFNet [105]). Furthermore, we have conducted
a detailed quantitative comparative study [109] between J-Sim, ns-2 and SSFNet. The results of
our empirical study indicate that J-Sim demonstrates better scalability because of better memory
usage. In large-scale simulation scenarios (e.g., the number of nodes ≥ 18000), J-Sim outperforms
ns-2 and SSFNET in terms of the simulation setup time and the simulation completion time. In
small-scale simulation scenarios, the simulation completion time in J-Sim is no more than four times
larger than that in ns-2.
For all the reasons mentioned above, we believe that J-Sim is a promising candidate for the
network simulator to be extended with the state space exploration capability. However, we believe
that our technique can be implemented in other network simulators too. Furthermore, although we
propose our technique in the context of simulation of computer networks, the idea itself is generic
enough and can be applied to other application domains of simulation.





In this chapter, we elaborate on the state space exploration framework that we implemented in
J-Sim. In Section 3.1, we describe our design goals. In Section 3.2, we explain the verification
model. Section 3.3 gives a detailed explanation of the state space exploration process. Following
that, Section 3.4 mentions the implementation problems that we faced and how we solved them.
Finally, Section 3.5 summarizes what a user needs to do in order to verify the simulation model of
a network protocol.
3.1 Design Goals
While building the state space exploration framework in J-Sim, we had two major design goals in
mind:
1. The core design and implementation of J-Sim must not be modified.
2. Any modifications to the J-Sim simulation model of the network protocol must be minimal and
must not degrade the execution time of the J-Sim simulation model if a user is only interested
in using the model for performance evaluation purposes.
We believe that these two design goals should be also kept in mind if one desires to build a state
space exploration framework in any other (network) simulator.
Towards realizing the above design goals, we implement an explicit-state stateful state space
explorer in Java as a component in the ACA of J-Sim. The state space explorer executes the
J-Sim simulation model of the network protocol directly and explores the state space on-the-fly.
Specifically, the state space explorer starts from an initial state and generates successor states by
executing the events of the simulation model. This process continues until either a counterexample
disproving the assertion is found or the state space is explored up to a configurable maximum depth
(MAXDEPTH). In the former case, the state space explorer outputs a counterexample; i.e., the
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sequence of events that starts from the initial state and leads to violating the assertion. In the latter
case, the state space explorer reports a message stating that “No assertion violation was found”; this
does not mean that the simulation model does not violate the assertion and further testing is not
required. A violation of the assertion may exist at depths larger than MAXDEPTH. Furthermore,
the state space explorer may run out of memory (or take an excessively long amount of time) before
exploring the state space up to MAXDEPTH. Hence, the goal of our framework is not to prove
that the simulation model satisfies the assertions. Instead, the goal is to find violations of those
assertions if any exists given a certain budget of time and memory constraints.
3.2 The Verification Model
For the purpose of performance evaluation, a simulation model contains only components of the
real system that are relevant to measuring performance. Similarly, for the purpose of verification
using state space exploration, a verification model contains only components of the simulation model
that are relevant to state space exploration. In other words, we can ignore some attributes in the
simulation model for verification purposes and get a model which is bisimilar to the simulation
model. Formally, let L be the set of states in the simulation model, S be the set of states in the
verification model, and α : L 7−→ S be the mapping from L to S such that for any two states
l1, l2 ∈ L, if α(l1) = α(l2) then both α(l1) and α(l2) satisfy the same assertions. Now consider the
states l1, l2 ∈ L such that α(l1) = α(l2). Let l1 −→ l
′
1 denote executing an event in the simulation
model from state l1 to state l
′
1. The function α witnesses the bisimilarity of the simulation and




2 such that l2 −→ l
′
2
and α(l′1) = α(l
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Based on the formal conditions in the previous paragraph, one can see that there are two criteria
for one to ignore an attribute in the simulation model. First, forgetting it should result in no
“change of behavior”. Next, the attribute should not play a role in the checking of the assertion. An
example of an attribute that is part of the simulation model but not part of the verification model
is a fixed configuration parameter whose value does not change from one state to another (e.g., the
maximum number of times to try sending a packet). Another example is an ACA timer. Since we
do not consider the actual expiration times of a timer (see Section 3.4) and none of the assertions
considered in this thesis depend on time, the expiration time of an ACA timer is not included in
the verification model because it is irrelevant for state space exploration.
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Hence, the definition of the verification model may change if the assertion that is to be checked
changes, and it is the responsibility of the user to define the verification model and the mapping α
mentioned above. This is similar to changing the simulation model if the objectives of a performance
evaluation study change. Note that the verification model is not needed for measuring performance;
it is only needed for checking whether or not the simulation model satisfies the assertion. In contrast,
the simulation model is needed for state space exploration because the events are executed inside
the simulation model. This will be explained in more detail in Section 3.3.2.
3.2.1 Global States
Figure 3.1 illustrates the overall framework of incorporating state space exploration into J-Sim.
As shown in Figure 3.1, the state space explorer component interacts via ports with the protocol
entities P1, P2, ... , Pn, which are instances of the Java classes that implement the simulation model
of the network protocol. In order to explore the state space created by the simulation model, the
notion of the “state” has to be adequately defined in the verification model. To this end, the state
space explorer makes use of a class called GlobalState. The GlobalState class includes (some of) the
attributes of the entities as data members. In the verification model, a state is an instance of the
GlobalState class that assigns to each data member (i.e., attribute) a value. The implementation of
GlobalState differs from one network protocol to another; hence, it is the responsibility of the user
to provide an implementation of GlobalState. In addition, the user should also construct an initial
state in order for state space exploration to get started.
As shown in Figure 3.1, the state space explorer interacts via ports with three instances of
GlobalState, namely initialState (the initial state), currentState (the current state being explored)
and nextState (one of the possible successors of the current state). The contract needed to define
the information exchange between the state space explorer and the three instances of GlobalState is
implemented in the ModelCheckingGlobalStateContract class, which is a subclass of Contract, a key
J-Sim class that defines a contract. As mentioned in Section 2.3, a contract specifies the causality
of information exchange between components but not the components that may participate in the
information exchange. At the system design time, neither the initiator nor the reactor knows
the identity of the other. The connection between the initiator and the reactor (which is shown
using double-arrows in Figure 3.1) takes place only at the system integration time when the two
components are bound to fulfill the contract. This ensures a loosely-coupled component architecture.
Similarly, the ModelCheckingProtocolEntityContract class implements the contract needed to define
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Figure 3.1: Overall framework of state space exploration in J-Sim. The protocol entities P1, P2, ... ,
Pn constitute the simulation model whereas the initial state, current state and next state constitute
the verification model.
the information exchange between the state space explorer and the protocol entities.
Making the state space explorer take control of the simulation model in order to explore the (en-
tire) state space, rather than just exploring one single execution path as J-Sim traditionally does,
is achieved by having the state space explorer be the initiator of the ModelCheckingProtocolEntity-
Contract (ModelCheckingGlobalStateContract) contract, and having a protocol entity (global state)
be the reactor respectively.
3.2.2 Events
In each state in the state space, some events may or may not be enabled. Examples of events that are
common among various network protocols are: packet reception, packet loss and timeout. Enabled
events are parameterized; hence, an enabled event may generate multiple successor states depending
on the values of its parameters. For instance, a packet reception event may generate multiple
successor states because if the network contains K packets m1,m2, . . . ,mK whose destination is
node n and the network does not guarantee ordered packet delivery, K successor states can be
generated depending on which of the K packets is to be received by node n. On the other hand,
a node reboot event may generate only one successor state (namely the state of the node after
reboot). In the current implementation, the parameters of the events are limited to integer values.
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For example, in the packet reception event described above, the index i (0 ≤ i ≤ K − 1) of a packet
in the network is used as a parameter to determine which packet is to be received.
It is important to note that the number of possible successor states that an enabled event can
generate is state-dependent. In particular, an event may be enabled in one state but disabled in
another. It is the responsibility of the user to specify (a) the finite set of events that can occur,
(b) a function that dynamically determines the state-dependent number of possible successor states
that each event generates (zero if the event is disabled); we call this function the enabling function,
and (c) how each event is handled (i.e., an event handler function that makes a state change). Note
that the enabling function is part of the verification model whereas the event handlers are part of
the simulation model. This is because the user has to write the event handlers anyway in order to
have a working simulation model of the network protocol in J-Sim, even if he/she does not intend
to make use of the state space exploration framework for the purpose of verification.
3.2.3 State Space Graph
Although all the J-Sim simulation models are written in Java code and not in any formal definition
language, it is useful to formally define the state space graph created by the simulation model
of a network protocol, which we denote as JP K. After defining the global states (Section 3.2.1)
and the events (Section 3.2.2), JP K can be formally defined as the tuple (Σ, S,−→) where Σ is the
finite alphabet denoting the finite set of events that can occur, S is the set of global states, and
−→ ⊆ S × Σ× S is the transition relation.
If s, s′ ∈ S and e ∈ Σ, then we write (s, e, s′) ∈ −→ as s
e
−→ s′. To account for the fact that events
are parameterized, we introduce the following extra notation. For a pair of states s, s′ ∈ S and i is
an integer parameter of an event e such that s
e





−→ s′ ⇐⇒ ∃i, s
e(i)
−−→ s′.
Let φ be an assertion. We write s  φ to denote that the state s ∈ S satisfies φ.
3.3 The State Space Exploration Process
In this section, we give a detailed explanation of the state space exploration process.
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3.3.1 Stateful Search
Figure 3.2 shows the pseudo-code of the state space exploration procedure SSExploreAddNext(),
which is one of the main procedures in the state space explorer component (Figure 3.1). The two
major data structures in SSExploreAddNext() are ToBeExplored and AlreadyVisited. ToBeExplored
stores the states from which no event has been explored yet. AlreadyVisited stores the states, or the
hash codes of the states, that have already been visited.
If AlreadyVisited stores the states that have already been visited, a traditional explicit-state
state space explorer would avoid (re-)exploring a state s1 if the same, identical state were previously
visited, i.e., were in the data structure AlreadyVisited. Figure 3.2, on the other hand, presents a
modified explicit-state stateful search that avoids (re-)exploring a state s1 if another state s2 has
already been visited before, which (provably) simulates it. Informally, s1 is simulated by s2 (or s2
simulates s1) if the states that can be explored from s1 are also simulated by those that can be
explored from s2; hence, there is no need to explore states from s1. Formally, a simulation relation
is a binary relation R over the set of states S (i.e., R ⊆ S × S) such that for every pair of states
s1, s2 ∈ S, if (s1, s2) ∈ R then (1) for every assertion φ, s1  φ ⇐⇒ s2  φ, and (2) for each event e
that is enabled in s1, s1
e
−→ s′1 where s
′
1 ∈ S implies that e is also enabled in s2, and s2
e
−→ s′2 where




2) ∈ R. In this case, we say that s2 simulates s1 (or s1 is simulated by s2). We also
say that s1 and s2 are similar. Note that the simulation relation is a preorder; hence, it is reflexive
and transitive.
As part of the verification model, the user writes a function isSimulatedBy() such that a state
s1 is said to be simulated by another state s2 if s1.isSimulatedBy(s2) returns true. When the com-
munication between network entities is unreliable (i.e., when message delivery is neither guaranteed
nor ordered), which is typically the case for end-to-end protocols for wireless networks, there is a
very simple and natural simulation relation. Note that the state space of such protocols will consist
of states comprising of a protocol state (encoding information needed in modeling the specific proto-
col) and an unordered collection of messages that have been sent but not delivered. For states s and
s′ with identical protocol states, and with the additional property that every undelivered message
in s is also undelivered in s′ (s′ could have more undelivered messages), we observe that s′ simulates
s. For the examples in Chapters 4-5 we exploit this simulation relation. However, in general, a
user could potentially exploit specific details of the protocol to reveal a stronger simulation relation
(and hence a faster exploration of a larger state space). Hence, we leave the implementation of
isSimulatedBy() to the user.
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If AlreadyVisited stores the hash codes of the states that have already been visited instead of
the states themselves, then the user writes a function computeHashCode() that computes the hash
code of a state as part of the verification model. The state space exploration procedure would then
avoid (re-)exploring a state s1 if another state s2, having the same hash code as s1, has already been
visited before; i.e., s1.computeHashCode() exists in AlreadyVisited. The state space exploration
procedure in this case is different from, but a straightforward modification of, SSExploreAddNext()
(Figure 3.1) and we defer its detailed description and analysis to Chapter 7. In this chapter, we
focus on the case where AlreadyVisited stores the states themselves.
Regardless of whether AlreadyVisited stores the hash codes of states or the states themselves,
the goal of the stateful search in both cases is to turn the state space, which is usually a graph, into
a finite computation tree [21]. The root of this tree is the initial state. The depth of a node (i.e.,
state) s is the length of the path from the root to s. The tree is finite for two reasons: (1) the state
space is explored up to MAXDEPTH, and (2) the search is stateful.
3.3.2 Interaction with the State Space Explorer Component
SSExploreAddNext() starts with each of AlreadyVisited and ToBeExplored initially contains the ini-
tial state only (Figure 3.2, lines 3-4). As long as ToBeExplored is not empty (Figure 3.2, line 5),
SSExploreAddNext() removes a state from ToBeExplored and sets currentState to it (Figure 3.2, line
6). This operation is an example of information exchange that makes use of the ModelChecking-
GlobalStateContract contract. Specifically, the state space explorer is the initiator and currentState
is the reactor. The state space explorer sends currentState the state s that has been removed from
ToBeExplored. currentState responds by setting its attributes to the values assigned to them in the
state s.
For each state being explored (currentState), SSExploreAddNext() first determines the events
that are enabled in currentState by invoking GenerateEnabledEvents() (Figure 3.2, line 7). In Gen-
erateEnabledEvents(), the enabling function (Figure 3.2, line 27) returns the number of possible
successor states for each event (zero if the event is disabled). This operation is another example of
an information exchange that makes use of the ModelCheckingGlobalStateContract contract because
calculating the number of possible successor states is done inside the verification model. Gener-
ateEnabledEvents() returns EnabledEvents, which is a list of enabled events (Figure 3.2, line 30).
Each entry in EnabledEvents stores the corresponding event information EventInfo (Figure 3.2, line
29). Specifically, let each protocol entity have a unique ID p (Figure 3.2, line 25), each event have
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a unique ID e (Figure 3.2, line 26), and each enabled event has a set of integer-valued parameters
i where 0 ≤ i ≤ NumberOfNextStates − 1 (Figure 3.2, line 28), then each instance of EventInfo
stores p, e and i.
SSExploreAddNext() then generates each of the successor states (nextState) by calling the Gen-
erateNextState() function (Figure 3.2, line 10) for each enabled event, which in turn invokes the
corresponding event handler (Figure 3.2, line 34). Recall that the verification model is bisimilar to
the simulation model and obtained by ignoring attributes that are either fixed or irrelevant. What
this means is that if we instantiate the irrelevant variables with any values, execute the event in-
side the simulation model and then ignore the irrelevant/fixed attributes, we would be faithfully
executing a single step of the verification model. Hence, an event handler is only invoked from the
state space explorer but actually executed inside the simulation model; namely the protocol entities
themselves. Therefore, SSExploreAddNext() must first set the state of the protocol entities to the
state reflected in currentState before the execution of the event handler. This is achieved by the
CopyFromVModelToSModel() function call (Figure 3.2, line 32). CopyFromVModelToSModel() is
an example of an operation that makes use of both the ModelCheckingGlobalStateContract and the
ModelCheckingProtocolEntityContract contracts. Specifically, the state space explorer uses Mod-
elCheckingGlobalStateContract to query currentState, and currentState responds with the state of
the protocol entities reflected in it. Following that, the state space explorer uses ModelChecking-
ProtocolEntityContract to instruct the protocol entities to set their state to the state reflected in
currentState. Executing an event handler (Figure 3.2, line 34) is an example of an operation that
makes use of the ModelCheckingProtocolEntityContract contract, where the state space explorer
instructs a protocol entity to execute an event. After the execution of the event handler, the
CopyFromSModelToVModel() function is called (Figure 3.2, line 35) to perform the reverse opera-
tion; i.e., extract the new state information from the protocol entities and copy them to nextState.
CopyFromSModelToVModel() is another example of an operation that makes use of both the Mod-
elCheckingProtocolEntityContract and the ModelCheckingGlobalStateContract contracts. (Note that
CopyFromSModelToVModel() implements the mapping α mentioned in Section 3.2.) Following that,
SSExploreAddNext() sets the depth of nextState to one plus the depth of currentState (Figure 3.2,
line 11).
SSExploreAddNext() then checks whether nextState violates an assertion (Figure 3.2, line 12).
We here distinguish between two disjoint types of events:
1. safe event : generates a nextState that does not violate any assertion.
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1. procedure SSExploreAddNext()
2. initialState.depth = 0 ;
3. AlreadyVisited.add(initialState) ;
4. ToBeExplored.add(initialState) ;
5. while ( ToBeExplored is not empty ) {
6. currentState = ToBeExplored.remove() ;
7. EnabledEvents = GenerateEnabledEvents(currentState) ;
8. for ( int i = 0 ; i < EnabledEvents.size() ; i++ ) {
9. EventInfo E = EnabledEvents.get(i) ;
10. nextState = GenerateNextState(currentState, E) ;
11. nextState.setDepth(currentState.depth + 1) ; /* set the depth of nextState */
12. checkProperty = nextState.verifyAssertion() ;
13. if ( (checkProperty == false) AND (DoesCounterexampleContainEvent(nextState)) ) {
14. Print("Counterexample ") ;
15. printCounterexample(nextState) ;
16. exit ;
17. } else if ( (checkProperty == true) AND (nextState.depth < MAXDEPTH) ) {
18. if (nextState not simulated by any state in AlreadyVisited) { // use protocol-specific properties
19. if ( search strategy is BeFS ) {




} /* end if */
} /* end else if */
} /* end for */
} /* end while */
23. EventInfoList GenerateEnabledEvents(GlobalState currentState)
24. EnabledEvents = { } ;
25. for ( all protocol entities p ) { /* for all protocol entities */
26. for ( all possible events e ) { /* for all events */
27. NumberOfNextStates = EnablingFunction(currentState, p, e) ;
28. for ( int i = 0 ; i < NumberOfNextStates ; i++ ) { /* for all integer-valued parameters */
29. EnabledEvents.add(new EventInfo(p, e, i)) ;
} /* end for */
} /* end for */
} /* end for */
30. return EnabledEvents ;
31. GlobalState GenerateNextState(GlobalState currentState, EventInfo E)
32. CopyFromVModelToSModel(currentState) ;
33. nextState = currentState ; /* Start with nextState as a copy of currentState */
34. ExecuteEvent(E) ; /* Invoke E’s event handler */
35. CopyFromSModelToVModel(nextState) ;
36. return nextState ;
Figure 3.2: An explicit-state stateful state space exploration procedure. This procedure adds a state
being generated (i.e., nextState) to both AlreadyVisited (line 21) and ToBeExplored (line 22).
2. unsafe event : generates a nextState that violates an assertion.
Our state space exploration framework in J-Sim also allows the user to specify that a counterexample
has to contain at least one state that is generated due to a particular event. This requirement is
checked by calling the DoesCounterexampleContainEvent() function (Figure 3.2, line 13). (We have
made use of this feature in some of our experiments in Chapters 4-6 and 8.) If the user does not
want to make use of this feature, DoesCounterexampleContainEvent() always returns true.
If nextState violates an assertion (i.e., the case of an unsafe event) and DoesCounterexample-
ContainEvent() returns true, a counterexample is printed by calling the printCounterexample()
function (Figure 3.2, line 15), which is a recursive function that traces the state space backwards
from nextState until initialState is reached.
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If nextState does not violate an assertion (i.e., the case of a safe event) and the depth of nextState
in the state space is strictly less than the specified maximum depth MAXDEPTH (Figure 3.2, line
17), SSExploreAddNext() checks whether nextState is not simulated by any state in AlreadyVisited
(Figure 3.2, line 18). We here distinguish between three disjoint types of events:
1. deepest event : generates a nextState whose depth is equal to MAXDEPTH.
2. non-tree event : generates a nextState whose depth is strictly less than MAXDEPTH and
that is simulated by a state s in AlreadyVisited such that the depth of s is less than or equal
to the depth of nextState.
3. tree event : generates a nextState whose depth is strictly less than MAXDEPTH and that is
not simulated by any state s in AlreadyVisited such that the depth of s is less than or equal
to the depth of nextState.
Note that it is impossible that the depth of nextState is strictly greater than MAXDEPTH. In
Section 3.3.5, we provide an example that illustrates the definitions of tree, non-tree and deepest
events.
If the event that generated nextState is a safe tree event, nextState is added to ToBeExplored
(Figure 3.2, line 22) in order to be explored later and is also added to AlreadyVisited (Figure 3.2, line
21) to denote that it has been already visited. Adding a state to ToBeExplored or AlreadyVisited
requires a function that creates a copy of a state (e.g., clone()).
3.3.3 Different Search Strategies
Depending on the order in which states are added to, and removed from, ToBeExplored, SSExplore-
AddNext() can employ breadth-first (BFS), depth-first (DFS) and best-first (BeFS) search strategies.
Precisely, in BFS, ToBeExplored is implemented as a first-in first-out (FIFO) queue; in DFS, To-
BeExplored is implemented as a last-in first-out (LIFO) stack; whereas in BeFS, ToBeExplored is
implemented as a priority queue. We call these three search strategies: BFS-AN, DFS-AN and
BeFS-AN respectively1.
A best-first search strategy is implemented by state ranking. Specifically, as part of the verifica-
tion model, the user writes a function that maps each state to a BeFS tuple < b1, b2, . . . , bB−1, bB >
(Figure 3.2, line 20) based on protocol-specific properties. The state space explorer then considers
ToBeExplored as a priority queue in which states are ranked in decreasing lexicographical order of
1AN stands for “Add Next”.
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this tuple; i.e., a state s1 is considered “better than” a state s2 if s1 has a higher lexicographical
order of this tuple than s2.
Clearly, both DFS and BeFS are not level-order traversals of the state space. Hence, in order
to implement the stateful search correctly in these two cases, we limit the search in AlreadyVisited
(Figure 3.2, line 18) to the states whose depth is less than or equal to the depth of nextState.
Note that SSExploreAddNext() adds a state being generated (i.e., nextState) to AlreadyVisited
(Figure 3.2, line 21) only if nextState is not simulated by any state in AlreadyVisited. Another way
of implementing the explicit-state stateful search is to add a state being explored (i.e., currentState)
to AlreadyVisited only if currentState is not simulated by any state in AlreadyVisited. This state-
ful search, which we call SSExploreAddCurrent(), is shown in Figure 3.3. The difference between
SSExploreAddNext() and SSExploreAddCurrent() is that the former eagerly detects and eliminates
similar states while the latter lazily does so. In other words, SSExploreAddNext() emphasizes saving
memory at the expense of spending time for checking whether nextState is simulated by any state
in AlreadyVisited (Figure 3.2, line 18) whereas SSExploreAddCurrent() emphasizes saving the time
of this check until is needed (Figure 3.3, line 7) at the expense of allocating memory for (possibly
unnecessarily) adding nextState to ToBeExplored (Figure 3.3, line 22). The choice of eager versus
lazy detection of similar states may hence affect the time and memory costs of the state space
search. Since the number of similar states in a state space is generally unknown in advance and
the time and memory budgets may differ from one case study to another, we provide both types of
stateful searches in our framework. Similar to SSExploreAddCurrent(), SSExploreAddNext() can also
employ BFS, DFS and BeFS search strategies depending on the order in which states are added
to, and removed from, ToBeExplored. We call these three search strategies: BFS-AC, DFS-AC and
BeFS-AC respectively2.
A third way of implementing the explicit-state stateful search is a recursive depth-first search,
which does not make use of ToBeExplored but instead uses the program’s stack. We call this search
strategy: DFS-R (shown in Figure 3.4)3.
3.3.4 Different Randomized Search Strategies
The performance of each of the seven search strategies mentioned above depends on the order
in which enabled events are added to the list of enabled events EnabledEvents (Figure 3.2, line
29). SSExploreAddCurrent(), SSExploreAddNext() and SSExploreRecursiveDFS() assume a fixed search
2AC stands for “Add Current”.
3R stands for “Recursive”.
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1. procedure SSExploreAddCurrent()
2. initialState.depth = 0 ;
3. AlreadyVisited = { } ;
4. ToBeExplored.add(initialState) ;
5. while ( ToBeExplored is not empty ) {
6. currentState = ToBeExplored.remove() ;
7. if (currentState not simulated by any state in AlreadyVisited) { // use protocol-specific properties
8. AlreadyVisited.add(currentState) ;
9. EnabledEvents = GenerateEnabledEvents(currentState) ; /* See Figure 3.2 for GenerateEnabledEvents() */
10. for ( int i = 0 ; i < EnabledEvents.size() ; i++ ) {
11. EventInfo E = EnabledEvents.get(i) ;
12. nextState = GenerateNextState(currentState, E) ; /* See Figure 3.2 for GenerateNextState() */
13. nextState.setDepth(currentState.depth + 1) ; /* set the depth of nextState */
14. checkProperty = nextState.verifyAssertion() ;
15. if ( (checkProperty == false) AND (DoesCounterexampleContainEvent(nextState)) ) {
16. Print("Counterexample ") ;
17. printCounterexample(nextState) ;
18. exit ;
19. } else if ( (checkProperty == true) AND (nextState.depth < MAXDEPTH) ) {
20. if ( search strategy is BeFS ) {
21. nextState.computeBeFSTuple() ; /* use protocol-specific properties */
}
22. ToBeExplored.add(nextState) ;
} /* end else if */
} /* end for */
} /* end if */
} /* end while */
Figure 3.3: An explicit-state stateful state space exploration procedure. This procedure adds a
state being explored (i.e., currentState) to AlreadyVisited (line 8) and a state being generated (i.e.,
nextState) to ToBeExplored (line 22).
order; i.e., the order is the same each time the procedure executes. Specifically, the search order
determined by the three for loops (Figure 3.2, lines 25-29) is: increasing order of protocol entity IDs
p, increasing order of event IDs e and increasing order of event parameters i.
However, it has been shown in [30] that variations in the search order can give rise to very
large variations in state space exploration costs and assertion violation detection effectiveness. In
order to allow for search order variations, we implement randomized versions of SSExploreAddCur-
rent(), SSExploreAddNext() and SSExploreRecursiveDFS(). Similar to [29], randomization is achieved
by shuﬄing the set of enabled events at each state being explored using a Fisher-Yates shuﬄing
algorithm [56]. Hence, the order of enabled events in EnabledEvents is randomized each time the
function GenerateEnabledEvents() executes (Figure 3.2 (line 7), Figure 3.3 (line 9) and Figure 3.4
(line 8)). Randomization in the shuﬄe follows a pseudo-random sequence whose seed is passed
as a parameter to the state space exploration framework. We call the corresponding seven ran-
domized search strategies: BFS-ANS, DFS-ANS, BeFS-ANS, BFS-ACS, DFS-ACS, BeFS-ACS and
DFS-RS.4 We do not compare between the randomized and non-randomized versions of the search
strategies in this thesis.




2. initialState.depth = 0 ;
3. AlreadyVisited.add(initialState) ;
4. RecursiveDFS(initialState) ;
5. procedure RecursiveDFS(GlobalState s)
6. currentState = s ;
7. temp = currentState ; /* save a copy of current state */
8. EnabledEvents = GenerateEnabledEvents(currentState) ; /* See Figure 3.2 for GenerateEnabledEvents() */
9. for ( int i = 0 ; i < EnabledEvents.size() ; i++ ) {
10. EventInfo E = EnabledEvents.get(i) ;
11. nextState = GenerateNextState(currentState, E) ; /* See Figure 3.2 for GenerateNextState() */
12. nextState.setDepth(currentState.depth + 1) ; /* set the depth of nextState */
13. checkProperty = nextState.verifyAssertion() ;
14. if ( (checkProperty == false) AND (DoesCounterexampleContainEvent(nextState)) ) {
15. Print("Counterexample ") ;
16. printCounterexample(nextState) ;
17. exit ;
18. } else if ( (checkProperty == true) AND (nextState.depth < MAXDEPTH) ) {
19. if (nextState not simulated by any state in AlreadyVisited) { // use protocol-specific properties
20. AlreadyVisited.add(nextState) ;
21. RecursiveDFS(nextState) ;
22. currentState = temp ; /* restore current state */
} /* end if */
} /* end else if */
} /* end for */
Figure 3.4: An explicit-state stateful state space exploration procedure. SSExploreRecursiveDFS()
employs a recursive depth-first search that does not make use of ToBeExplored. This procedure adds
a state being generated (i.e., nextState) to AlreadyVisited (line 20).
3.3.5 An Example
In this section, we provide an example of a state space graph and some examples of its exploration.
Consider the state space graph shown in Figure 3.5. s0 is the initial state. Each state is simulated
by itself since a simulation relation is reflexive. Assume further that s4 is simulated by s2 and s7 is
simulated by s5. For simplicity, we assume that none of the states violates an assertion.
Figure 3.6 shows four different state space explorations of the state space graph in Figure 3.5.
We assume that MAXDEPTH = 3. The order in which a state is visited is shown at the top left
corner of a state. Solid edges correspond to tree events, dashed edges correspond to non-tree events,
and dotted edges correspond to deepest events. The stateful search turned the state space graph
into a tree. The initial state is the root of the tree. The states generated by the tree events are the
interior nodes while the states generated by the non-tree and deepest events are the leaves of the
tree. Non-tree events make the search stateful. Deepest and non-tree events make the tree finite.
3.4 Implementation Problems and Solutions
We have encountered two major implementation problems in the course of incorporating the state
space explorer into J-Sim: one is related to how network protocol entities communicate with each








Figure 3.5: An example state space graph. s0 is the initial state. Each state is simulated by itself
since a simulation relation is reflexive. Assume further that s4 is simulated by s2 and s7 is simulated
by s5.
section, we describe both problems and how we solve them while keeping our two design goals met.
Without verification using state space exploration, the protocol entities communicate with each
other via ports. However, when the simulation model is being verified and the state space explorer
is used as shown in Figure 3.1, the protocol entities need to communicate with each other via the
state space explorer. Initially, we simply connected the ports of each protocol entity to those of the
state space explorer, but then found that protocol-specific data/control messages generated by the
protocol entities during the execution of an event handler (Figure 3.2, line 34) may not be forwarded
to the state space explorer at the required time. This is because the state space explorer does not
wait until the protocol entities finish executing an event handler. This may cause the state space
explorer to exclude some of the new state’s information in nextState (Figure 3.2, line 35). We solve
this problem by setting the ports that are involved in the interaction between the state space explorer
and the protocol entities to the function-call execution model instead of the default independence
execution model [108]. Figure 3.7 shows the two execution models supported by the ACA. In the
function-call execution model, the state space explorer (Component A in Figure 3.7) waits until
a protocol entity (Component B in Figure 3.7) finishes executing an event handler; therefore, this
solution ensures that all the new state’s information will be included in nextState.
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(d) Another DFS-RS exploration.
Figure 3.6: Examples of state space explorations of the state space graph shown in Figure 3.5.
MAXDEPTH = 3. The order in which a state is visited is shown at the top left corner of a state.
Solid edges correspond to tree events, dashed edges correspond to non-tree events, and dotted edges
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(b) Function-call execution model
Figure 3.7: The execution models supported by the ACA. (This figure is excerpted from [108].)
hence, it might violate our second design goal. In order to keep our design goals met, we prefer
making this modification in a subclass of the Java class that implements the simulation model of a
network protocol entity, thus keeping the original parent Java class unmodified and ensuring that
the J-Sim simulation model execution time will not degrade if the user is only interested in using the
model for performance evaluation purposes. For a similar reason, we set the ports that are involved
in the interaction between the state space explorer and the global states to the function-call execution
model.
The second problem is related to the ACA timers, which are used to model timers (e.g., re-
transmission timers) in network simulation models in J-Sim. Without verification using state space
exploration, a protocol entity that uses an ACA timer sets the timer to a pre-determined time
interval. When the timer expires, a timeout() callback function is invoked to handle the timeout
event if the timer is still active (i.e., has not already been canceled). If the simulation model is to
be verified, the state space explorer should explore all the possible events from a given state, and
should not be limited to a single timeout value for each timer. Instead, the state space explorer
should trigger the timeout event when that event may occur in the real world. For example, a
typical retransmission timer in a reliable unicast protocol may expire at any time as long as there is
a pending data message that has been sent but not yet acknowledged. (We assume that the setting
of the interval of a timer may differ from one run of the simulation to another (which is typically the
case, especially if a pseudo-random number sequence is used for generating the interval of a timer);
otherwise, this approach may suffer from excessive false positives.)
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A possible solution to this problem is to modify the implementation of the setTimeout() method
defined in class Module, a key J-Sim class that has a timer port used to set up (and cancel) timers.
However, this solution requires modifying the core implementation of J-Sim, and hence violates our
first design goal. In order to keep our design goals met, we choose to make this modification in a
subclass of the Java class that implements the simulation model of a network protocol entity.
3.5 Role of the User
It should be noticed that the state space exploration process is not fully automated. We summarize
below what the user needs to do, in order to verify the simulation model of a network protocol.
1. States: Provide an implementation of GlobalState (including writing the assertion as a Java
method and a function that creates a copy of a state), and specify how to construct the initial
state. To reduce the user’s burden, we provide an implementation of a class, called SystemState,
that includes the protocol-independent information (e.g., the depth of a state and which event
generated the state). GlobalState, which should be implemented as a sub-class of SystemState,
includes the protocol-specific information.
2. Events: Specify (a) the set of events that exist in the network protocol, (b) the Enabling-
Function() that returns the state-dependent number of possible successor states that an event
generates; zero if the event is disabled, and (c) how each event is handled. (As mentioned
above, the user has to write the event handlers anyway in order to have a working simulation
model of the network protocol in J-Sim.)
3. Enabling the Stateful Search: In order to enable the stateful search, the user needs to
implement either isSimulatedBy() or computeHashCode(); the former is needed only if Al-
readyVisited stores the states that have already been visited whereas the latter is needed
only if AlreadyVisited stores the hash codes of the states that have already been visited.
isSimulatedBy() determines based on protocol-specific properties, whether two states are
similar. Observe that there is a general simulation relation that can be exploited when the
communication is assumed to be unreliable (Section 3.3.1). computeHashCode() computes
the hash code of a state.
4. State Ranking: In order to enable a best-first search strategy, the user needs to write the
Java method computeBeFSTuple() (Figure 3.2 (line 20) and Figure 3.3 (line 21)) that maps
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each state to a tuple < b1, b2, . . . , bB−1, bB > based on protocol-specific properties such that a
state s1 is considered “better than” a state s2 if s1 has a higher lexicographical order of this
tuple than s2.
5. Interaction with the State Space Explorer: Provide implementations for the operations
that involve information exchange with the state space explorer component (e.g., CopyFromV-
ModelToSModel() and CopyFromSModelToVModel()). To facilitate programming, we made
use of ports and contracts to provide a seamless interface between components; in this case,
between the state space explorer on one side and either the protocol entities or the global
states on the other side (see Figure 3.1). In addition, the user needs to modify the Java class
that implements the simulation model of a network protocol entity (or preferably its subclass),
as explained in Section 3.4, to facilitate interaction with the state space explorer.
It is important to note that making use of protocol-specific properties for the simulation rela-
tion and state ranking is done in the verification model and is hence isolated from both the state
space explorer and the simulation model. This ensures that the state space exploration framework
is general enough and not tied to a particular network protocol or communication mechanism. Fur-
thermore, this allows the user to try several simulation relations and/or state ranking mechanisms
until a counterexample is found within a certain budget of time and/or memory. In the following




In this chapter, we apply the J-Sim state space exploration framework to the J-Sim simulation
model of the Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector routing protocol for wireless ad-hoc networks. In
Section 4.1, we give an overview of AODV’s key functionality. In Section 4.2, we describe the steps
that we follow to verify its simulation model including how we exploit protocol-specific properties. In
Section 4.3, we present the results of this verification. In Section 4.4, we compare the performance
of our state space exploration framework in J-Sim to that of Java PathFinder (JPF) [52, 111], a
state-of-the-art model checker for Java programs. Finally, in Section 4.5, we summarize the lessons
that we learned in this case study.
The J-Sim simulation model of AODV (not including the J-Sim library) has about 1200 lines
of code. We conduct all the experiments on a dual-processor Intel Xeon 2.8 GHz machine running
Linux version 2.6.17 with 2 GB memory. We use Sun’s 1.5.0 04-b05 Java HotSpotTM Client VM
with 0.5 GB initial heap size and 1.5 GB maximum heap size.
4.1 Overview of AODV
The Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [78] is a well-known and widely
used reactive routing protocol for multihop wireless ad-hoc networks. AODV is reactive in the sense
that a route to a given destination is established via a route discovery process only when it is needed
by a source node (i.e., traffic-driven). In this section, we describe the J-Sim simulation model of
AODV, which is based on AODV Draft (version 11) [77].
In AODV, each node n in the ad-hoc network maintains a routing table. For node n, a routing
table entry (RTE) to a destination node d contains the following fields: a destination address destn,d
(the address of the destination d), a next hop address nexthopn,d (the address of the node to which
n forwards data packets destined for node d), a hop count hopsn,d (the number of hops needed to
reach node d from node n), a destination sequence number seqnon,d (a measure of the freshness of
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the route information), and a flag isV alidn,d (representing whether the RTE is valid or invalid).
Each RTE is associated with a lifetime. Periodically, a route timeout event is triggered invali-
dating (but not deleting) all the RTEs that have not been used (e.g., to send or forward packets to
the destination) for a time interval that is greater than the lifetime. Invalidating a RTE involves
setting isV alidn,d to false, incrementing seqnon,d and setting hopsn,d to ∞.
Each node n also maintains two monotonically increasing counters: a node sequence number
seqnon (whose initial value is 2) and a broadcast ID bidn (whose initial value is 1). When node
n requires a route to a destination d, if it does not already have a valid RTE to node d, it first
creates an invalid RTE to node d with hopsn,d set to ∞ and seqnon,d set to zero. Following that,
node n increments seqnon, broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet containing the following
fields < n, seqnon, bidn, d, seqnon,d, hopCountq > and then increments bidn. The hopCountq field
is initialized to 1. The pair < n, bidn > uniquely identifies a RREQ packet.
Each node m, receiving the RREQ packet from node n, keeps the pair < n, bidn > in a broadcast
ID cache so that it can later check if it has already received a RREQ with the same source address
and broadcast ID. If so, the incoming RREQ packet is discarded. If not, node m either satisfies the
RREQ by unicasting a route reply (RREP) packet back to node n if it has a fresh enough route to
node d (or it is node d itself), or rebroadcasts the RREQ to its own neighbors after incrementing
the hopCountq field if it does not have a fresh enough route to node d (nor is itself node d). An
intermediate node m determines whether it has a fresh enough route to node d by comparing the
destination sequence number seqnom,d in its own RTE with the seqnon,d field in the RREQ packet.
Each intermediate node also records a reverse route to the requesting node n; this reverse route
will be used to send/forward route replies to node n. The requesting node’s sequence number seqnon
is used to maintain the freshness of this reverse route. Each entry in the broadcast ID cache has a
lifetime. Periodically, a broadcast ID timeout event is triggered causing the deletion of entries in
the cache that have expired.
A RREP packet, which is sent by an intermediate node m, contains the following fields <
n, d, seqnom,d, hopCountp >. The hopCountp field is initialized to 1+hopsm,d. If it is the destination
d that sends the RREP packet, it first increments seqnod and then sends a RREP packet containing
the following fields < n, d, seqnod, 1 >. The unicast RREP travels back to the requesting node n via
the reverse route. Each intermediate node along the reverse route sets up a forward pointer to the
node from which the RREP came, thus establishing a forward route to the destination d, increments
the hopCountp field and forwards the RREP packet to the next hop towards n.
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If node m offers node n a new route to node d, node n compares seqnom,d (the destination
sequence number of the offered route) to seqnon,d (the destination sequence number of the current
route), and accepts the route with the greater sequence number. If the sequence numbers are equal,
the offered route is accepted only if it has a smaller hop count than the hop count in the RTE; i.e.,
hopsn,d > hopsm,d.
4.2 Verifying the Simulation Model of AODV
We next present the steps that we follow to verify the J-Sim simulation model of AODV. These
steps constitute a generic methodology for verifying the simulation model of any network protocol
in J-Sim.
Step 1. States: Definitions of the global state, the initial state, and the
assertion
We define GlobalState as a tuple that has two components, namely the protocol state and the network
cloud. The protocol state is an array of N node states where N is the number of nodes in the ad-hoc
network. The node state of a node n includes n’s routing table, broadcast ID cache, seqnon and bidn.
The network cloud models the network as an unbounded multiset that contains AODV packets, and
also maintains the neighborhood information. A broadcast AODV packet whose source is node s is
modeled as a set of packets, each of which is destined for one of the neighbors (i.e., the nodes that
are within the transmission range) of node s.
In the initial global state, the network does not contain any packets and the AODV process at
each node is initialized as specified by the J-Sim simulation model of AODV. Specifically, the AODV
process starts with an empty routing table, empty broadcast ID cache, seqnon = 2 and bidn = 1.
An important assertion in a routing protocol such as AODV is the loop-free property. Intuitively,
a node must not occur at two points on a path between two other nodes; therefore, at each hop
along a path from a node n to a destination d, either the destination sequence number must increase
or the hop count toward the destination must decrease. Formally, consider two nodes n and m
such that both nodes have valid RTEs to some destination d, and m is the next hop of n to d; i.e.,
nexthopn,d = m. The loop-free property can be expressed as follows [16,68]:
((seqnon,d < seqnom,d) ∨ (seqnon,d == seqnom,d ∧ hopsn,d > hopsm,d))
38
Informally, the loop-free property requires that either m has a more fresh RTE to d than that of n
(i.e., an RTE with a greater destination sequence number) or m has a shorter route that is equally
fresh.
Step 2. Events
Next, we specify the set of events, when each event is enabled and the corresponding EnablingFunc-
tion(), and how each event is handled. We classify the events into two categories: node events (i.e.,
events that are triggered inside a node) and network events (i.e., events that are triggered inside the
network). The events in each category are listed as follows:
1. Node Events
T0 Initiation of a route request by node n to a destination d 6= n: This event is enabled if
node n does not have a valid RTE to the destination d. When enabled, EnablingFunc-
tion(currentState, n, T0) returns 1. The event is handled by creating an invalid RTE to
node d with hopsn,d set to ∞, incrementing seqnon, and then broadcasting a RREQ.
T1 Restart of the AODV process at node n: This event may take place because of a node
reboot. This event is always enabled; i.e., EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T1) always
returns 1. The event is handled by reinitializing the state of the AODV process at node
n.
T2 Broadcast ID timeout at node n: This event is enabled if there is at least one entry in
the broadcast ID cache of node n. When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T2)
returns the number of entries in the broadcast ID cache of node n. The event is handled
by deleting an entry from the broadcast ID cache of node n.
T3 Timeout of the route to destination d at node n 6= d: This event is enabled if node n has
a valid RTE to node d. When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T3) returns 1.
The event is handled by invalidating this RTE.
2. Network Events
T4 Delivering an AODV packet to node n: This event is enabled if the network contains at
least one AODV packet such that node n is the destination (or the next hop towards the
destination) of the packet and node n is one of the neighbors of the source of the packet.
When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T4) returns the number of the AODV
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packets that satisfy these conditions. The event is handled by removing one of these
AODV packets from the network and forwarding it to node n in order to be processed as
explained in Section 4.1.
T5 Loss of an AODV packet destined for node n: This event is enabled if the network
contains at least one AODV packet that is destined for node n. When enabled, Enabling-
Function(currentState, n, T5) returns the number of the AODV packets that satisfy this
condition. The event is handled by removing one of these AODV packets from the net-
work.
Step 3. Simulation Relation
We use the general simulation relation outlined in the introduction and Section 3.3. For AODV
specifically it reduces to the following definition. A state s2 is said to simulate a state s1 if (i)
s1 and s2 have the same neighborhood information, (ii) for each AODV packet in s1, there is
a corresponding equivalent AODV packet in s2, and (iii) for each node n, s1 and s2 have equal
corresponding values for seqnon, bidn, and node n’s routing table and broadcast ID cache (each
viewed as an unordered set of entries).
In Appendix A, we argue that this relation is a simulation relation.
Step 4. State Ranking: Exploiting protocol-specific properties
Recall from Chapter 3 that in order to enable a best-first search strategy, the user needs to write
a Java method that maps each state to a tuple < b1, b2, . . . , bB−1, bB > based on protocol-specific
properties such that a state s1 is considered “better than” a state s2 if s1 has a higher lexicographical
order of this tuple than s2.
A suitable BeFS heuristic for exploring the state space of AODV can be obtained by inspecting
the loop-free property. A node, which does not have a valid RTE to any node, does not affect the
truth value of the loop-free property. Therefore, a suitable BeFS heuristic (which we call AODV-1-
BeFS) is to consider a state s1 better than a state s2 if the number of valid RTEs to any node in
s1 is greater than that in s2. In other words, the BeFS tuple, assigned to a state s, consists of one
component < b1 > such that b1 is the number of valid RTEs to any node in s.
Another BeFS heuristic (which we call AODV-2-BeFS) is obtained by inspecting the loop-free
property, which can be rewritten as follows:
(((seqnon,d − seqnom,d) < 0) ∨ (seqnon,d == seqnom,d ∧ ((hopsm,d − hopsn,d) < 0)))
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Therefore, the greater (seqnon,d−seqnom,d) and/or (hopsm,d−hopsn,d) in a state s, the more likely
s is close to an assertion violation. Hence, AODV-2-BeFS considers a state s1 better than a state
s2 if the following summation
Md =
∑
n6=d((seqnon,d − seqnom,d) + (hopsm,d − hopsn,d))
in s1 is greater than that in s2, where nexthopn,d = m. In other words, the BeFS tuple, assigned
to a state s, consists of one component < b1 > such that b1 = Md. Note that the summation Md is
specific to a certain destination d; hence, AODV-2-BeFS requires considering only one destination
node (as we do in Section 4.3). The summation Md includes only the nodes n and m that have valid
RTEs to the destination d. If none of the nodes have a valid RTE to node d, Md is set to −∞ (i.e.,
worst or least interesting state).
In addition to AODV-1-BeFS and AODV-2-BeFS, we also consider the following BeFS heuristics:
1. AODV-3-BeFS: Similar to AODV-2-BeFS, AODV-3-BeFS requires considering only one desti-
nation node d. This heuristic assigns to a state s a BeFS tuple that consists of two components
< b1, b2 > such that b1 is the number of valid RTEs to the destination d in s, and b2 is the
number of valid RTEs to any node in s.
2. AODV-4-BeFS: Since a valid RTE is established upon receiving a RREP packet, AODV-4-
BeFS assigns to a state s a BeFS tuple that consists of one component < b1 > such that b1 is
the number of RREP packets in s.
3. AODV-5-BeFS: AODV-5-BeFS assigns to a state s a BeFS tuple that consists of two compo-
nents < b1, b2 > such that b1 is the number of RREP packets in s (as in AODV-4-BeFS), and
b2 is the number of valid RTEs to any node in s.
4.3 Results of the Verification
Clearly, the state space created by the J-Sim simulation model of AODV is infinite. Furthermore,
there is an infinite number of possible initial states depending on the number of nodes and the
network topology. As an attempt towards handling the state space explosion problem, we (1)
consider an initial state of an ad-hoc network consisting of N nodes: n0, n1, . . . , nN−1 arranged
in a chain topology where each node is a neighbor of both the node to its left and the node to
its right (if any exists); i.e., all wireless links are assumed to be bidirectional, and (2) reduce the
number of events and states by considering only one destination node nN−1. Therefore, all RREQ
41
packets request a route to node nN−1 and the route timeout event invalidates the RTE to node nN−1
only. Furthermore, the loop-free property checks the absence of routing loops to node nN−1 only.
Although this scenario is simple, it ensures that nodes n0, n1, . . . , nN−3 require multihop routes to
reach node nN−1; i.e., AODV multihop routing is needed. In addition, if an assertion is violated in
a chain network topology, it may also be violated in an arbitrary network topology.
While verifying the J-Sim simulation model of AODV in a chain network topology consisting of
N = 3 nodes, we have discovered an assertion violation (which we call Counterexample 1) in the
AODV simulation model caused by its failure to follow a part of the AODV specification [77] that
determines certain actions that must be taken after a node reboot. Conceptually, if nexthop0,2 = 1
and the AODV process at node n1 restarts due to a node reboot, the net effect is that all the RTEs
stored at node n1 will be deleted. As a result, node n1 may later accept a route that was offered
by node n2 with a lower sequence number than that of node n0 (i.e., seqno0,2 > seqno1,2), hence
violating the loop-free property. We also manually injected two errors (which we call Counterex-
amples 2 and 3 respectively): in Counterexample 2, seqnon,d is not incremented when a RTE is
invalidated and in Counterexample 3, a RTE is deleted (instead of invalidated) when its lifetime
expires. The state space exploration framework was able to find these two errors too.1 A routing
loop may occur due to either of these two errors. This is because in the case that nexthop0,2 = 1
and a route timeout event takes place at node n1, in either Counterexample 2 or 3, if n1 is later
offered a route to node n2 by node n0, this route will be accepted (because in Counterexample 2,
hops1,2 = ∞; hence, hops1,2 > hops0,2; whereas in Counterexample 3, seqno0,2 > seqno1,2). The
interested reader is referred to Appendix B for detailed traces (along with the explanations) of the
three counterexamples.
Table 4.1 gives the performance of the various randomized search strategies, for finding each of
the three counterexamples, with respect to the following two types of performance evaluation criteria:
(a) platform-independent ; namely, the number of events executed and the number of states stored
in memory (sum of the sizes of AlreadyVisited and ToBeExplored)2, and (b) platform-dependent ;
namely, the time needed to find an assertion violation. In Table 4.1, AlreadyVisited stores the states
that have already been visited and the stateful search depends on the simulation relation. We ran
100 experiments for each search strategy. Each experiment has a different seed, but the same set
1For Counterexamples 2 and 3, we require that the counterexample contain at least one state that is generated
due to the route timeout event, T3. In order to achieve that, we made use of the DoesCounterexampleContainEvent()
function provided by the state space exploration framework (Figures 3.2-3.4).
2Note that we do not report the total number of states generated because it is simply equal to the number of
events executed plus 1 (to account for the initial state).
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of 100 seeds were used for each of the seven search strategies. For each performance evaluation
criterion, we report the minimum, the maximum and the average values.
Counterexample 1 Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
MAXDEPTH = 10 Min Max Average Min Max Average Min Max Average
DFS-RS 0.290 14.773 4.727 117 2069 971.09 1175 30669 13566.29
BFS-ACS 7.445 25.013 15.854 10112 19463 15206.02 14513 28182 21933.33
DFS-ACS 0.133 15.577 4.751 98 2130 1018.12 285 30530 13542.06
AODV-1-BeFS-ACS 0.477 4.142 1.246 423 1587 727.86 1900 13123 4898.39
AODV-2-BeFS-ACS 0.192 16.592 4.165 157 2176 908.16 411 31310 11102.91
AODV-3-BeFS-ACS 0.347 4.278 1.030 280 1594 609.81 1148 13433 3746.18
AODV-4-BeFS-ACS 0.375 6.769 2.322 262 2266 1042.60 1463 19004 9040.47
AODV-5-BeFS-ACS 0.489 3.041 1.611 319 1628 1034.66 2063 11562 6958.73
BFS-ANS 35.552 129.806 79.759 4475 8101 6430.43 14513 28182 21933.33
DFS-ANS 0.142 14.422 4.671 94 1961 979.60 251 27416 13268.05
AODV-1-BeFS-ANS 0.483 5.351 1.463 440 1542 726.72 1633 12432 4575.70
AODV-2-BeFS-ANS 0.183 16.219 3.899 176 2148 888.96 355 29793 10373.95
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 0.343 5.379 1.202 345 1564 627.70 1091 12868 3529.72
AODV-4-BeFS-ANS 0.372 8.237 2.603 195 1978 913.52 1442 17638 8372.29
AODV-5-BeFS-ANS 0.493 4.328 2.207 236 1529 947.65 2008 11384 6778.21
Counterexample 2 Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
MAXDEPTH = 10 Min Max Average Min Max Average Min Max Average
DFS-RS 0.169 37.138 9.439 47 3492 1432.37 381 49553 20355.26
BFS-ACS 7.819 27.636 17.280 10056 20321 15928.23 14428 29704 23030.89
DFS-ACS 0.397 32.664 9.342 198 3339 1472.73 1661 46158 20222.31
AODV-1-BeFS-ACS 0.088 15.788 4.034 84 2448 866.31 97 30166 8997.88
AODV-2-BeFS-ACS 0.210 39.989 6.974 169 3647 1174.64 492 51171 14738.62
AODV-3-BeFS-ACS 0.098 15.726 3.557 97 2486 692.41 124 30295 7218.30
AODV-4-BeFS-ACS 0.807 11.692 6.313 688 2851 1855.61 3933 26449 17422.37
AODV-5-BeFS-ACS 0.426 8.512 2.819 345 2530 1158.91 1613 21288 8679.10
BFS-ANS 36.106 130.238 82.658 4484 8370 6712.08 14428 29704 23030.89
DFS-ANS 0.238 35.339 8.927 123 3342 1380.25 764 47306 19133.05
AODV-1-BeFS-ANS 0.120 17.817 4.530 97 2399 852.34 97 30088 8772.99
AODV-2-BeFS-ANS 0.209 35.715 6.881 174 3510 1175.56 480 48319 14076.26
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 0.125 17.526 3.892 108 2425 695.41 112 29830 7059.34
AODV-4-BeFS-ANS 1.007 15.618 7.591 622 2638 1665.14 3747 26278 16729.05
AODV-5-BeFS-ANS 0.444 11.444 3.752 329 2248 1014.04 1563 21345 8516.39
Counterexample 3 Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
MAXDEPTH = 10 Min Max Average Min Max Average Min Max Average
DFS-RS 0.228 13.211 4.794 80 1899 967.88 796 28678 13916.49
BFS-ACS 7.395 23.643 16.295 10140 18560 15181.45 14662 27348 22231.78
DFS-ACS 0.155 17.913 4.435 94 2065 960.95 329 28543 12902.70
AODV-1-BeFS-ACS 0.089 3.397 1.080 84 1490 582.81 102 11995 4119.79
AODV-2-BeFS-ACS 0.215 14.788 3.353 149 2081 802.72 600 28588 9441.64
AODV-3-BeFS-ACS 0.096 3.531 0.837 95 1494 459.12 126 12366 2968.35
AODV-4-BeFS-ACS 0.380 5.405 1.911 257 1914 907.43 1480 15894 7844.89
AODV-5-BeFS-ACS 0.421 1.266 0.681 303 848 506.62 1617 6022 3043.93
BFS-ANS 32.710 107.542 73.664 4378 7426 6163.44 14662 27348 22231.78
DFS-ANS 0.154 16.334 3.973 90 1955 877.15 305 27291 11896.59
AODV-1-BeFS-ANS 0.119 4.138 1.290 97 1427 568.49 97 11583 3909.00
AODV-2-BeFS-ANS 0.209 11.673 3.085 151 1821 796.99 557 24905 8819.96
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 0.125 4.318 0.972 108 1403 453.03 116 11915 2797.03
AODV-4-BeFS-ANS 0.372 7.219 2.159 209 1795 810.34 1467 16239 7457.34
AODV-5-BeFS-ANS 0.441 1.602 0.789 240 816 465.90 1571 5990 2993.95
Table 4.1: AODV case study: Time and space requirements (sum of the sizes of AlreadyVisited and
ToBeExplored) and the number of events executed for finding the three counterexamples in a 3-node
chain ad-hoc network using several randomized search strategies. AlreadyVisited stores the states
that have already been visited and the stateful search depends on the simulation relation.
As shown in Table 4.1, AODV-1-BeFS-ACS (AODV-1-BeFS-ANS)3 achieves significant reduc-
tion with respect to the evaluation criteria when compared to other standard search strategies such
as BFS-ACS and DFS-ACS (BFS-ANS and DFS-ANS) respectively. Also, the choice of the BeFS
3We explain the notation as follows: AODV-1-BeFS denotes the BeFS heuristic itself whereas AODV-1-BeFS-ACS
denotes the BeFS-ACS search strategy when making use of the AODV-1-BeFS heuristic.
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heuristic has an impact on the performance. As shown in Table 4.1, AODV-2-BeFS-ACS (AODV-
2-BeFS-ANS) performs worse than AODV-1-BeFS-ACS (AODV-1-BeFS-ANS) for the three coun-
terexamples. This is because AODV-2-BeFS requires that a node (and its next hop towards the
destination) have valid RTEs to the destination. This may not be true in the first few stages (i.e.,
lower depths) of the search space. Therefore, in the first few stages of the search, the non-visited
states may look equally good and thus, AODV-2-BeFS may not be able to explore the states that
are most likely to lead to the assertion violation first. AODV-3-BeFS tackles this problem by fur-
ther differentiating equally good states by using a two-level BeFS heuristic. Hence, as shown in
Table 4.1, AODV-3-BeFS-ACS and AODV-5-BeFS-ACS (AODV-3-BeFS-ANS and AODV-5-BeFS-
ANS) respectively outperform AODV-2-BeFS-ACS and AODV-4-BeFS-ACS (AODV-2-BeFS-ANS
and AODV-4-BeFS-ANS) because they are able to better guide the best-first search towards the
assertion violation even at the lower depths of the search space.
4.4 Comparison with the Java PathFinder (JPF) Model
Checker
To further evaluate the state space exploration framework in J-Sim, we compare its performance
to that of Java PathFinder (JPF) [52, 111], a state-of-the-art model checker for Java programs. In
this section, we first give an overview of JPF (version 4.1). Following that, we elaborate on how we
enable JPF to explore the state space of the J-Sim simulation model of AODV. Finally, we present
the performance results [90].
4.4.1 Overview of JPF
JPF is a general-purpose explicit-state model checker for Java programs. JPF takes as input a
Java program and an optional bound on the length of program execution. JPF explores all execu-
tions (up to the given bound) that the program can have due to different thread interleavings and
nondeterministic choices. JPF can generate as output the traces of those executions that violate
a given property; e.g., the loop-free assertion in AODV. JPF is implemented in Java as a special
Java Virtual Machine (JVM) that runs on top of the host JVM.4 The main difference between JPF
and a regular JVM is that JPF implements a backtrackable JVM; i.e., JPF can (quickly) backtrack
the program execution by restoring a state that was previously encountered during the execution.
4In contrast to JPF, our state space exploration framework in J-Sim does not require a special JVM.
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Backtracking allows exploration of different executions from the same state.
To achieve fast backtracking, JPF uses a special representation of states and executes program
bytecodes by modifying this representation. For instance, JPF represents the heap as follows: JPF
uses integers to represent object identifiers and to encode all field values, be they primitive (int,
boolean, float, etc.) or pointers to other objects (which can hold the special value null). (JPF
determines the meaning of various integers based on the field types kept in the class information.)
Conceptually, JPF represents each object as an integer array, and the entire heap as an array
of integer arrays. This special representation enables JPF to quickly store and restore states for
backtracking; it is crucial for making the overall state space exploration efficient.
In order to enable a stateful search, JPF computes a linear representation of the state, also called
state linearization [49], by traversing the root of the heap in a depth-first search order, assigning
a unique identifier to each object (null pointers have value 0) and backtracking when it detects a
cycle. Linearization builds a canonical representation of the state and hence enables the comparison
of states during the state space exploration; two states are equivalent if their linearizations are equal.
Specifically, JPF computes a hash code from the state linearization, and uses hash sets to efficiently
check whether a state has been visited before. Alternatively, JPF enables the user to customize the
stateful search by specifying which part(s) of the state to be stored and used for state comparison
and making the search backtrack on user-specified conditions.
Model Java Interface (MJI) is a mechanism in JPF that enables accessing the JPF special state
representation from the host JVM and hence allows parts of JPF execution to be delegated from
JPF into the host JVM. MJI is analogous to the Java Native Interface (JNI) [102] that allows
parts of JVM execution to be delegated from the JVM into the native code, written in say the C
language. MJI, like JNI, splits executions at the method granularity; specifically, each method can be
marked to be executed either in JPF or in the host JVM. (JPF uses special name mangling to mark
methods for the host JVM execution.) MJI also provides API that allows the host JVM execution
to manipulate the JPF special state representation, for example to read or write field values or to
create new objects. One advantage of MJI is that it can be used to improve the performance of
JPF [26].
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4.4.2 Enabling JPF to Explore the State Space of the J-Sim Simulation
Model of AODV
JPF could not execute the code for the entire J-Sim simulator and the AODV protocol. This is
because of the complexity of the J-Sim simulation model of AODV and because the built-in state
linearization algorithm takes into account the entire heap, not just the parts of the state that are
relevant to AODV. Therefore, we had to create a simplified version of the J-Sim simulation model
of AODV. This version does not have the full generality of the J-Sim simulator but provides the
basic functionality needed to run AODV. Following that, we wrote a test driver for the (simplified)
J-Sim simulation model of AODV. The driver produces an environment that checks which events
are enabled in each state being explored, and initiates the execution of all sequences of enabled
events up to a configurable maximum depth (MAXDEPTH). Similar drivers were previously used
in several studies on JPF [112–114]. Similar to the state space exploration framework in J-Sim,
the JPF driver implements an explicit-state stateful search that avoids visiting a state s1 if another
state s2 has already been visited before and either s2 simulates s1 (Section 3.3.1) or the hash code
of s2 is equal to the hash code of s1. The choice between using either the simulation relation or the
equality of the hash codes is up to the user. In what follows, we explain the JPF driver assuming
the simulation relation is used.
Figure 4.1 gives the pseudo-code of the driver JPFDriver() for state space exploration in JPF.
JPFDriver() is executed in JPF’s backtrackable JVM. First, the aodvNodes array, whose elements
correspond to the wireless nodes in the ad-hoc network, is created and initialized (Figure 4.1, line
3). In order to denote that the initial state has been visited, JPFDriver() has to add the initial
state to the AlreadyVisited data structure. We keep AlreadyVisited in the host JVM; otherwise,
JPF would consider it part of the program state, represent it using the special representation and
restore it on backtracking. Hence, JPFDriver() adds the initial state to AlreadyVisited by invoking
the addInitialState() function using the MJI API (Figure 4.1, line 4). Following that, we use the MJI
API to read the JPF special state representation and construct a global state that corresponds to
the initial state in the host JVM. This is achieved by the constructGlobalState() function (Figure 4.2,
line 2). The implementation of constructGlobalState() required a lot of programming effort and time
as it requires understanding of the JPF special state representation and the MJI API.
As long as the assertion has not been violated and MAXDEPTH bound has not been reached,
the while loop in Figure 4.1 (lines 6 to 17) is executed. Each iteration of the loop corresponds to a
state being explored (i.e., currentState). The events that are enabled in currentState are determined
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1. procedure JPFDriver()
2. depth = 0 ;
3. initialize(aodvNodes) ;
4. addInitialState(aodvNodes) ; /* addInitialState() is invoked using MJI API. See Figure 4.2. */
5. checkProperty = true ;
6. while ( (checkProperty == true) AND (depth < MAXDEPTH) ) {
7. EnabledEvents = GenerateEnabledEvents() ;
8. eventID = Verify.random(EnabledEvents.size() - 1) ;
9. ExecuteEvent(EnabledEvents.get(eventID)) ;
10. checkProperty = verifyAssertion() ;
11. if ( (checkProperty == false) AND (DoesCounterexampleContainEvent(nextState)) ) {
12. Print("Counterexample ") ;
13. printCounterexample() ;
14. exit ;
} /* end if */
15. else if ( (checkProperty == true) AND ((depth + 1) < MAXDEPTH) )
16. Verify.ignoreIf(wasSimulated(aodvNodes)) ; // wasSimulated() is invoked using MJI API. See Figure 4.2.
17. depth = depth + 1 ;
} /* end while */
18. EventInfoList GenerateEnabledEvents()
19. EnabledEvents = { } ;
20. for ( all protocol entities p ) { /* for all protocol entities */
21. for ( all possible events e ) { /* for all events */
22. NumberOfNextStates = EnablingFunction(p, e) ;
23. for ( int i = 0 ; i < NumberOfNextStates ; i++ ) /* for all integer-valued parameters */
24. EnabledEvents.add(new EventInfo(p, e, i)) ;
} /* end for */
} /* end for */
25. return EnabledEvents ;
Figure 4.1: JPF driver for state space exploration: Code executed in JPF’s backtrackable JVM.
1. native void addInitialState(MJIEnv env, int classRef, int objRef)
/* addInitialState() is ‘‘native’’; hence, it is executed in the regular host JVM. */
2. initialState = constructGlobalState(env, objRef) ;
3. AlreadyVisited.add(initialState) ;
4. native boolean wasSimulated(MJIEnv env, int classRef, int objRef)
/* wasSimulated() is ‘‘native’’; hence, it is executed in the regular host JVM. */
5. nextState = constructGlobalState(env, objRef) ;
6. if ( nextState is not simulated by any state in AlreadyVisited ) { /* use protocol-specific properties */
7. if ( search strategy is BeFS )
8. nextState.computeBeFSTuple() ; /* use protocol-specific properties */
9. AlreadyVisited.add(nextState) ;
10. return false ;
}
11. else
12. return true ;
Figure 4.2: JPF driver for state space exploration: Code executed in the regular host JVM. Al-
readyVisited stores the states that have already been visited and the stateful search depends on the
simulation relation.
by invoking the GenerateEnabledEvents() function (Figure 4.1, line 7). These events are stored in
the EnabledEvents list, which is returned by GenerateEnabledEvents() (Figure 4.1, line 25).
Following that, the JPF’s library method Verify.random(int maxBound) is invoked (Figure 4.1,
line 8); this method nondeterministically returns a number between zero and maxBound inclusive.
Note that Verify.random(int maxBound) does not produce a single execution corresponding to a single
(random) number between zero and maxBound. Instead, Verify.random(int maxBound) produces
(maxBound + 1) executions corresponding to the (maxBound + 1) different values between zero
and maxBound. Hence, Figure 4.1, line 8, nondeterministically chooses an enabled event. This
chosen event is then executed (Figure 4.1, line 9) and the new state’s information is stored in the
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aodvNodes array. JPFDriver() then checks the assertion (Figure 4.1, line 10). We use the same
definitions of the safe and unsafe events that we used in Section 3.3.2. Furthermore, we have
also implemented the DoesCounterexampleContainEvent() function (Section 3.3.2) that allows the
user to specify that a counterexample has to contain at least one state that is generated due to a
particular event.
If the assertion is violated (i.e., the case of an unsafe event) and DoesCounterexampleContain-
Event() returns true, a counterexample is printed (Figure 4.1, line 13). On the other hand, if the
assertion is not violated (i.e., the case of a safe event) and the depth of the next state in the state
space is strictly less than the specified maximum depth MAXDEPTH (Figure 4.1, line 15), JPF-
Driver() has to check whether the next state is simulated by a state that has been visited before.
Since the AlreadyVisited data structure is kept in the host JVM, JPFDriver() has to invoke the
wasSimulated() function using the MJI API (Figure 4.1, line 16). If wasSimulated() returns true
(i.e., the case of a safe non-tree event), the JPF’s library method Verify.ignoreIf() instructs JPF
to backtrack the execution; hence, another enabled event will be nondeterministically chosen in
Figure 4.1, line 8. If not (i.e., the case of a safe tree event), the state space exploration proceeds
in the search order determined by the search strategy: breadth-first (BFS), depth-first (DFS) or
best-first (BeFS). It should be noted that the driver (Figure 4.1) does not contain code for storing
and restoring states because this is done by JPF. (In our state space exploration framework, storing
and restoring states is implemented by adding states to, and removing them from, ToBeExplored.)
In summary, the tasks that are executed inside the JPF’s backtrackable JVM are: the overall
state space exploration process, checking which events are enabled in each state being explored,
executing the enabled events and checking the assertion. On the other hand, the tasks that are
executed inside the host JVM are: implementing the stateful search (using AlreadyVisited), and
implementing a best-first search (using state ranking by assigning a tuple < b1, b2, . . . , bB−1, bB >
to each state being generated).
The reasons why the stateful search has to be done inside the host JVM instead of the JPF’s back-
trackable JVM are that we do not want JPF to consider AlreadyVisited as part of the program state
as explained above, and that the stateful search using the simulation relation with the previously
visited states depends on the protocol-specific properties (e.g., the routing table entries in AODV
and the AODV messages). Due to the JPF special state representation, these protocol-specific prop-
erties are represented using (arrays of) integers; hence, not directly accessible. Therefore, we make
use of the MJI API to manipulate the JPF special state representation, extract the protocol-specific
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properties and construct an instance of the GlobalState class inside the regular host JVM. This is
achieved by the constructGlobalState() function call (Figure 4.2, line 2 and line 5). After construct-
ing the global state, we can check state similarity with the previously visited states (Figure 4.2, line
6) and add the global state to AlreadyVisited if necessary (Figure 4.2, line 3 and line 9).
Using state ranking to enable a best-first search strategy is achieved by assigning a BeFS tuple
< b1, b2, . . . , bB−1, bB > to nextState (Figure 4.2, line 8) in the same way as we did with instances
of the GlobalState class in J-Sim. The reason why we choose to implement the computation of
the BeFS tuple inside the host JVM is only for programming ease and efficiency since we have to
construct the global state inside the host JVM anyway.
4.4.3 Results of the Comparison between the J-Sim State Space
Exploration Framework and JPF
Table 4.2 gives the (i) time, (ii) space (size of AlreadyVisited), and (iii) number of events executed
for finding the three counterexamples using both J-Sim and JPF with several search strategies. In
Table 4.2, AlreadyVisited stores the states that have already been visited and the stateful search
depends on the simulation relation. Since we used the same definition of the simulation relation
that determines state similarity and the same implementations of BeFS heuristics for state ranking
in both tools, the number of events executed and the number of states in AlreadyVisited are exactly
the same for both J-Sim and JPF. (We have also verified that this is the case for lower values of
MAXDEPTH where the assertion violations do not occur. In fact, we have also verified that the
sequence in which states are visited is exactly the same for both J-Sim and JPF.) Therefore, both
J-Sim and JPF are having the same amount of “workload”. Table 4.2 shows the time needed by
both tools to finish that workload. The last column of Table 4.2 shows the ratio between the time
needed by JPF and that needed by J-Sim to find the assertion violation. In the case that a small
number of events is executed (e.g., the cases of AODV-2-BeFS-AN and AODV-3-BeFS-AN), JPF is
much slower than J-Sim. In the case that a moderate number of events is executed (e.g., the cases of
AODV-4-BeFS-AN and AODV-5-BeFS-AN in Counterexamples 1 and 3), JPF is slower than J-Sim.
In the case that a large number of events is executed (e.g., the cases of DFS-R and BFS-AN), the
time needed to find an assertion violation by JPF is close to that of our state space exploration
framework in J-Sim, with JPF getting close to, or outperforming, J-Sim in the cases of BFS-AN
only.
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Counterexample 1 JPF J-Sim JPF/J-Sim
MAXDEPTH = 10 Space (number of states) Events Time (s.) Time (s.) Time Ratio
BFS-AN 4699 26303 103.445 111.371 0.929
DFS-R 1459 21757 41.249 9.632 4.282
AODV-1-BeFS-AN 489 4169 8.988 1.012 8.881
AODV-2-BeFS-AN 394 1606 5.289 0.545 9.705
AODV-3-BeFS-AN 240 1179 4.085 0.363 11.253
AODV-4-BeFS-AN 745 8229 16.865 2.225 7.580
AODV-5-BeFS-AN 588 6025 12.679 1.531 8.282
Counterexample 2 JPF J-Sim JPF/J-Sim
MAXDEPTH = 10 Space (number of states) Events Time (s.) Time (s.) Time Ratio
BFS-AN 4762 26641 105.282 113.905 0.924
DFS-R 1502 22364 41.954 10.074 4.165
AODV-1-BeFS-AN 485 4116 9.034 1.000 9.034
AODV-2-BeFS-AN 389 1562 5.227 0.529 9.881
AODV-3-BeFS-AN 240 1140 4.041 0.355 11.383
AODV-4-BeFS-AN 2123 25205 49.614 13.507 3.673
AODV-5-BeFS-AN 1809 20976 41.507 10.412 3.986
Counterexample 3 JPF J-Sim JPF/J-Sim
MAXDEPTH = 10 Space (number of states) Events Time (s.) Time (s.) Time Ratio
BFS-AN 4310 25211 94.571 97.083 0.974
DFS-R 1406 21056 39.703 9.101 4.362
AODV-1-BeFS-AN 477 4039 8.856 0.972 9.111
AODV-2-BeFS-AN 386 1552 5.202 0.516 10.081
AODV-3-BeFS-AN 239 1131 4.022 0.344 11.692
AODV-4-BeFS-AN 743 8216 16.902 2.196 7.697
AODV-5-BeFS-AN 581 5806 12.479 1.473 8.472
Table 4.2: AODV case study: Time and space requirements (size of AlreadyVisited) and the number
of events executed for finding the three counterexamples in a 3-node chain ad-hoc network using both
J-Sim and JPF with several search strategies. AlreadyVisited stores the states that have already
been visited. The stateful search depends on the simulation relation.
In order to further compare the performance of the state space exploration framework in J-Sim
with that in JPF in the cases that a large number of events is executed, we implemented the shuﬄing
algorithm, which we mentioned in Section 3.3.4, in JPF and ran 100 experiments for each of the
BFS-ANS and DFS-RS search strategies and the three counterexamples. Each experiment has a
different seed, but the same set of 100 seeds were used for each of J-Sim and JPF. In all experiments,
we have verified that the sequence in which states are visited is exactly the same for both J-Sim and
JPF; i.e., the common random numbers are synchronized. Figure 4.3 shows the difference between
the average JPF time and the average J-Sim time for finding the three counterexamples in a 3-node
chain ad-hoc network topology. In Figure 4.3, AlreadyVisited stores the states that have already
been visited and the stateful search depends on the simulation relation. As shown in Figure 4.3, the
time needed to find an assertion violation by our state space exploration framework in J-Sim can
be several seconds less than that of JPF.
Next, we compare the scalability of our state space exploration framework in J-Sim with that of
JPF. Specifically, we study the effect of increasing the number of nodes, N , in the network on the
performance of both tools with respect to the time needed to find an assertion violation. Table 4.3
gives the (i) time, (ii) space (size of AlreadyVisited), and (iii) number of events executed for finding


































































Figure 4.3: AODV case study: The difference between the average JPF time and the average J-Sim
time for finding the three counterexamples in a 3-node chain ad-hoc network topology using the
BFS-ANS and DFS-RS search strategies and MAXDEPTH = 10. We report the difference in
means obtained from the 100 experiments and the 99% confidence interval. AlreadyVisited stores
the states that have already been visited. The stateful search depends on the simulation relation.
JPF J-Sim JPF/J-Sim
N MAXDEPTH Space (number of states) Events Time (s.) Time (s.) Time Ratio
3 15 74 155 2.278 0.138 16.507
4 20 402 2235 8.303 0.789 10.523
5 25 1332 12976 48.327 8.323 5.806
6 30 548 3447 19.009 1.514 12.555
7 35 628 2605 22.633 1.793 12.623
8 40 838 2931 36.588 3.154 11.601
9 45 1578 23658 159.922 22.371 7.149
10 50 3875 118119 873.809 247.595 3.529
11 55 4294 143401 1161.203 342.591 3.389
12 60 6302 257045 2417.541 834.982 2.895
Table 4.3: AODV case study: Time and space requirements (size of AlreadyVisited) and the number
of events executed for finding Counterexample 3 in a N-node chain ad-hoc network using both J-Sim
and JPF with the AODV-1-BeFS-AN search strategy. AlreadyVisited stores the states that have
already been visited. The stateful search depends on the simulation relation.
1-BeFS-AN search strategy. In Table 4.3, AlreadyVisited stores the states that have already been
visited and the stateful search depends on the simulation relation. As shown in Table 4.3, our
framework is able to find a counterexample in larger network topologies within reasonable time and
space requirements. Furthermore, in the case that a large number of events is executed (e.g., the
cases of N = 11 and N = 12), the time needed to find an assertion violation in JPF is slightly larger
than that in our state space exploration framework in J-Sim.
The overall conclusion drawn from Tables 4.2-4.3 and Figure 4.3 is that our state space explo-
ration framework in J-Sim is slightly faster than JPF in terms of the time needed to find an assertion
violation. The reason why J-Sim is only slightly faster than JPF is that the operation that takes the
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Operation JPF Time (s.) J-Sim Time (s.)
Generate enabled events 18.298 0.095
Shuﬄe enabled events 3.853 0.013
Execute event handlers 10.020 1.011
Compute a hash code 0.000 0.000
Verify an assertion 2.900 0.096
Construct global state 1.627 0.000
Search in AlreadyV isited 37.069 85.133
Insert in AlreadyV isited 0.013 0.229
Subtotal 73.780 86.577
Other operations 17.880 0.924
Total time 91.660 87.501
JPF/J-Sim time ratio 1.050
Number of executed events 22946 22946
Table 4.4: AODV case study: Breakdown of the average state space exploration time (sec.) spent
in some selected operations in J-Sim and JPF for a case in which a large number of events is
executed. Specifically, the example shown corresponds to the following scenario: a 3-node chain ad-
hoc network, Counterexample 1, MAXDEPTH = 10, search strategy is BFS-ANS and the number
of replications is 100. AlreadyVisited stores the states that have already been visited. The stateful
search depends on the simulation relation.
most significant portion of the state space exploration time is the search in AlreadyVisited for any
previously visited state that simulates the state that has just been generated (Figure 3.2, line 18 and
Figure 4.2, line 6). Since this operation is executed in the regular JVM in both tools, the overhead
incurred by JPF’s backtrackable JVM due to backtracking and storing and restoring states is only
slightly manifested. As an example, we show in Table 4.4 a breakdown of the average state space
exploration time spent in some selected operations in J-Sim and JPF for a case in which a large
number of events is executed. As shown in Table 4.4, the search in AlreadyVisited is the operation
that takes the most significant portion of the state space exploration time in both J-Sim and JPF.
In order to show how the overhead incurred by JPF’s backtrackable JVM can significantly
manifest itself, we let AlreadyVisited store the hash codes of the states that have already been
visited instead of the states themselves. In this setting, there is no need for the constructGlobalState()
function. Furthermore, the search in AlreadyVisited for a hash code that is equal to the hash code
of the state that has just been generated becomes an extremely cheap operation that only takes
a very small portion of the state space exploration time. On the other hand, the operations of
executing the events, computing the hash codes, checking the assertion, determining the enabled
events, and computing the BeFS tuple (in the case of a BeFS strategy), which are now all done in
JPF’s backtrackable JVM, become the operations that take the most significant portion of the state
space exploration time. For the sake of completeness, we include the pseudo-code of the JPF driver
in this case in Figure 4.4 and the code executed in the host JVM in Figure 4.5. The advantage of
this setting is that it requires less programming effort since the user does not need to implement
the constructGlobalState() function. We still keep AlreadyVisited in the regular host JVM since we
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1. procedure JPFModifiedDriver()
2. depth = 0 ;
3. initialize(aodvNodes) ;
4. hashCode = computeHashCode(aodvNodes) ;
5. addInitialStateHashCode(hashCode) ; // addInitialStateHashCode() is invoked using MJI API. See Figure 4.5.
6. checkProperty = true ;
7. while ( (checkProperty == true) AND (depth < MAXDEPTH) ) {
8. EnabledEvents = GenerateEnabledEvents() ; /* See Figure 4.1 for GenerateEnabledEvents() */
9. eventID = Verify.random(EnabledEvents.size() - 1) ;
10. ExecuteEvent(EnabledEvents.get(eventID)) ;
11. hashCode = computeHashCode(aodvNodes) ;
12. checkProperty = verifyAssertion() ;
13. if ( (checkProperty == false) AND (DoesCounterexampleContainEvent(nextState)) ) {
14. Print(‘‘Counterexample ‘‘) ;
15. printCounterexample() ;
16. exit ;
} /* end if */
17. else if ( (checkProperty == true) AND ((depth + 1) < MAXDEPTH) ) {
18. Verify.ignoreIf(wasVisited(hashCode)) ; // wasVisited() is invoked using MJI API. See Figure 4.5.
19. if ( search strategy is BeFS )
20. computeBeFSTuple(aodvNodes) ; /* use protocol-specific properties */
} /* end if */
21. depth = depth + 1 ;
} /* end while */
Figure 4.4: JPF modified driver for state space exploration: Code executed in JPF’s backtrackable
JVM.
1. native void addInitialStateHashCode(MJIEnv env, int classRef, int objRef)
/* addInitialStateHashCode() is ‘‘native’’; hence, it is executed in the regular host JVM. */
2. hashCode = env.getIntField(objRef) ; /* retrieve the hash code */
3. AlreadyVisited.add(hashCode) ;
4. native boolean wasVisited(MJIEnv env, int classRef, int objRef)
/* wasVisited() is ‘‘native’’; hence, it is executed in the regular host JVM. */
5. hashCode = env.getIntField(objRef) ; /* retrieve the hash code */
6. if ( hashCode does not exist in AlreadyVisited ) {
7. AlreadyVisited.add(hashCode) ;
8. return false ;
}
9. else
10. return true ;
Figure 4.5: JPF modified driver for state space exploration: Code executed in the regular host
JVM. AlreadyVisited stores the hash codes of the states that have already been visited. The stateful
search depends on the equality of the hash codes.
do not want JPF to consider it as part of the program state as explained above.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 give the performance results of both tools under this setting. As we did
above, we used the same hash code computation in both tools. Specifically, the hash code of a state
is computed by first constructing an integer array representation of the state. Following that, an
integer-valued hash code of this integer array representation is computed using the Jenkins’ hash
function that is part of the JPF (version 4.1) distribution. (We slightly modified this function to
return an integer instead of a long value.) The integer array representation of a state depends
on the protocol-specific information such as the AODV packet headers and payloads, and each
node’s seqnon, bidn, routing table entries and broadcast ID cache entries. The reason we used this
integer array representation instead of the linearization algorithm built-in inside JPF is that the JPF
linearization algorithm linearizes the entire heap, but we are only interested in the AODV protocol-
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Counterexample 1 JPF J-Sim JPF/J-Sim
MAXDEPTH = 10 Space (number of hash codes) Events Time (s.) Time (s.) Time Ratio
BFS-AN 70308 283122 1607.966 21.880 73.490
DFS-R 22908 344333 1789.221 21.365 83.745
AODV-1-BeFS-AN 1346 10878 50.611 1.173 43.147
AODV-2-BeFS-AN 6491 85977 401.103 5.706 70.295
AODV-3-BeFS-AN 569 2560 12.129 0.484 25.060
AODV-4-BeFS-AN 4431 45816 232.117 3.411 68.050
AODV-5-BeFS-AN 2398 19525 104.798 1.834 57.142
Counterexample 2 JPF J-Sim JPF/J-Sim
MAXDEPTH = 10 Space (number of hash codes) Events Time (s.) Time (s.) Time Ratio
BFS-AN 70551 284689 1611.868 21.957 73.410
DFS-R 23290 350204 1839.625 21.784 84.448
AODV-1-BeFS-AN 1302 10524 48.895 1.138 42.966
AODV-2-BeFS-AN 6488 85941 413.173 5.711 72.347
AODV-3-BeFS-AN 530 2284 10.929 0.457 23.915
AODV-4-BeFS-AN 17004 183929 970.930 12.129 80.050
AODV-5-BeFS-AN 15147 159198 844.428 10.791 78.253
Counterexample 3 JPF J-Sim JPF/J-Sim
MAXDEPTH = 10 Space (number of hash codes) Events Time (s.) Time (s.) Time Ratio
BFS-AN 69073 280967 1579.651 21.552 73.295
DFS-R 22767 342585 1793.470 21.286 84.256
AODV-1-BeFS-AN 1291 10414 47.722 1.106 43.148
AODV-2-BeFS-AN 6473 85779 410.389 5.670 72.379
AODV-3-BeFS-AN 529 2275 10.853 0.442 24.554
AODV-4-BeFS-AN 4427 45816 236.260 3.401 69.468
AODV-5-BeFS-AN 2384 19166 101.402 1.796 56.460
Table 4.5: AODV case study: Time and space requirements (size of AlreadyVisited) and the number
of events executed for finding the three counterexamples in a 3-node chain ad-hoc network using
both J-Sim and JPF with several search strategies. AlreadyVisited stores the hash codes of the
states that have already been visited. The stateful search depends on the equality of the hash codes.
JPF J-Sim JPF/J-Sim
N MAXDEPTH Space (number of hash codes) Events Time (s.) Time (s.) Time Ratio
3 15 86 134 2.667 0.133 20.053
4 20 520 1988 13.300 0.462 28.788
5 25 7094 62206 495.295 5.897 83.991
6 30 3437 42631 404.387 4.610 87.720
7 35 5269 102833 1242.740 11.185 111.108
Table 4.6: AODV case study: Time and space requirements (size of AlreadyVisited) and the number
of events executed for finding Counterexample 3 in a N-node chain ad-hoc network using both J-Sim
and JPF with the AODV-1-BeFS-AN search strategy. AlreadyVisited stores the hash codes of the
states that have already been visited. The stateful search depends on the equality of the hash codes.
specific information in order to ensure a fair comparison between J-Sim and JPF. Furthermore, we
used the same implementations of BeFS heuristics for state ranking in both J-Sim and JPF. Hence,
the number of events executed and the number of hash codes in AlreadyVisited are exactly the same
for both tools. (We have also verified that this is the case for lower values of MAXDEPTH where
the assertion violations do not occur and that the sequence in which states are visited is exactly
the same for both J-Sim and JPF.) As shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, our state space exploration
framework in J-Sim can be up to almost two orders of magnitude faster than that in JPF.
In order to further compare the performance of the state space exploration framework in J-Sim
with that in JPF in this setting, we ran 20 experiments for each of the BFS-ANS and DFS-RS search


























































Figure 4.6: AODV case study: The difference between the average JPF time and the average J-Sim
time for finding the three counterexamples in a 3-node chain ad-hoc network topology using the
BFS-ANS and DFS-RS search strategies and MAXDEPTH = 10. We report the difference in
means obtained from the 20 experiments and the 99% confidence interval. AlreadyVisited stores the
hash codes of the states that have already been visited. The stateful search depends on the equality
of the hash codes.
seed, but the same set of 20 seeds were used for each of J-Sim and JPF. Similar to what we did
above, we have verified that the sequence in which states are visited is exactly the same for both
J-Sim and JPF in all experiments. Figure 4.6 shows the difference between the average JPF time
and the average J-Sim time for finding the three counterexamples in a 3-node chain ad-hoc network
topology. In Figure 4.6, AlreadyVisited stores the hash codes of the states that have already been
visited. The stateful search depends on the equality of the hash codes. As shown in Figure 4.6,
the time needed to find an assertion violation by our state space exploration framework in J-Sim is
significantly less than that of JPF.
In order to understand the reasons behind this observation, we show in Table 4.7 a breakdown
of the average state space exploration time spent in some selected operations in J-Sim and JPF
for a case in which a large number of events is executed. As shown in Table 4.7, the operations
of executing the events, computing the hash codes, checking the assertion, and determining the
enabled events, which are all done in JPF’s backtrackable JVM, take more than 81% of the state
space exploration time in JPF. On the other hand, the corresponding operations in J-Sim take much
less time and thus make the state space exploration framework in J-Sim significantly faster than
that in JPF.
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Operation JPF Time (s.) J-Sim Time (s.)
Generate enabled events 59.960 0.540
Shuﬄe enabled events 12.740 0.065
Execute event handlers 84.448 4.388
Compute a hash code 652.444 1.762
Verify an assertion 22.510 0.690
Construct global state 0.000 0.000
Search in AlreadyV isited 0.184 0.111
Insert in AlreadyV isited 0.059 0.104
Subtotal 832.345 7.660
Other operations 170.240 4.550
Total time 1002.585 12.210
JPF/J-Sim time ratio 82.110
Number of executed events 192312 192312
Table 4.7: AODV case study: Breakdown of the average state space exploration time (sec.) spent
in some selected operations in J-Sim and JPF for another case in which a large number of events is
executed. Specifically, the example shown corresponds to the following scenario: a 3-node chain ad-
hoc network, Counterexample 2, MAXDEPTH = 10, search strategy is DFS-RS and the number of
replications is 20. AlreadyVisited stores the hash codes of the states that have already been visited.
The stateful search depends on the equality of the hash codes.
4.5 Lessons Learned
The results presented in this chapter show that our state space exploration framework in J-Sim can be
significantly faster than that in JPF (Figure 4.6) unless a significant amount of programming effort is
done in JPF to make its performance close to that of our SSE framework in J-Sim (Figure 4.3). This
result justifies the need for building a framework in J-Sim for the verification of network simulation
models by state space exploration instead of using a general-purpose model checking tool since we
believe that wireless network protocol designers and simulation modelers will feel more comfortable
using J-Sim as a single integrated environment for both building a simulation model and verifying




Directed Diffusion Case Study
In this chapter, we apply the J-Sim state space exploration framework to the J-Sim simulation model
of the Directed Diffusion data dissemination protocol for wireless sensor networks. In Section 5.1, we
give an overview of the key functionality of directed diffusion. In Section 5.2, we describe the steps
that we follow to verify its simulation model including how we exploit protocol-specific properties.
In Section 5.3, we present the results of this verification. Finally, in Section 5.4, we summarize the
lessons that we learned in the two case studies of AODV and directed diffusion.
The J-Sim simulation model of directed diffusion (not including the J-Sim library) has about
1400 lines of code. We conduct all the experiments on a dual-processor Intel Xeon 2.8 GHz machine
running Linux version 2.6.17 with 2 GB memory. We use Sun’s 1.5.0 04-b05 Java HotSpotTM Client
VM with 0.5 GB initial heap size and 1.5 GB maximum heap size.
5.1 Overview of Directed Diffusion
A major objective of a wireless sensor network (WSN) is to monitor and sense events of interests (e.g.,
changes in the acoustic sound, seismic, or temperature) in a specific environment. Events of interest
are generated by target nodes. For instance, a moving tank in a battlefield may generate ground
vibrations that can be detected by seismic sensors. Upon detecting an event of interest, sensor
nodes send reports to sink (user) nodes either periodically or on demand. From the perspective of
network simulation, a WSN typically consists of these three types of nodes: sensor nodes (that sense
and detect the events of interest), target nodes (that generate events of interest), and sink nodes
(that utilize and consume the sensor information). The implementation details of the simulation and
emulation frameworks for WSNs in J-Sim can be found in [88, 89, 91]. In this section, we describe
the J-Sim simulation model of directed diffusion.
Directed diffusion [48] is a data-centric information dissemination paradigm for WSNs. Con-
ceptually, data in WSNs is the collected (or processed) information of a physical phenomenon. In
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directed diffusion, a sink node periodically broadcasts an INTEREST packet, containing the de-
scription of a sensing task that it is interested in (e.g., detecting a chemical explosion in a specific
area). INTEREST packets are diffused throughout the network; e.g., via flooding. After receiving
an INTEREST packet, a node may decide to re-send the INTEREST packet to its neighbors, or
suppress a received INTEREST if it has recently resent a matching INTEREST. INTEREST packets
are used to set up exploratory gradients. A gradient is the direction state created in each node that
receives an INTEREST, where the gradient direction is set toward the neighboring node from which
the INTEREST is received. It should be noted that this mechanism results in neighboring nodes
establishing a gradient toward each other. This is because when a node receives an INTEREST
from its neighbor, it has no way of knowing whether that INTEREST was in response to one it sent
out earlier or is an identical INTEREST from another sink on the other side of that neighbor.
Each node maintains an interest cache. Each interest entry in this cache corresponds to a distinct
interest and stores information about the gradients that a node has (up to one gradient per neighbor)
for that interest. Each gradient in an interest entry has a lifetime that is determined by the sink
node. When a gradient expires, it is removed from its interest entry. When all gradients in an
interest entry have been removed, the interest entry itself is removed from the interest cache.
When an INTEREST packet arrives at a sensor node that can sense data which matches the
interest, this sensor node becomes a source node, prepares DATA packets (each of which describes
the sensed data), and sends them to neighbors for whom it has a gradient once every exploratory
interval. Each node also maintains a data cache that keeps track of recently seen DATA packets.
When a node receives a DATA packet, if the DATA packet has a matching data cache entry, it is
discarded; otherwise, the node adds the received DATA packet to the data cache and forwards it to
each neighbor for whom the node has a gradient. As a result, DATA packets are forwarded toward
the sink node(s) along (possibly) multiple gradient paths.
Upon receipt of a DATA packet, a sink node reinforces its preferred neighbor based on a data-
driven local rule. For instance, the sink node may reinforce any neighbor from which it received
previously unseen data (i.e., the neighbor from which it first received the latest data matching
the interest). The data cache is used to determine that preferred neighbor. In order to reinforce a
neighbor, the sink node sends a positive reinforcement packet to that neighbor to inform it of sending
data at a smaller interval (i.e., higher rate) than the exploratory interval, thereby establishing a
reinforced gradient (also called data gradient) towards the sink node. The reinforced neighbor will
in turn reinforce its preferred neighbor. This process repeats all the way back to the data source,
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resulting in a reinforced path (i.e., a chain of reinforced gradients) between the source and the sink
nodes. It should be noticed that this mechanism can result in more than one path being reinforced,
thereby consuming more energy. Furthermore, one reinforced path may turn out to be consistently
“better” than another path, which then needs to be negatively reinforced. Specifically, a negative
reinforcement packet is used to inform a neighbor to send data at the lower rate determined by the
exploratory interval. Similar to positive reinforcements, a data-driven local rule is used to decide
whether to negatively reinforce a neighbor or not. One plausible rule is to negatively reinforce a
neighbor from whom no new events have been received within a window of W events (i.e., the
neighbor that consistently sends previously seen events).
5.2 Verifying the Simulation Model of Directed Diffusion
We follow the same steps in Section 4.2 to verify the simulation model of directed diffusion.
Step 1. States: Definitions of the global state, the initial state, and the
assertion
We use the same definitions of GlobalState and network cloud that were introduced in Section 4.2. On
the other hand, since the protocol state is protocol-specific, the protocol state in directed diffusion
includes each node’s interest cache and data cache. In the initial global state, the network does not
contain any packets and the directed diffusion process at each node starts with an empty interest
cache and an empty data cache.
The assertion that we check is the loop-free property of the reinforced path. Consider two nodes
n and m where RPath(n,m) is true if and only if there is a reinforced path from n to m. The
loop-free property can be expressed as follows:
¬ ( RPath(n,m) ∧ RPath(m,n) )
Step 2. Events
Next, we specify the set of events, when each event is enabled and the corresponding EnablingFunc-
tion(), and how each event is handled. We classify the events into two categories: node events and
network events. The events in each category are listed as follows:
1. Node Events
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T0 Initiation of a sensing task by node n: This event is enabled if node n is a sink node.
When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T0) returns 1. The event is handled
by broadcasting an INTEREST packet.
T1 Restart of the directed diffusion process at node n: This event may take place because of
a node reboot. This event is always enabled; i.e., EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T1)
always returns 1. The event is handled by reinitializing the state of the directed diffusion
process at node n.
T2 Gradient timeout at node n: This event is enabled if the interest cache of node n contains
at least one interest entry that has at least one gradient. When enabled, EnablingFunc-
tion(currentState, n, T2) returns the total number of gradients in the interest cache of
node n. The event is handled by removing one of the gradients in the interest cache of
node n. If all gradients in an interest entry have been removed, the interest entry itself
is removed from the interest cache.
T3 Data cache timeout
1 at node n: This event is enabled if there is at least one entry in the
data cache of node n. When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T3) returns the
number of entries in the data cache of node n. The event is handled by deleting an entry
from the data cache of node n.
2. Network Events
T4 Delivering a packet to node n: This event is enabled if the network contains at least
one packet that is destined for node n such that node n is one of the neighbors of the
source of the packet. When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T4) returns the
number of the packets that satisfy this condition. The event is handled by removing one
of these packets from the network and forwarding it to node n in order to be processed
as explained in Section 5.1.
T5 Loss of a packet destined for node n: This event is enabled if the network contains at least
one packet that is destined for node n. When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n,
T5) returns the number of the packets that satisfy this condition. The event is handled
by removing one of these packets from the network.
1For practical reasons, previously received DATA packets can not be kept in the data cache for an indefinitely
long time; otherwise, the size of the data cache can increase arbitrarily. In the J-Sim simulation model of directed
diffusion, each DATA packet in the data cache is associated with a lifetime. Periodically, a data cache timeout event
is triggered causing the deletion of entries in the cache that have expired.
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Step 3. Simulation Relation
Again, we use the general simulation relation outlined in the introduction and Section 3.3. For
directed diffusion this reduces to the following definition. A state s2 is said to simulate a state
s1 if (i) s1 and s2 have the same neighborhood information, (ii) for each packet in s1, there is a
corresponding equivalent packet in s2, and (iii) for each node n, s1 and s2 have correspondingly
equal node n’s interest cache and data cache (each viewed as an unordered set of entries).
In Appendix A, we argue that this relation is a simulation relation.
Step 4. State Ranking: Exploiting protocol-specific properties
Recall from Chapter 3 that in order to enable a best-first search strategy, the user needs to write
a Java method that maps each state to a tuple < b1, b2, . . . , bB−1, bB > based on protocol-specific
properties such that a state s1 is considered “better than” a state s2 if s1 has a higher lexicographical
order of this tuple than s2.
In the course of verifying the J-Sim simulation model of AODV (Section 4.3), AODV-1-BeFS
and AODV-3-BeFS provided comparatively better performance results. Hence we use these two
BeFS heuristics to devise two corresponding BeFS heuristics for directed diffusion. In particular,
the loop-free property for AODV involves only valid RTEs to a destination d, and by analogy, the
loop-free property for directed diffusion involves only reinforced gradients. Similarly, data packets
are forwarded in AODV based on the next hop information stored in the valid RTEs, and by analogy,
data packets are forwarded in directed diffusion based on the gradients established at the nodes.
Therefore, two potentially good BeFS heuristics for exploring the state space of directed diffusion
are:
1. DD-1-BeFS: This heuristic assigns to a state s a BeFS tuple that consists of one component
< b1 > such that b1 is the total number of both exploratory and reinforced gradients in s.
2. DD-2-BeFS: This heuristic assigns to a state s a BeFS tuple that consists of two components
< b1, b2 > such that b1 is the number of reinforced gradients in s, and b2 is the total number
of both exploratory and reinforced gradients in s.
Along a similar line of arguments, we also devise the following BeFS heuristics:
1. DD-3-BeFS: Since a reinforced gradient is established upon receiving a positive reinforcement
packet, DD-3-BeFS assigns to a state s a BeFS tuple that consists of one component < b1 >
such that b1 is the number of positive reinforcement packets in s.
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2. DD-4-BeFS: DD-4-BeFS assigns to a state s a BeFS tuple that consists of two components
< b1, b2 > such that b1 is the number of positive reinforcement packets in s (as in DD-3-BeFS),
and b2 is the total number of both exploratory and reinforced gradients in s.
3. DD-5-BeFS: This heuristic assigns to a state s a BeFS tuple that consists of one component
< b1 > such that b1 is the total number of data cache entries at all nodes in s.
4. DD-6-BeFS: DD-6-BeFS assigns to a state s a BeFS tuple that consists of two components
< b1, b2 > such that b1 is the total number of data cache entries at all nodes in s (as in
DD-5-BeFS), and b2 is the total number of both exploratory and reinforced gradients in s.
5.3 Results of the Verification
We consider an initial state that consists of a chain topology of N nodes: n0 (the only sink node,
which is interested in a single sensing task), n1, n2, . . . , nN−2, and nN−1 (the only source node, which
can sense data that matches the interest). A loop in the reinforced path may take place because
the interest and gradient setup mechanisms themselves do not guarantee loop-free reinforced paths
between the source and the sink nodes. In order to prevent loops from taking place, the data cache
is used to suppress previously seen DATA packets. However, we discover that, in the case of (a) the
deletion of a DATA packet from the data cache and/or (b) a node reboot (which effectively deletes
all the entries in the data and interest caches), a loop may be created. The loop that is created in
the first case is referred to as Counterexample 1 while the loop that is created in the second case is
referred to as Counterexample 2. For instance, consider a chain topology consisting of N = 4 nodes.
If n1 accepts a DATA packet sent by n2, n2 becomes n1’s preferred neighbor. Now, if n2 deletes the
DATA packet from its data cache due to a data cache timeout (Counterexample 1) or a node reboot
(Counterexample 2), it may later accept the DATA packet sent by n1 (because it will be previously
unseen data) causing n1 to become n2’s preferred neighbor. (Recall that neighboring nodes establish
gradients toward each other.) Therefore, n1 and n2 may positively reinforce each other causing a
loop in the reinforced path. In fact, positive reinforcement packets may not eventually reach the
source node causing a disruption in the reinforced path (i.e., the reinforced path may include a
loop that does not include the source node).2 The interested reader is referred to Appendix C for
detailed traces (along with the explanations) of the two counterexamples. It has to be mentioned
2For Counterexample 2, we require that the counterexample contain at least one state that is generated due to a
node reboot event, T1. Furthermore, in order to show that a loop in the reinforced path may still take place even if
the data cache timeout event, T3, does not happen (i.e., the data cache size is infinite), we disabled T3; i.e., we made
EnablingFunction(currentState, n, T3) always return zero.
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Counterexample 1, MAXDEPTH = 15
Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
BFS-AN 809.701 16735 115698
DFS-R 319.243 8306 173823
DD-1-BeFS-AN 0.563 513 1042
DD-2-BeFS-AN 0.599 501 1279
DD-3-BeFS-AN 128.526 5638 113342
DD-4-BeFS-AN 0.309 284 474
DD-5-BeFS-AN 542.764 14284 175807
DD-6-BeFS-AN 320.229 12985 95036
Counterexample 2, MAXDEPTH = 20
Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
BFS-AN 6410.453 44348 425181
DFS-R 262.659 8027 179112
DD-1-BeFS-AN 306.545 18063 92820
DD-2-BeFS-AN 469.543 20435 132382
DD-3-BeFS-AN 2059.233 21670 521326
DD-4-BeFS-AN 21.882 3574 18373
DD-5-BeFS-AN N/A N/A N/A
DD-6-BeFS-AN 5218.443 55336 508048
Table 5.1: Directed diffusion case study: Time and space requirements (sum of the sizes of Al-
readyVisited and ToBeExplored) and the number of events executed for finding the two counterex-
amples in a 4-node chain WSN using different search strategies. N/A indicates that the state space
explorer is not able to find a counterexample in two hours. AlreadyVisited stores the states that
have already been visited and the stateful search depends on the simulation relation.
that although the reinforced path may have a loop, this loop will not continue to exist forever. It
will be removed later either by the negative reinforcement mechanism or by the gradient timeout
mechanism. Furthermore, forwarding a DATA packet over the loop will stop once all nodes on the
loop have received the DATA packet.
Table 5.1 gives the (i) time, (ii) space (sum of the sizes of AlreadyVisited and ToBeExplored), and
(iii) number of events executed for finding the two counterexamples using several search strategies.
As shown in Table 5.1, DD-1-BeFS-AN provides orders of magnitude reduction with respect to the
evaluation criteria when compared to other standard search strategies such as BFS-AN and DFS-R.
Furthermore, DD-4-BeFS-AN outperforms DD-3-BeFS-AN, and DD-6-BeFS-AN outperforms DD-
5-BeFS-AN. This is because both DD-4-BeFS and DD-6-BeFS are two-level BeFS heuristics that
use DD-1-BeFS if the non-visited states are equally good and are thus able to better guide the
best-first search strategy, in the lower depths of the search space, than DD-3-BeFS and DD-5-BeFS
respectively.
In order to better study the effect of the choice of the BeFS heuristic, we ran 20 randomized
experiments for each BeFS heuristic. Each experiment has a different seed, but the same set of 20
seeds were used for each of the six BeFS heuristics. Table 5.2 reports the minimum, the maximum
and the average values for each performance evaluation criterion. As shown in Table 5.2, DD-4-
BeFS-ACS and DD-6-BeFS-ACS (DD-4-BeFS-ANS and DD-6-BeFS-ANS) respectively outperform
DD-3-BeFS-ACS and DD-5-BeFS-ACS (DD-3-BeFS-ANS and DD-5-BeFS-ANS) in terms of the
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Counterexample 1 Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
MAXDEPTH=15 Min Max Average Min Max Average Min Max Average
DD-1-BeFS-ACS 0.184 0.512 0.377 204 485 342.00 282 1329 869.60
DD-2-BeFS-ACS 0.176 0.744 0.450 208 481 342.75 233 2261 1193.05
DD-3-BeFS-ACS 143.693 557.510 371.231 6606 12340 9834.05 118106 253210 201005.30
DD-4-BeFS-ACS 0.180 0.368 0.271 198 355 259.30 283 789 501.55
DD-5-BeFS-ACS 155.088 1243.090 699.670 10881 31324 20092.55 113662 395107 267022.60
DD-6-BeFS-ACS 98.702 107.742 102.341 18041 19193 18474.80 96016 100840 97758.20
DD-1-BeFS-ANS 0.236 0.719 0.507 193 631 418.75 282 1231 799.45
DD-2-BeFS-ANS 0.229 1.103 0.599 195 656 407.15 233 2194 1164.00
DD-3-BeFS-ANS 2.939 489.176 209.151 600 10791 6605.30 8319 222677 128465.25
DD-4-BeFS-ANS 0.222 0.530 0.309 193 445 257.25 221 789 407.80
DD-5-BeFS-ANS 246.009 908.874 539.620 8226 19310 12997.50 102115 288012 182186.60
DD-6-BeFS-ANS 322.794 352.894 335.397 13084 14336 13540.45 95698 101561 97930.55
Counterexample 2 Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
MAXDEPTH=20 Min Max Average Min Max Average Min Max Average
DD-1-BeFS-ACS 25.197 294.842 160.366 10057 43758 30520.25 46536 200973 139185.10
DD-2-BeFS-ACS 131.078 492.221 238.152 14707 39644 24498.70 107358 255321 160739.35
DD-3-BeFS-ACS 142.102 6373.538 2524.681 5826 46016 24204.90 122964 1050558 573942.50
DD-4-BeFS-ACS 7.140 15.271 12.150 5944 8785 7152.05 17828 35332 29264.55
DD-5-BeFS-ACS 1048.740 7352.659 3246.824 22467 79064 43810.45 340947 1057788 615142.75
DD-6-BeFS-ACS 2336.184 2787.956 2427.339 74870 83479 76540.25 575905 628108 587570.10
DD-1-BeFS-ANS 92.118 581.052 373.419 8357 24759 19406.85 44562 140796 105669.10
DD-2-BeFS-ANS 298.220 786.888 400.639 14680 26383 17972.30 96617 183642 119599.00
DD-3-BeFS-ANS 0.904 4301.194 821.720 295 40114 11919.45 3398 826966 250433.75
DD-4-BeFS-ANS 18.846 28.061 23.176 3415 4275 3709.15 16153 23087 20537.90
DD-5-BeFS-ANS N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DD-6-BeFS-ANS 5314.174 6624.542 5599.007 55258 66900 57866.75 509282 577676 527568.95
Table 5.2: Directed diffusion case study: Time and space requirements (sum of the sizes of Al-
readyVisited and ToBeExplored) and the number of events executed for finding the two counterex-
amples in a 4-node chain WSN using different randomized best-first search strategies. Number of
replications is 20. N/A indicates that in some replications, the state space explorer is not able
to find a counterexample in 125 minutes. AlreadyVisited stores the states that have already been
visited and the stateful search depends on the simulation relation.
average time to find an assertion violation.
In Table 5.2, N/A indicates that in some replications, the state space explorer is not able to find
a counterexample in 125 minutes. This occurred only for the DD-5-BeFS-ANS in Counterexample
2. On the other hand, DD-5-BeFS-ACS was able to find the same counterexample in all replications
in less than 125 minutes. We found that this is because in both search strategies the operation that
takes the most significant portion of the state space exploration time is the search in AlreadyVisited
for any previously visited state that simulates nextState (in the case of BeFS-ANS) or currentState
(in the case of BeFS-ACS). Since BeFS-ACS lazily performs this operation as we explained in
Section 3.3.3, it is able to find the assertion violation in more replications than BeFS-ANS.
Table 5.3 gives the time and space requirements and the number of events executed for finding
Counterexample 1 in a chain topology consisting of N nodes using DD-4-BeFS-AC. Again our
framework is able to find a counterexample in larger network topologies within reasonable time and
space requirements.
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N MAXDEPTH Time (s.) Space (number of states) Events
4 15 0.252 247 474
5 20 14.667 2289 27826
6 25 38.848 3604 51341
7 30 31.679 4503 51649
8 35 101.222 8506 110540
9 40 205.121 13839 172912
10 45 689.344 24105 347204
11 50 1332.193 33422 495318
12 55 3721.432 51666 867921
Table 5.3: Directed diffusion case study: Time and space requirements (sum of the sizes of Al-
readyVisited and ToBeExplored) and the number of events executed for finding Counterexample 1
in a N-node chain WSN using DD-4-BeFS-AC. AlreadyVisited stores the states that have already
been visited and the stateful search depends on the simulation relation.
5.4 Lessons Learned
In this section, we summarize the lessons learned in the two case studies of AODV and directed
diffusion. First, we show that the state space exploration framework is able to verify the simulation
models of two fairly complex network protocols such as AODV and directed diffusion. This demon-
strates that the framework is general enough and not tied to a particular network protocol. To
verify the simulation model of another network protocol, one needs to follow the steps as outlined
in Section 4.2 and Section 5.2.
Second, we demonstrate that the use of BeFS heuristics reduces the time and space require-
ments by several orders of magnitude when compared to classic breadth-first and depth-first search
strategies. Based on the results obtained for the BeFS heuristics that we devised, we recommend
deriving the BeFS heuristic from properties inherent to the network protocol and the assertion being
checked. This is justified by the observation that AODV-1-BeFS and DD-1-BeFS provide better
performance results in terms of time and space requirements and number of events executed for find-
ing a violation of an assertion as shown in Table 4.1 and Table 5.1 respectively. Furthermore, using
a two-level BeFS heuristic, in which a BeFS heuristic such as AODV-1-BeFS or DD-1-BeFS is used
if the non-visited states are equally good, also improved the performance. This is justified by the
observation that AODV-5-BeFS outperforms AODV-4-BeFS (Table 4.1), DD-4-BeFS outperforms




In this chapter, we apply the J-Sim state space exploration framework to the J-Sim simulation model
of the Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) protocol. In Section 6.1, we give an overview of ARQ’s
key functionality. In Section 6.2, we describe the steps that we follow to verify its simulation model
including how we exploit protocol-specific properties. In Section 6.3, we present the results of this
verification.
The J-Sim simulation model of ARQ (not including the J-Sim library) has about 170 lines of
code. We conduct all the experiments on a dual-processor Intel Xeon 2.8 GHz machine running
Linux version 2.6.17 with 2 GB memory. We use Sun’s 1.5.0 04-b05 Java HotSpotTM Client VM
with 0.5 GB initial heap size and 1.5 GB maximum heap size.
6.1 Overview of ARQ
Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) is a well-known error control protocol that has several variations,
each of which works between two communicating nodes: a sender and a receiver. ARQ ensures that
every data packet sent by the sender will eventually be received correctly by the receiver and that
the receiver will get the data packets in order, i.e., it is an in-order reliable unicast protocol.
The simplest form of the ARQ protocol is stop-and-wait ARQ in which the sender sends a single
data packet and then waits for a positive acknowledgment (ACK) before it advances to the next
data packet. The receiver replies with an ACK if the data packet is correctly received. As either
the data packet or the corresponding ACK may be lost/corrupted in transit, the sender sets a
retransmission timer after it has sent a data packet. If no ACK is received before the retransmission
timer expires, the sender retransmits the data packet. It should be mentioned that the setting of
the timeout interval at the sender is very important, and is a trade-off between premature timeout
and prolonged retransmission.
For the receiver to distinguish between a data packet that is sent for the first time and a retrans-
66
mission, a sequence number is included in the header of each data packet. For stop-and-wait ARQ,
it is sufficient that the sequence number be 1-bit (i.e., either 0 or 1) because the only ambiguity is
between a data packet and its immediate predecessor and successor, but not between the predeces-
sor and successor themselves [100]. For similar reasons, each ACK should also contain a sequence
number. In the common practice, the sequence number in the ACK is the sequence number of
the next expected data packet rather than the sequence number of the data packet that has been
recently received. If the receiver receives a data packet whose sequence number is not equal to the
sequence number it is expecting, the receiver discards this duplicate data packet and retransmits an
ACK announcing the sequence number of the next expected data packet. Upon receiving the ACK,
the sender checks the sequence number in the ACK to determine whether a new data packet or a
retransmission should be sent.
6.2 Verifying the Simulation Model of ARQ
We follow the same steps in Sections 4.2-5.2 to verify the simulation model of ARQ.
Step 1. Definitions of the global state, the initial state, and the assertion
We define GlobalState as a tuple that has two components, namely the protocol state and the network
cloud. The protocol state contains SeqNoSent (the sequence number of the data packet that has
most recently been sent by the sender and whose ACK the sender is waiting for), SeqNoExpected
(the sequence number of the data packet that the receiver is expecting), NumDistinctDataMsgSent
(the total number of distinct data packets sent by the sender), and NumDistinctDataMsgReceived
(the total number of distinct data packets received by the receiver). The network cloud models the
network as an unbounded list that contains the data and ACK packets.
The initial state is the state in which the sender has just sent the first data packet with sequence
number 0 (denoted as D0 ), the receiver is expecting D0 and the network contains D0.
An important assertion for any reliable unicast protocol is that the receiver does not miss any
data packet that the sender believes to have been received by the receiver. In an ARQ protocol that
uses a 1-bit sequence number, this assertion translates to the requirement that the difference between
the total number of distinct data packets transmitted by the sender (NumDistinctDataMsgSent) and
the total number of distinct data packets received by the receiver (NumDistinctDataMsgReceived)




Next, we specify the set of events, when each event is enabled and the corresponding EnablingFunc-
tion(), and how each event is handled. We list the events as follows, assuming that n0 is the sender
and n1 is the receiver:
T0 Delivering a data packet: This event is enabled if the network contains at least one data packet.
When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n1, T0) returns 1. The event is handled by re-
moving this packet from the network and forwarding it to the receiver in order to be processed.
If the sequence number in the data packet is equal to SeqNoExpected, the receiver updates
SeqNoExpected and NumDistinctDataMsgReceived. In any case, the receiver transmits an
ACK announcing SeqNoExpected.
T1 Delivering an ACK packet: This event is enabled if the network contains at least one ACK
packet. When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n0, T1) returns 1. The event is han-
dled by removing this packet from the network and forwarding it to the sender in order to be
processed. If the sequence number in the ACK is equal to SeqNoSent, the sender retransmits
the data packet with that sequence number; otherwise, the sender updates SeqNoSent and
NumDistinctDataMsgSent and transmits a new data packet.
T2 Timeout of the retransmission timer at the sender: This event is enabled if the network does
not contain any data packets. This condition corresponds to either the case that the most
recently sent data packet was lost and hence needs to be retransmitted or the case that the
ACK of the most recently sent data packet is still in transit from the receiver to the sender.
When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n0, T2) returns 1. The event is handled by
having the sender retransmit the data packet that was most recently sent and whose ACK the
sender is waiting for.
T3 Loss of a data packet: This event is enabled if the network contains at least one data packet.
When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n1, T3) returns 1. The event is handled by
removing this packet from the network.
T4 Loss of an ACK packet: This event is enabled if the network contains at least one ACK packet.
When enabled, EnablingFunction(currentState, n0, T4) returns 1. The event is handled by
removing this packet from the network.
68
Step 3. Equality Relation
We use the following equality relation between states. Two states s1, s2 ∈ S are equal if (i) s1 and
s2 have the same number and the same sequence of identical packets, and (ii) s1 and s2 have equal
corresponding values for SeqNoSent, SeqNoExpected, NumDistinctDataMsgSent, and NumDistinct-
DataMsgReceived.
Step 4. State Ranking: Exploiting protocol-specific properties
Recall from Chapter 3 that in order to enable a best-first search strategy, the user needs to write
a Java method that maps each state to a tuple < b1, b2, . . . , bB−1, bB > based on protocol-specific
properties such that a state s1 is considered “better than” a state s2 if s1 has a higher lexicographical
order of this tuple than s2.
A suitable BeFS heuristic for exploring the state space of ARQ can be obtained by inspecting
the assertion, which requires that
(NumDistinctDataMsgSent−NumDistinctDataMsgReceived) ≤ 2
Intuitively, the greater (NumDistinctDataMsgSent−NumDistinctDataMsgReceived) in a state
s, the more likely s is close to an error. Therefore, a suitable BeFS heuristic for ARQ is to
consider a state s1 better than another state s2 if the quantity (NumDistinctDataMsgSent −
NumDistinctDataMsgReceived) in s1 is greater than the corresponding quantity in s2. In other
words, the BeFS tuple, assigned to a state s, consists of one component < b1 > such that b1 is the
quantity (NumDistinctDataMsgSent−NumDistinctDataMsgReceived) in s. We call this BeFS
heuristic ARQ-1-BeFS.
We also consider the following heuristic, which is “badly” obtained from the assertion. Specif-
ically, the BeFS tuple, assigned to a state s, consists of one component < b1 > such that b1 =
(NumDistinctDataMsgReceived−NumDistinctDataMsgSent), We call this “bad” BeFS heuris-
tic ARQ-2-BeFS.
6.3 Results of the Verification
To demonstrate the ability of the state space exploration framework to find assertion violations, we
manually injected the following error in the ACK packet delivery event T1. Specifically, the sender
does not check the sequence number in the ACK before sending a data packet; i.e., the sender always
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sends a new data packet whenever an ACK is received. This error may lead to a violation of the
assertion because it may make the sender think that a lost/corrupted data packet has been received
by the receiver. We call this assertion violation as Counterexample 1.
When running this erroneous simulation model of ARQ in J-Sim, the user may obtain an output
trace similar to that shown in Figure 6.1 in a typical J-Sim simulation run. (In Figure 6.1, a data
packet with sequence number i is denoted by Di and an ACK with sequence number j is denoted
by ACKj.) Repeating the same experiment several times may also reproduce the same output.
This may lure into believing that this erroneous simulation model of ARQ is correct. However, not
making the sender check the sequence number in the ACK before sending a data packet may lead
to an error. Using the breadth-first BFS-ANS search strategy, we obtain the counterexample given
in Figure 6.2. We explain the counterexample as follows. State 1 is the initial state. In State 2, the
receiver receives D0 and transmits an ACK. In State 3, the sender’s retransmission timer expires
prematurely causing the sender to retransmit D0. In State 4, the receiver discards the duplicate D0
and retransmits the ACK. In State 5, the sender receives an ACK and transmits D1. In State 6, the
sender receives the other ACK and since the sender does not check the sequence number in the ACK
before sending a data packet, the sender thinks this ACK is acknowledging the receipt of D1 sent in
State 5 and transmits D0. In State 7, D1 is lost; i.e., the receiver will miss D1 although the sender
believes that D1 has been received by the receiver. In State 8, the receiver discards the duplicate
D0 and retransmits the ACK. In State 9, the sender receives the ACK and since the sender does
not check the sequence number in the ACK before sending a data packet, the sender thinks it is
acknowledging the receipt of D0 sent in State 6 and transmits D1. State 9 represents a state from
which the ARQ protocol can resume without the sender and the receiver noticing that an error has
happened. In other words, the ARQ protocol fails.
Table 6.1 gives the performance of the various randomized search strategies with respect to the
following two types of performance evaluation criteria: (a) platform-independent, namely the number
of events executed and the number of states stored in memory (sum of the sizes of AlreadyVisited
and ToBeExplored)1, and (b) platform-dependent, namely the time needed to find an assertion
violation. In Table 6.1, AlreadyVisited stores the states that have already been visited and the
stateful search depends on the simulation relation. We ran 100 experiments for each search strategy.
Each experiment has a different seed, but the same set of 100 seeds were used for each of the seven
search strategies. For each performance evaluation criterion, we report the minimum, the maximum
1Note that we do not report the total number of states generated because it is simply equal to the number of
events executed plus 1 (to account for the initial state).
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Sender: sending D0
Receiver: receiving EXPECTED D0
Receiver: sending ACK1, expecting D1
Sender: receiving ACK1
Sender: sending D1
Receiver: receiving EXPECTED D1
Receiver: sending ACK0, expecting D0
Sender: receiving ACK0
Sender: sending D0
Receiver: receiving EXPECTED D0
Receiver: sending ACK1, expecting D1
Sender: receiving ACK1
Sender: sending D1
Receiver: receiving EXPECTED D1
Receiver: sending ACK0, expecting D0
Sender: receiving ACK0
Sender: sending D0
Receiver: receiving EXPECTED D0
Receiver: sending ACK1, expecting D1
Sender: receiving ACK1
Sender: sending D1
Receiver: receiving EXPECTED D1




Figure 6.1: A sample output trace of the erroneous simulation model of ARQ. The trace looks like
a valid output trace of an error-free simulation model of ARQ. Hence, the user cannot perceive the
error.
and the average values. As shown in Table 6.1, best-first search strategies (ARQ-1-BeFS-ACS and
ARQ-1-BeFS-ANS) perform better than the corresponding breadth-first search strategies (BFS-ACS
and BFS-ANS) in terms of the three performance evaluation criteria. This is because the ARQ-1-
BeFS heuristic successfully guides the search towards the states that may potentially lead to a state
that violates the assertion. On the other hand, the “bad” ARQ-2-BeFS heuristic failed to guide
the search and hence incurred a performance that is significantly worse than both BFS and DFS.
This result shows that, even for such a simple case study, the choice of a BeFS heuristic can have a
significant effect on the performance of the state space exploration framework.
Time (ms.) Space (number of states) Events
Min Max Average Min Max Average Min Max Average
DFS-RS 12.0 72.0 41.87 10 50 29.35 11 121 62.77
BFS-ACS 65.0 85.0 73.27 78 104 89.32 109 146 125.34
DFS-ACS 14.0 74.0 44.29 20 63 41.62 22 132 75.13
ARQ-1-BeFS-ACS 61.0 70.0 62.96 50 53 51.39 96 103 99.58
ARQ-2-BeFS-ACS 147.0 154.0 148.37 191 192 191.57 471 475 472.96
BFS-ANS 72.0 86.0 76.38 77 103 87.46 109 146 125.34
DFS-ANS 20.0 75.0 40.91 23 59 40.78 21 120 60.82
ARQ-1-BeFS-ANS 61.0 69.0 62.63 52 55 53.51 96 102 99.06
ARQ-2-BeFS-ANS 117.0 125.0 118.19 147 149 148.00 336 340 338.02
Table 6.1: ARQ case study: Time and space requirements (sum of the sizes of AlreadyVisited and
ToBeExplored) and the number of events executed for finding the counterexample using several
randomized search strategies. MAXDEPTH = 10. AlreadyVisited stores the states that have
already been visited and the stateful search depends on the simulation relation.
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In this chapter, we elaborate on the incremental state space exploration technique that we imple-
mented in J-Sim while keeping our two design goals (Section 3.1) met. Note that the incremental
state space exploration technique is implemented as a procedure in the state space explorer compo-
nent (Figure 3.1). In Section 7.1, we review the traditional (non-incremental) state space exploration
procedure. In Section 7.2, we present the incremental state space exploration procedure. In Sec-
tion 7.3, we analyze the performance of each of the non-incremental and incremental state space
exploration procedures in order to analytically derive necessary conditions for the incremental state
space exploration procedure to provide a speedup in the state space exploration time when compared
to the non-incremental state space exploration procedure. Finally, in Section 7.4, we discuss the
correctness of both the non-incremental and incremental state space exploration procedures.
7.1 Non-incremental State Space Exploration Procedure
Figure 7.1 shows the pseudo-code of the non-incremental state space exploration procedure SSEx-
plore(), which is similar to SSExploreAddNext() (Figure 3.2) except for the fact that AlreadyVisited
has to store the hash codes of the states that have already been visited instead of the states them-
selves. Figure 7.1 thus presents an explicit-state stateful search that avoids (re-)exploring a state s1
if another state s2, having the same hash code as s1, has already been visited before. This check is
made in Figure 7.1, line 20. In order to enable this check, the hash codes of the visited states have
to be computed (Figure 7.1, line 3 and line 13) and added to AlreadyVisited, if necessary, to denote
that these states have been visited (Figure 7.1, line 4 and line 22). The definitions of the tree and
non-tree events (Section 3.3.2) are modified accordingly. For example, a tree event is an event that
generates a nextState whose depth is strictly less than MAXDEPTH and whose hash code does
not exist in AlreadyVisited at any depth that is less than or equal to the depth of nextState. The
definitions of the deepest, safe and unsafe events remain the same as in Section 3.3.2.
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1. procedure SSExplore()
2. initialState.depth = 0 ;
3. initialStateHashCode = initialState.computeHashCode() ;
4. AlreadyVisited.add(initialStateHashCode) ;
5. ToBeExplored.add(initialState) ;
6. while ( ToBeExplored is not empty ) {
7. currentState = ToBeExplored.remove() ;
8. EnabledEvents = GenerateEnabledEvents(currentState) ; /* See Figure 3.2 for GenerateEnabledEvents() */
9. for ( int i = 0 ; i < EnabledEvents.size() ; i++ ) {
10. EventInfo E = EnabledEvents.get(i) ;
11. nextState = GenerateNextState(currentState, E) ; /* X: execute an event */
/* See Figure 3.2 for GenerateNextState() */
12. nextState.setDepth(currentState.depth + 1) ;
13. nextStateHashCode = nextState.computeHashCode() ; /* H: compute a hash code */
14. checkProperty = nextState.verifyAssertion() ; /* Y: verify the assertion */
15. if ( (checkProperty == false) AND (DoesCounterexampleContainEvent(nextState)) ) {
16. Print("Counterexample ") ;
17. printCounterexample(nextState) ;
18. exit ;
19. } else if ( (checkProperty == true) AND (nextState.depth < MAXDEPTH) ) {
/* v: safe event; i.e., nextState does not violate any assertion. 1-v: unsafe event. */
/* d: deepest event; i.e., depth of nextState == MAXDEPTH. */
20. if ( nextStateHashCode does not exist in AlreadyVisited ) { /* A: search in AlreadyVisited */
/* n: non-tree event. t=1-n-d: tree event. */
21. if ( search strategy is best-first ) nextState.computeBeFSTuple() ; /* U: compute BeFS tuple */
22. AlreadyVisited.add(nextStateHashCode) ; /* R: add a hash code to AlreadyVisited */





Figure 7.1: An explicit-state stateful state space exploration procedure. AlreadyVisited stores the
hash codes of the states that have already been visited. The stateful search depends on the equality
of the hash codes. The symbols used in the comments are explained in Table 7.2.
Similar to SSExploreAddNext() (Figure 3.2), SSExplore() (Figure 7.1) invokes GenerateEnabledE-
vents() (Figure 3.2, lines 23-30) and GenerateNextState() (Figure 3.2, lines 31-36) to determine the
enabled events and execute them respectively. Furthermore, SSExplore() can employ the different
(randomized) search strategies: BFS-AN, DFS-AN, BeFS-AN, BFS-ANS, DFS-ANS and BeFS-
ANS. The best-first search strategies are implemented by state ranking (Figure 7.1, line 21). The
randomized search strategies are implemented by shuﬄing the set of enabled events at each state
being explored as explained in Section 3.3.4.
7.2 Incremental State Space Exploration Procedure
Incremental state space exploration (ISSE) is a technique that aims to provide a speedup in the
verification time of evolving simulation models. Incremental state space exploration considers several
versions of the simulation model and reuses the results of verifying one version to speed up the




We make the following two assumptions:
1. The first assumption is related to the definition of the global state (Section 3.2.1): The def-
inition of the global state does not change from one version to another; e.g., a new version
does not add or remove attributes to the existing global state definition. In particular, the
implementation of the function computeHashCode() that computes the hash code of a state
as part of the verification model does not change in the subsequent version(s) verified using
ISSE.
2. The second assumption is related to the event IDs and the event parameters (Section 3.3.2):
An event having ID e in one version keeps the same ID in the subsequent version(s) verified
using ISSE. In addition, the meanings of the event parameters stay the same from one version
to another. We elaborate on this assumption in the following section.
7.2.2 Technique
We describe the ISSE technique in the context where the evolution from one version of the simulation
model to another is the modification of one or more of the existing event handlers in the simulation
model. In order to use the ISSE technique, the extra work that the user needs to do is to determine
which events were modified. The ISSE technique is also applicable, in a straightforward way, to
other kinds of evolutions such as adding a new event handler and/or removing an existing one as
long as the second assumption mentioned in Section 7.2.1 holds. In the case of adding a new event,
the new event will have a new event ID that is not used by any old event. In the case of both adding
a new event and removing an existing one, the event ID assigned to the new event has to be unequal
to the ID that was used by the event being removed. (In some of our experiments (Chapter 8), we
studied the effect of adding a new event handler.)
Figure 7.3 shows the pseudo-code of IncrementalSSExplore(), the incremental version of the state
space exploration procedure in Figure 7.1. The added or modified lines are shown in italic. In
Figure 7.3, line 1, the two parameters write and read determine the mode of operation of the
procedure. Table 7.1 shows the four possible modes of operation of the ISSE technique.
If write is false and read is false, it is easy to see that the operation of IncrementalSSExplore()
is exactly the same as SSExplore() (Figure 7.1). In other words, the non-incremental SSE procedure
is a special case of the ISSE technique.
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Table 7.1: The four possible modes of operation of the ISSE technique. The non-incremental SSE
procedure (Section 7.1) is just one mode of these four modes.
If write is true, IncrementalSSExplore() stores the state space graph in the OUTPUT data
structure (Figure 7.3, lines 42-45). OUTPUT stores only the hash codes of the visited states that
do not violate an assertion. Specifically, each executed safe event s
E
−→ s′, where E is an instance
of EventInfo (Section 3.3.2) and both s and s′ are instances of GlobalState (Section 3.2.1), is
represented in OUTPUT as < h,E, h′ > where h is the hash code of s and h′ is the hash code of
s′. Before IncrementalSSExplore() terminates, the OUTPUT data structure is written to an output
file (Figure 7.3, line 35 and line 46) on secondary storage.
If read is true, IncrementalSSExplore() first loads a state space graph from an input file and
stores it in the INPUT data structure (Figure 7.3, line 2). In a typical setting, the user would
invoke IncrementalSSExplore() with read = false and write = true in order to write the state space
graph of one version to an output file. Following that, while verifying a subsequent version, the user
would invoke IncrementalSSExplore() with read = true in order to load the state space graph of the
previous version from that file.
For each enabled event in currentState, IncrementalSSExplore() makes use of two decision variables
execute and postProcess to determine the “workload” associated with this enabled event. If execute
is false, this enabled event is not executed and hence no workload is associated with it. If execute
is true (Figure 7.3, line 23), the event is executed and a nextState is generated (Figure 7.3, line 24).
If postProcess is also true (Figure 7.3, line 26 and line 38), (i) the hash code of nextState has to be
computed (Figure 7.3, line 27), (ii) IncrementalSSExplore() has to check whether nextState violates
an assertion (Figure 7.3, line 28), and (iii) IncrementalSSExplore() may have to check whether the
hash code of nextState exists in AlreadyVisited (Figure 7.3, line 38). Otherwise, none of these three
operations need to be done.
The settings of execute and postProcess are determined as follows. Initially, both are set to true
(Figure 7.3, lines 12-13). IncrementalSSExplore() then checks whether the enabled event represents
a non-modified event. This check is achieved by the isModifiedEvent() function call (Figure 7.3,




miss (1-p) hit (p);
hence, safe
Figure 7.2: Non-modified events can be either “miss” or “hit”. Potential savings obtained from ISSE
(indicated by the rectangle) come from the non-modified hit events. The symbols used between
parentheses are explained in Table 7.2.
implementation of isModifiedEvent() is the responsibility of the user.
If the event is modified (i.e., isModifiedEvent() returns true), execute and postProcess remain
true since the event has to be executed and the generated nextState has to be post-processed
as explained above. On the other hand, if the enabled event represents a non-modified event,
potential savings may be gained depending on whether or not information about this event exists
in INPUT . IncrementalSSExplore() searches for the hash code of currentState and the EventInfo E
that corresponds to this event in INPUT (Figure 7.3, line 16). We here divide the non-modified
events into two disjoint types:
1. miss event : a non-modified event such that the hash code of currentState and the EventInfo
E that corresponds to this event do not exist in INPUT .
2. hit event : a non-modified event such that the hash code of currentState and the EventInfo E
that corresponds to this event exist in INPUT .
Figure 7.2 shows this division diagrammatically.
If the hash code of currentState and the EventInfo E that corresponds to the non-modified event
do not exist in INPUT (i.e., the case of a miss event), then execute and postProcess remain true
since this event may generate a nextState that violates an assertion (i.e., the case of an unsafe event)
or a nextState that has not been visited before (i.e., the case of a safe tree event). On the other
hand, if the hash code of currentState and the EventInfo E that corresponds to the non-modified
event exist in INPUT (i.e., the case of a hit event), then postProcess is set to false (Figure 7.3,
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line 17) because we can fetch the hash code of nextState from INPUT (Figure 7.3, line 18) and we
know that nextState does not violate an assertion because INPUT does not store the hash codes
of states that violate an assertion as explained above; i.e., every hit event is safe. Hence, we saved
both the time of computing the hash code of nextState and the time of checking whether nextState
violates an assertion.
Following that, IncrementalSSExplore() checks if the depth of nextState (which is one plus the
depth of currentState) is equal to MAXDEPTH. If so (i.e., the case of a hit deepest event),
execute is also set to false (Figure 7.3, line 20) because there is no need to execute an event that
will generate a nextState that satisfies the assertion and will not be added to ToBeExplored. If not,
IncrementalSSExplore() checks if the hash code of nextState exists in AlreadyVisited (Figure 7.3, line
21). If so (i.e., the case of a hit non-tree event), execute is also set to false (Figure 7.3, line 22) for
the same reason as in the former check. If not (i.e., the case of a hit tree event), execute remains
true.
In summary, the potential savings obtained from the ISSE technique come from two primary
sources:
1. non-modified hit tree events: not computing the hash code of nextState and not checking
whether nextState violates an assertion, and
2. non-modified hit non-tree or deepest events: not executing the event, not computing the hash
code of nextState and not checking whether nextState violates an assertion.
It is important to note that every tree event is executed.
It should be mentioned that if both read = true and write = true, we use only one data structure
for both INPUT and OUTPUT instead of two separate data structures. This design choice saves
the time of inserting in OUTPUT the event information that already exists in INPUT . This
explains why the conditions in the if statements (Figure 7.3, lines 42-44) include the condition
postProcess == true.
Note that an obvious overhead that is incurred by the incremental state space exploration tech-
nique is the extra memory overhead due to the INPUT and/or OUTPUT data structures. Note
further that while loading a state space graph from an input file and storing it in the INPUT data
structure (Figure 7.3, line 2), we do not insert the information of the modified events in INPUT .
This reduces the memory consumed by INPUT and at the same time does not lose any poten-
tial time savings since we search in INPUT (Figure 7.3, line 16) for the non-modified events only
78
(Figure 7.3, line 15).
In the following chapter, we measure the memory overhead incurred by the incremental state
space exploration technique in our experiments. In the next section, we focus on the performance
of the incremental state space exploration technique with respect to time.
7.3 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of each of the non-incremental and incremental state
space exploration procedures in order to analytically derive necessary conditions for the incremental
state space exploration procedure to provide a speedup in the state space exploration time when
compared to the non-incremental state space exploration procedure.
7.3.1 Analysis of the Non-incremental State Space Exploration
Procedure
First, we analyze the average time TNonInc spent in an iteration of the for loop in which enabled
events get executed and the generated states are post-processed (Figure 7.1, lines 9-23). We focus
on the operations that would help us compare between the non-incremental and the incremental
state space exploration procedures. Table 7.2 shows the notations that we use in this chapter. Some
of the comments in Figure 7.1 make use of the symbols shown in Table 7.2.
Analyzing Figure 7.1, we see that
TNonInc = X + H + Y + vnA + vt(A + U + R + N)
Note that n + t = 1− d. Hence, we have,
TNonInc = X + H + Y + v(1− d)A + vt(U + R + N)
7.3.2 Analysis of the Incremental State Space Exploration Procedure
Next, we analyze the average time TInc spent in an iteration of the for loop in which enabled
events may or may not be executed and the generated states may or may not be post-processed
(Figure 7.3, lines 10-45). Again, we focus on the operations that would help us compare between
the non-incremental and the incremental state space exploration procedures. The purpose of this
analysis is to identify the necessary conditions for the incremental state space exploration procedure
to provide a speedup in the state space exploration time.
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X Time to execute an enabled event.
H Time to compute the hash code of a generated state.
Y Time to check whether or not a generated state satisfies the assertion.
v Proportion of explored events that are safe.
Hence, 1− v is the proportion of explored events that are unsafe.
d Proportion of explored events that are deepest.
n Proportion of explored events that are non-tree.
t Proportion of explored events that are tree. t = 1− n− d
A Time to search in AlreadyVisited.
U Time to compute the BeFS tuple of a generated state.
U = 0 if the search strategy is not best-first.
R Time to add a hash code of a generated state to AlreadyVisited.
N Time to add a generated state to ToBeExplored.
q Proportion of explored events that are modified.
Hence, 1− q is the proportion of explored events that are not modified.
L Time to search in INPUT .
p Proportion of explored non-modified events whose information is found in INPUT .
In other words, p is the proportion of explored non-modified events that are hit
(i.e., searches in INPUT that are successful).
Hence, 1− p is the proportion of explored non-modified events that are miss.
Ftotal Time to load a state space graph from the input file and store it in INPUT .
κ Total number of explored events.
F Ftotalκ
Table 7.2: Notation used in this chapter: A capital letter is used for the average time spent in an
operation, and a small letter is used for the proportion of events that satisfy a certain condition.
First we note that an obvious overhead of IncrementalSSExplore() is the time Ftotal spent in
loading the state space graph from the input file and storing it in INPUT (Figure 7.3, line 2). Since
we are interested in analyzing the average time spent in an iteration of the for loop (Figure 7.3, lines
10-45), we work with F = Ftotalκ where κ is the total number of explored events.
Obviously, if read is false, the incremental state space exploration technique is disabled, and
hence no speedup is expected. Furthermore, if q = 1 (i.e., all enabled events are modified) then
the condition in the if statement (Figure 7.3, line 15) will always be false, and no speedup will be
expected from the incremental state space exploration procedure. Hence, if the user determines that
all events were modified, we set read to false in order to save the time that would otherwise be
wasted in opening and processing the input file (Figure 7.3, line 2).
Similarly, if p = 0 (i.e., no information about the explored non-modified events is found in
INPUT ) then the condition in the if statement (Figure 7.3, line 16) will always be false, and no
speedup will be expected from the incremental state space exploration procedure either. Therefore,
read = true, q 6= 1 and p 6= 0 are three obvious necessary conditions. Another trivial necessary
condition is v 6= 0.
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Analyzing Figure 7.3, we see that the average time TInc spent in an iteration of the for loop
(Figure 7.3, lines 10-45) is given by:
TInc = F + qTNonInc + (1− q){L + (1− p)TNonInc + pnA + pt[A + X + U + R + N ]}
In order to have a speedup, we must have TInc < TNonInc. In other words,
F + qTNonInc + (1− q){L + (1− p)TNonInc + p(1− d)A + pt(X + U + R + N)} < TNonInc
If q 6= 1, we have
F
1−q + L + (1− p)TNonInc + p(1− d)A + ptX + pt(U + R + N) < TNonInc




p + (1− d)A + tX + t(U + R + N) < TNonInc








p + (1− d)(1− v)A + t(1− v)(U + R + N) < H + Y + (1− t)X
Since in the state spaces of the sophisticated simulation models of network protocols, the proportion
of explored events that are unsafe is usually significantly small, it is reasonable to assume that
v ≈ 1. This is especially true if the state space explorer searches for a state that violates the
assertion and terminates the state space exploration once one is found. Therefore, and since we are
only interested in a necessary condition and the two terms (1− d)(1− v)A and t(1− v)(U + R + N)
are non-negative, if both A and (U + R + N) are of the same order1 as Fp(1−q) +
L
p , we can drop





p < H + Y + (1− t)X
Informally, this condition means that incremental state space exploration cannot provide a speedup
unless the costs of executing events, computing hash codes, and checking the assertions are high
and there is a small proportion of tree events. Furthermore, this condition also says that the larger
the value of p and the smaller the value of q, the more likely it is for the incremental state space
exploration to provide a speedup. In addition, this condition also suggests that a reduction in p
(with q fixed) will have a more adversarial effect on the incremental state space exploration than
1We will empirically validate this assumption in the evaluation sections (Chapter 8).
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an increase in q (with p fixed). Intuitively, this is true because the overhead associated with a
modified event is executing the event and post-processing nextState while the overhead associated
with a non-modified event whose event information is not found in INPUT is executing the event,
post-processing nextState, and the search in INPUT (Figure 7.3, line 16).
In summary, the necessary conditions for IncrementalSSExplore() (Figure 7.3) to provide a speedup
in state space exploration when compared with SSExplore() (Figure 7.1) are:
1. read = true
2. q 6= 1, p 6= 0, and v 6= 0
3. Fp(1−q) +
L
p < H + Y + (1− t)X
The J-Sim state space explorer dynamically estimates the values of the symbols in Table 7.2
and checks whether or not the necessary conditions are satisfied. The user may run a sample run
of IncrementalSSExplore() to know whether using the incremental state space exploration procedure
can provide a speedup.
The analysis in this section assumed write = false. The case of write = true can be done in a
similar way to what we did above.
7.4 Correctness
In this section, we discuss the correctness of both the non-incremental and incremental state space
exploration procedures.
First, we consider the correctness of a special case of the procedures, namely when there is no
hashing; i.e., the computeHashCode() function (Figure 7.1, line 3 and line 13; Figure 7.3, line 4 and
line 27) is the identity function. In this case, the non-incremental state space exploration procedure
(Figure 7.1) is guaranteed to discover any state that violates an assertion and whose depth is at
most MAXDEPTH. The incremental state space exploration procedure (Figure 7.3) can also be
easily shown to find any such state.
In the presence of hashing, however, there are a couple of subtle issues to consider. First,
the non-incremental state space exploration procedure (Figure 7.1) becomes only sound but not
complete. In other words, it can miss a state that violates an assertion and whose depth is at most
MAXDEPTH. This is because of the following possible scenario: the procedure may visit a state
s2 that is distinct from a previously visited state s1 but whose hash code is equal to the hash code
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of s1. Hence, when the non-incremental state space exploration procedure looks up the hash code of
s2 in AlreadyVisited (Figure 7.1, line 20), it will decide to not explore further any executions from
s2. This can potentially miss those states that are reachable from s2 and violate an assertion. Since
the non-incremental state space exploration procedure is not complete in the presence of hashing,
its incremental version (Figure 7.3) will clearly also not be complete due to the same reasons.
However, there is a second subtle source for the incompleteness of the incremental state space
exploration procedure in the presence of hashing. Suppose that, while verifying a previous version
of the simulation model, a state s1 is explored and its hash code and events information are output
to the OUTPUT data structure and eventually to the output file on secondary storage. Suppose
further that, while verifying a subsequent version of the model after loading the state space graph
from that file into the INPUT data structure, a state s2 is visited before s1 such that (1) s2 is
distinct from s1 but the hash code of s2 is equal to that of s1, and (2) s2 has an enabled non-modified
event that was also enabled in s1. In this case, the incremental state space exploration procedure will
(incorrectly) conclude that the state s2 was visited while verifying the previous version of the model
(Figure 7.3, line 16). The incremental state space exploration procedure may then use the hash
code(s) of the state(s) reached from s1 (Figure 7.3, line 18) to search in AlreadyVisited (Figure 7.3,
line 21). Consequently, the incremental procedure may not explore certain paths that would be
explored by the non-incremental version.
Despite these limitations, the incremental procedure is guaranteed to be sound for assertions,
which are the focus of this thesis. This is because every tree event is executed, even if the hash
code of the generated nextState is not recomputed. Since the discovery of assertion violations is
often the goal of state space exploration tools (as witnessed by the widespread use of hashing in
non-incremental procedures despite its incompleteness), we expect that these theoretical limitations
will not affect the usefulness of our techniques in practice.
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1. procedure IncrementalSSExplore(boolean write, boolean read)
2. if ( read ) INPUT = readFromInputFile() ;
3. initialState.depth = 0 ;
4. initialStateHashCode = initialState.computeHashCode() ;
5. AlreadyVisited.add(initialStateHashCode) ;
6. ToBeExplored.add(initialState) ;
7. while ( ToBeExplored is not empty ) {
8. currentState = ToBeExplored.remove() ;
9. EnabledEvents = GenerateEnabledEvents(currentState) ; /* See Figure 3.2 for GenerateEnabledEvents() */
10. for ( int i = 0 ; i < EnabledEvents.size() ; i++ ) {
11. EventInfo E = EnabledEvents.get(i) ;
12. execute = true ;
13. postProcess = true ;
14. if ( read ) {
15. if ( isModifiedEvent(E.getEventID()) == false ) {
/* q: event is modified. 1-q: event is not modified. */
16. if ( <currentState.hashCode, E> exists in INPUT ) { /* L: search in INPUT */
/* p: event information is found in INPUT. 1-p: not found in INPUT. */
17. postProcess = false ;
18. nextStateHashCode = <currentState.hashCode, E>.getNextStateHashCode() ;
19. if ( (currentState.depth + 1) == MAXDEPTH ) {
/* d: deepest event; i.e., depth of nextState == MAXDEPTH. */
20. execute = false ;
21. } else if ( nextStateHashCode exists in AlreadyVisited ) { /* A: search in AlreadyVisited */
/* n: non-tree event. t=1-n-d: tree event. */





23. if ( execute ) {
24. nextState = GenerateNextState(currentState, E) ; /* X: execute an event */
/* See Figure 3.2 for GenerateNextState() */
25. nextState.setDepth(currentState.depth + 1) ;
26. if ( postProcess ) {
27. nextStateHashCode = nextState.computeHashCode() ; /* H: compute a hash code */
28. checkProperty = nextState.verifyAssertion() ; /* Y: verify the assertion */
29. } else {
30. nextState.setHashCode(nextStateHashCode) ; /* Hash code of nextState was obtained from INPUT. */
31. checkProperty = true ; /* INPUT does not store hash codes of states that violate an assertion */
}
32. if ( (checkProperty == false) AND (DoesCounterexampleContainEvent(nextState)) ) {
33. Print("Counterexample ") ;
34. printCounterexample(nextState) ;
35. if ( write ) writeToOutputFile(OUTPUT) ;
36. exit ;
37. } else if ( (checkProperty == true) AND (nextState.depth < MAXDEPTH) ) {
/* v: safe event; i.e., nextState does not violate any assertion. */
/* d: deepest event; i.e., depth of nextState == MAXDEPTH. */
38. if ( (postProcess == false) OR (nextStateHashCode does not exist in AlreadyVisited ) {
/* A: search in AlreadyVisited */
/* n: non-tree event. t=1-n-d: tree event. */
39. if ( search strategy is best-first ) nextState.computeBeFSTuple() ; /* U: compute BeFS tuple */
40. AlreadyVisited.add(nextStateHashCode) ; /* R: add a hash code to AlreadyVisited */
41. ToBeExplored.add(nextState) ; /* N: add a state to ToBeExplored */
42. if ( write AND postProcess ) OUTPUT.add(<currentState.hashCode, E, nextStateHashCode>) ;
43. } else if ( write AND postProcess ) OUTPUT.add(<currentState.hashCode, E, nextStateHashCode>) ;
44. } else if ( checkProperty AND write AND postProcess )




46. if ( write ) writeToOutputFile(OUTPUT) ;
Figure 7.3: An incremental version of the state space exploration procedure in Figure 7.1. Added
or modified lines are shown in italic. AlreadyVisited stores the hash codes of the states that have
already been visited. The stateful search depends on the equality of the hash codes. The symbols





In this chapter, we apply the incremental state space exploration (ISSE) technique to the three case
studies: (a) the AODV case study (Section 8.1), (b) the Directed Diffusion case study (Section 8.2),
and (c) the ARQ case study (Section 8.3) and compare its performance to that of the traditional,
non-incremental state space exploration. We study scenarios in which code changes may or may
not lead to behavioral changes. In each experiment, we have checked that the state spaces explored
by the non-incremental and the incremental state space explorations are the same. In other words,
both techniques have the same “workload”. This check is important because it shows that the
source of incompleteness due to ISSE, which we discussed in Section 7.4, did not appear in any of
our experiments; hence, the time speedup gained by ISSE is not because ISSE is exploring a smaller
state space than that explored by non-incremental SSE.
In each case study, we used the same definitions of the global state, the initial state, the assertion,
and the events mentioned in the corresponding case study in Chapters 4-6. The hash code of a state
is computed by first constructing an integer array representation of the state. Following that, an
integer-valued hash code of this integer array representation is computed using the Jenkins’ hash
function that we borrowed from JPF. (We slightly modified this function to return an integer instead
of a long value.)
8.1 AODV Case Study (Revisited)
We apply the non-incremental and the incremental state space exploration procedures to the J-Sim
simulation model of the Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [78] for
wireless ad-hoc networks (Section 4.1).
The integer array representation of a state depends on the protocol-specific information such as
the AODV packet headers and payloads, and each node’s seqnon, bidn, routing table entries and
broadcast ID cache entries. The BeFS heuristic that we consider in the experiments is AODV-3-
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BeFS.
We conduct the experiments in this section on a 4 CPU Intel Pentium III 500 MHz machine
running Linux version 2.6.9 with 1 GB memory. We use Sun’s 1.6.0 b105 Java HotSpotTM Client
VM with 0.5 GB initial heap size and 2.5 GB maximum heap size.
8.1.1 Experiments
Recall that while verifying the J-Sim simulation model of AODV (Section 4.3), we manually injected
two errors (which we called Counterexamples 2 and 3 respectively): in Counterexample 2, seqnon,d
is not incremented when a RTE is invalidated and in Counterexample 3, a RTE is deleted (instead of
invalidated) when its lifetime expires. In all the experiments of the AODV case study in this section,
we require that the counterexample contain at least one state that is generated due to the route
timeout event, T3. In order to achieve that, we made use of the DoesCounterexampleContainEvent()
function provided by the state space exploration framework (Figure 7.1, line 15 and Figure 7.3, line
32). This effectively prevents the state space explorer from outputting Counterexample 1 mentioned
in Section 4.3. The reason why we did that in this section is because we want to focus on studying
the evolution of the simulation model from versions that output a counterexample to a version that
does not output any counterexample.
Code changes that do not incur behavioral changes:
We first study the performance of the incremental state space exploration procedure in six different
scenarios: (i) a best-case scenario (q = 0): no events are modified, and (ii) five practical-case
scenarios (0 < q < 1): one event (the route timeout event T3) or two events (T3 and T4), or three
events (T0, T3 and T4), or four events (T0, T2, T3 and T4), or five events (T0, T2, T3, T4 and T5) are
modified. Furthermore, we compare between the non-incremental and the incremental state space
exploration procedures in each of these six scenarios using the three randomized search strategies
BFS-ANS, DFS-ANS, and AODV-3-BeFS-ANS. To isolate the savings gained (or overhead incurred)
by the incremental state space exploration procedure, the modified events, if any, are just “flagged”
as modified but their implementations are not changed. Practically, this corresponds to code changes
that do not incur any behavioral changes; e.g., a code refactoring where any changes to the code
improve its readability or simplify its structure but do not change its results.
Table 8.1 gives the time needed to find an assertion violation if any exists (Counterexample 2 or
3). In Table 8.1, “Non-inc. SSE” refers to Figure 7.3 with read = false and write = false, while
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“Incremental SSE” refers to Figure 7.3 with read = true and write = false. Before running the
“Incremental SSE”, we had to execute Figure 7.3 with read = false and write = true in order to
generate the file that contains the state space graph; however, the time needed for this intermediate
step is not reported. For each experiment, we ran 10 replications. Each replication has a different
seed. The savings gained (or overhead incurred) by the incremental state space exploration is shown
as a percentage of the corresponding average non-incremental state space exploration time. In this
chapter, we denote a saving by a positive sign and an overhead by a negative sign. Formally, the
time savings or overhead is given by SSE time − ISSE timeSSE time . The last column of Table 8.1 shows t,
which is the proportion of explored events that are tree.
As shown in Table 8.1, the incremental state space exploration technique can indeed provide
time savings in the best-case scenario (q = 0) and all the practical-case scenarios (0 < q < 1). In
each row for the incremental state space exploration experiments, the time savings decrease with the
increase in q as expected. Note that we implemented our own file read and write functions because
we noticed an unreasonably large overhead when we used Java serialization.
In order to understand why the incremental state space exploration procedure was successful in
providing time savings, we show in Table 8.2 a breakdown of the average state space exploration
time spent in some selected operations taking the first row in Table 8.1 as an example. As shown
in Table 8.2, the costs of executing events (i.e., the sum of copying from the verification model to
the simulation model, executing the event handlers in the simulation model, and copying from the
simulation model to the verification model), computing hash codes, and checking the assertion are
considerably high taking together more than 78% of the average total time in the non-incremental
state space exploration. In contrast, the times spent in these three operations in the incremental
state space exploration procedure (0 ≤ q < 1) are smaller than their counterparts in the non-
incremental exploration. Furthermore, for all the values of q shown in Table 8.2, other operations
that are only done in the incremental state space exploration procedure (e.g., reading from the input
file and searching in INPUT ) take a comparatively small amount of time (less than 13% of the
incremental state space exploration time). Note that in this particular example, t = 6.98%; i.e., the
proportion of events that are tree is small. Furthermore, p = 0.999; i.e., almost all of the searches in
INPUT are successful. All these observations explain why the incremental state space exploration
procedure (0 ≤ q < 1) provided a time speedup. The second-to-last row in Table 8.2 shows the
value of this speedup, which is defined as the non-incremental state space exploration time divided
by the incremental state space exploration time; i.e., SSE timeISSE time . The last row in Table 8.2 gives
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No Counterexample Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false) Time Savings (+)
N = 3 Time (sec.) or Overhead (-) shown as a percentage of Non-inc. SSE Time
MAXDEPTH = 9 (read=false, No One Two Three Four Five
write=false) Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified
Search Strategy Events Event Events Events Events Events t
BFS-ANS 125.344 74.11% 73.60% 50.07% 40.42% 33.36% 14.75% 0.0698
DFS-ANS 127.905 76.26% 75.33% 51.40% 41.14% 34.20% 13.24% 0.0704
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 129.359 75.76% 75.11% 50.46% 40.37% 33.37% 13.77% 0.0706
Counterexample 2 Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false) Time Savings (+)
N = 3 Time (sec.) or Overhead (-) shown as a percentage of Non-inc. SSE Time
MAXDEPTH = 9 (read=false, No One Two Three Four Five
write=false) Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified
Search Strategy Events Event Events Events Events Events t
BFS-ANS 63.444 62.12% 61.38% 42.55% 33.54% 28.31% 12.27% 0.1635
DFS-ANS 35.912 74.67% 73.41% 50.10% 39.92% 33.23% 13.86% 0.0766
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 5.078 65.32% 63.42% 43.78% 33.19% 26.02% 10.92% 0.2094
Counterexample 3 Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false) Time Savings (+)
N = 3 Time (sec.) or Overhead (-) shown as a percentage of Non-inc. SSE Time
MAXDEPTH = 9 (read=false, No One Two Three Four Five
write=false) Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified
Search Strategy Events Event Events Events Events Events t
BFS-ANS 60.141 60.66% 60.18% 41.32% 32.27% 26.43% 9.87% 0.1687
DFS-ANS 36.188 74.11% 73.46% 50.14% 39.17% 32.17% 12.93% 0.0755
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 5.076 65.66% 64.24% 44.54% 34.24% 27.22% 10.35% 0.2094
Counterexample 3 Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false) Time Savings (+)
Search Strategy is Time (sec.) or Overhead (-) shown as a percentage of Non-inc. SSE Time
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS (read=false, No One Two Three Four Five
write=false) Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified
N MAXDEPTH Events Event Events Events Events Events t
3 15 0.568 14.20% 12.38% 9.25% 7.56% 5.14% 2.43% 0.5492
4 20 1.521 25.16% 18.68% 12.81% 11.56% 7.17% 3.51% 0.4832
5 25 14.046 49.15% 41.96% 31.34% 30.81% 20.24% 10.99% 0.3991
Table 8.1: AODV case study: Average time (sec.) for non-incremental state space exploration. The
savings (+) or overhead (-) of the incremental state space exploration is shown as a percentage of the
corresponding average non-incremental state space exploration time. The ad-hoc network consists
of N nodes arranged in a chain network topology. The state space explorer terminates state space
exploration if an assertion violation is detected. p = 0.999. AlreadyVisited stores the hash codes of
the states that have already been visited. The stateful search depends on the equality of the hash
codes.
the number of the executed events. Note that although t = 6.98%, the time of executing the event
handlers in the incremental state space exploration with no modified events is larger than 6.98% of
the time of executing the event handlers in the non-incremental state space exploration. We have
found that the reason for this observation is that the average time of executing a tree event is more
than the average time of executing a non-tree or deepest event.
It should also be noticed that the times of the operations that do not appear in the simplified
necessary condition (e.g., inserting the hash code of a state in AlreadyVisited, inserting a state in
ToBeExplored, searching in AlreadyVisited, and generating the enabled events) are almost equal in
both the non-incremental and incremental state space exploration techniques. Furthermore, the
sum of the times to search in AlreadyVisited, insert a hash code in AlreadyVisited, and insert a state
in ToBeExplored is of the same order as the sum of the times to search in INPUT and read from
the input file in the incremental state space exploration technique for all the values of q shown in
Table 8.2. This justifies the assumption that we made in Section 7.3.2.
88
No Counterexample Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false)
N = 3 Time (sec.) Time (sec.)
MAXDEPTH = 9 (read=false, No One Two Three Four Five
BFS-ANS Search Strategy write=false) Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified
Events Event Events Events Events Events
Operation q=0 q=0.0108 q=0.2856 q=0.4143 q=0.5130 q=0.7907
From V model to S model 14.012 1.303 1.613 5.102 6.543 7.793 11.236
Execute event handlers 46.980 5.871 6.155 20.235 25.667 29.397 38.703
From S model to V model 13.083 1.088 1.277 4.784 6.512 7.763 10.839
Compute a hash code 16.311 0.097 0.297 5.100 7.253 8.963 13.036
Verify an assertion 7.554 0.001 0.113 2.218 3.126 3.877 5.907
Read from input file 0.000 0.555 0.555 0.505 0.487 0.470 0.422
Search in INPUT 0.000 3.562 3.458 2.647 2.204 1.867 0.997
Insert in AlreadyV isited 0.901 1.206 1.118 1.046 0.991 1.034 0.989
Search in AlreadyV isited 1.074 0.947 0.874 0.935 0.993 1.029 1.015
Generate enabled events 4.628 4.943 4.816 5.131 4.545 4.486 4.498
Insert in ToBeExplored 3.519 4.002 3.923 3.810 3.887 3.628 3.523
Compute the BeFS tuple 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Subtotal 108.062 23.575 24.199 51.513 62.208 70.307 91.165
Other operations 17.282 8.873 8.893 11.069 12.467 13.221 15.686
Total time 125.344 32.448 33.092 62.582 74.675 83.528 106.851
Speedup 3.86x 3.79x 2.00x 1.68x 1.50x 1.17x
Number of executed events 460150 32114 36228 151658 206985 247422 369781
Table 8.2: AODV case study: Breakdown of the average state space exploration time (sec.) spent in
some selected operations. The example shown corresponds to the first row in Table 8.1. p = 0.999
As mentioned in Section 7.2.2, an obvious overhead that is incurred by the incremental state space
exploration technique is the extra memory overhead due to the INPUT and/or OUTPUT data
structures. In Table 8.3, we measure this memory overhead for the experiments shown in Table 8.1
and report it as a percentage of the corresponding average non-incremental state space exploration
memory consumption. Formally, the memory overhead is given by SSE memory − ISSE memorySSE memory . In
this chapter, we measure the memory consumption of each technique by subtracting the total amount
of memory currently available for future allocated objects (returned by Runtime.freeMemory()) from
the total amount of memory currently available for current and future objects (returned by Run-
time.totalMemory()). Note that this measurement does not give an accurate value for the memory
consumed in each technique because it only measures the object heap, which is not the only factor
that contributes to a program’s memory footprint; other factors being classes, native data structures
and code, etc. In each replication, this measurement is repeated periodically every 500 transitions
and also done at the end of the replication, after running garbage collection each time, and we keep
track of the maximum memory consumption among the samples collected during the replication.
Note that this sampling mechanism does not accurately give the maximum memory required for
state space exploration because it only measures the maximum memory consumption among the
samples collected. Despite these limitations, our measurements do serve our purpose since we are
only interested in the relative difference between the non-incremental and incremental state space
exploration techniques due to the incremental state space exploration memory overhead, and since
the state spaces created by the non-incremental and the incremental state space explorations are
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No Counterexample Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false) Memory
N = 3 Memory (MB) Overhead (-) shown as a percentage of Non-inc. SSE Memory
MAXDEPTH = 9 (read=false, No One Two Three Four Five
write=false) Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified
Search Strategy Events Event Events Events Events Events
BFS-ANS 75.569 -15.10% -15.00% -12.45% -11.26% -10.34% -7.76%
DFS-ANS 3.633 -332.83% -330.62% -273.60% -246.49% -226.38% -168.73%
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 4.160 -288.41% -286.51% -237.28% -213.76% -196.39% -146.63%
Counterexample 2 Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false) Memory
N = 3 Memory (MB) Overhead (-) shown as a percentage of Non-inc. SSE Memory
MAXDEPTH = 9 (read=false, No One Two Three Four Five
write=false) Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified
Search Strategy Events Event Events Events Events Events
BFS-ANS 75.573 -7.08% -7.03% -5.91% -5.34% -4.92% -3.79%
DFS-ANS 1.325 -261.93% -260.38% -218.77% -198.45% -183.14% -141.20%
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 0.987 -65.35% -64.93% -58.74% -55.31% -52.39% -46.21%
Counterexample 3 Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false) Memory
N = 3 Memory (MB) Overhead (-) shown as a percentage of Non-inc. SSE Memory
MAXDEPTH = 9 (read=false, No One Two Three Four Five
write=false) Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified
Search Strategy Events Event Events Events Events Events
BFS-ANS 74.193 -6.92% -6.88% -5.78% -5.22% -4.82% -3.71%
DFS-ANS 1.353 -258.88% -257.29% -216.04% -195.81% -181.04% -139.30%
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 0.970 -66.00% -65.63% -59.46% -56.02% -53.03% -46.70%
Counterexample 3 Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false) Memory
Search Strategy is Memory (MB) Overhead (-) shown as a percentage of Non-inc. SSE Memory
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS (read=false, No One Two Three Four Five
write=false) Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified
N MAXDEPTH Events Event Events Events Events Events
3 15 1.020 -25.71% -25.48% -25.46% -25.49% -25.34% -25.34%
4 20 3.577 -9.32% -8.36% -8.25% -8.20% -8.07% -7.96%
5 25 35.723 -2.70% -2.43% -2.21% -2.19% -1.95% -1.73%
Table 8.3: AODV case study: Average memory consumption (MB) for the non-incremental state
space exploration for the experiments shown in Table 8.1. The overhead (-) of the incremental state
space exploration is shown as a percentage of the corresponding average non-incremental state space
exploration memory consumption.
the same, we ensure that the samples are synchronized (i.e., the part of the state space explored at
each sample in a non-incremental state space exploration is the same as that at the corresponding
sample in the corresponding incremental state space exploration). Finally, since running garbage
collection before each sample and measuring the memory take time, we run each replication twice;
once to measure time with the memory sampling mechanism disabled and once to measure memory
with the memory sampling mechanism enabled.
As shown in Table 8.3, for the largest average memory consumption of the non-incremental state
space exploration technique, the largest corresponding memory overhead of the incremental state
space exploration technique is only 7.08% of the average non-incremental state space exploration
memory consumption. It should also be noted that the extra memory overhead of the incremental
state space exploration technique decreases with the increase in q. This is because we do not insert
the information of the modified events in INPUT ; hence, the larger the value of q the smaller the
size of INPUT .
In Table 8.1, the state space explorer terminates state space exploration if an assertion violation
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is detected. Table 8.4 gives the results for Counterexamples 2 and 3 in the case where state space
exploration does not terminate when an assertion violation is detected. Instead, the state space
explorer continues exploring the state space till the maximum specified depth MAXDEPTH, but
does not explore events from those states that violate the assertion. In general, the savings in
Table 8.4 are larger than their counterparts in Table 8.1 because of the reduction in t, which is the
proportion of explored events that are tree, as indicated in the last column of Table 8.4. Intuitively, t
is higher when the state space explorer terminates state space exploration if an assertion violation is
detected (Table 8.1) because the tree events are the ones that “make change” and cause the assertion
to be violated. This is especially true in the case of the AODV-3-BeFS-ANS strategy (see Table 8.1)
because the goal of the best-first search is to guide the state space explorer towards paths that lead
to the assertion violation in less time. As shown in Table 8.4, for the largest non-incremental state
space exploration time, the incremental state space exploration technique was able to provide a time
saving of 75.25% (or equivalently a 4.04x speedup) with one code change (i.e., one modified event)
that does not incur a behavioral change.
In Table 8.5, we measure the memory overhead of each of the incremental state space explo-
ration experiments shown in Table 8.4 and report it as a percentage of the corresponding average
non-incremental state space exploration memory consumption. As shown in Table 8.5, for the
largest average memory consumption of the non-incremental state space exploration technique, the
largest corresponding memory overhead of the incremental state space exploration technique is only
15.10% of the average non-incremental state space exploration memory consumption. Similar to our
observations on Table 8.3, the extra memory overhead of the incremental state space exploration
technique decreases with the increase in q. This is because we do not insert the information of the
modified events in INPUT ; hence, the larger the value of q the smaller the size of INPUT . Note
however that the value of the extra memory overhead of the incremental state space exploration
technique, not as a percentage but as the product of the percentage given in Table 8.5 and the corre-
sponding average non-incremental state space exploration memory consumption, is almost constant
in each column. This is because the size of the state space information stored in INPUT is almost
the same in each column because in each experiment the state space explorer does not terminate
when an assertion violation is detected but continues exploring the state space till the maximum
specified depth MAXDEPTH as we explained above.
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Counterexample 2 Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false) Time Savings (+)
N = 3 Time (sec.) or Overhead (-) shown as a percentage of Non-inc. SSE Time
MAXDEPTH = 9 (read=false, No One Two Three Four Five
write=false) Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified
Search Strategy Events Event Events Events Events Events t
BFS-ANS 124.656 74.04% 73.06% 49.62% 39.50% 32.43% 13.23% 0.0698
DFS-ANS 128.636 76.37% 75.47% 51.53% 41.11% 33.99% 14.56% 0.0704
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 128.365 75.73% 74.86% 50.40% 39.61% 32.44% 11.81% 0.0706
Counterexample 3 Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false) Time Savings (+)
N = 3 Time (sec.) or Overhead (-) shown as a percentage of Non-inc. SSE Time
MAXDEPTH = 9 (read=false, No One Two Three Four Five
write=false) Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified
Search Strategy Events Event Events Events Events Events t
BFS-ANS 121.825 74.00% 73.09% 49.32% 39.57% 32.00% 13.18% 0.0696
DFS-ANS 126.452 76.20% 75.34% 51.29% 40.52% 32.61% 12.24% 0.0703
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 129.367 76.24% 75.25% 51.09% 40.18% 33.99% 13.34% 0.0705
Table 8.4: AODV case study: Average time (sec.) for non-incremental state space exploration. The
savings (+) or overhead (-) of the incremental state space exploration is shown as a percentage of the
corresponding average non-incremental state space exploration time. The ad-hoc network consists
of N nodes arranged in a chain network topology. The state space explorer does NOT terminate
state space exploration if an assertion violation is detected. p = 0.999. AlreadyVisited stores the
hash codes of the states that have already been visited. The stateful search depends on the equality
of the hash codes.
Counterexample 2 Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false) Memory
N = 3 Memory (MB) Overhead (-) shown as a percentage of Non-inc. SSE Memory
MAXDEPTH = 9 (read=false, No One Two Three Four Five
write=false) Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified
Search Strategy Events Event Events Events Events Events
BFS-ANS 75.572 -15.10% -15.00% -12.45% -11.26% -10.34% -7.76%
DFS-ANS 3.642 -332.66% -330.46% -273.42% -246.30% -226.23% -168.56%
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 4.185 -286.75% -284.86% -235.93% -212.53% -195.27% -145.78%
Counterexample 3 Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false) Memory
N = 3 Memory (MB) Overhead (-) shown as a percentage of Non-inc. SSE Memory
MAXDEPTH = 9 (read=false, No One Two Three Four Five
write=false) Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified Modified
Search Strategy Events Event Events Events Events Events
BFS-ANS 74.192 -15.19% -15.09% -12.52% -11.32% -10.40% -7.80%
DFS-ANS 3.534 -338.61% -336.36% -278.15% -250.62% -230.27% -171.42%
AODV-3-BeFS-ANS 4.105 -288.73% -286.83% -237.44% -213.94% -196.62% -146.67%
Table 8.5: AODV case study: Average memory consumption (MB) for the non-incremental state
space exploration for the experiments shown in Table 8.4. The overhead (-) of the incremental state
space exploration is shown as a percentage of the corresponding average non-incremental state space
exploration memory consumption.
Code changes that incur behavioral changes:
To further evaluate the incremental state space exploration technique, we evaluate its performance
in another scenario; namely, one in which the implementation of a modified event does change.
Practically, this corresponds to code changes that do incur behavioral changes. Specifically, we
simulate the behavior of a user who tries to implement the route timeout event T3 correctly. First,
the user implements the route timeout event T3 by deleting an RTE instead of invalidating it causing
Counterexample 3 to occur (we call this implementation Version C), then the user figures out that the
RTE has to be invalidated instead of being deleted but forgets to increment the destination sequence
number causing Counterexample 2 to occur (we call this implementation Version B). Following
that, the user figures out the correct implementation, which includes invalidating the RTE and
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incrementing the destination sequence number (we call this implementation Version A). Table 8.6
shows the state space exploration time under this scenario using both the non-incremental and
incremental techniques. We also show the results for the case where the implementation changes from
Version B, to C and finally to A. (In fact, we have also considered the case where the implementation
changes from Version A, to B and finally to C, and the case where the implementation changes from
Version A, to C and finally to B, but we do not report the results for these cases because they are
similar to the results for the cases reported here.)
We distinguish between two cases: Case I, which we call WriteEachVersion, and Case II, which we
call WriteFirstVersion. In Case I, storing the state space graph in the OUTPUT data structure and
writing the OUTPUT data structure to an output file occurs in each version using the incremental
state space exploration technique. Specifically, read = false and write = true in the first version
while read = true and write = true in the second and third versions. On the other hand, in
Case II, storing the state space graph in the OUTPUT data structure and writing the OUTPUT
data structure to an output file occurs in only the first version using the incremental state space
exploration technique. Specifically, read = false and write = true in the first version while read =
true and write = false in the second and third versions.
As shown in Table 8.6, incremental state space exploration is able to provide up to 42.85% overall
time savings (or equivalently 1.75x speedup) with one code change (i.e., one modified event) that
does incur a behavioral change. The performance results in Case II are better than those in Case I
because the second and third versions of Case II avoid the operations associated with write = true;
namely, inserting event information in OUTPUT and writing the state space graph to the output
file. Note that the values of p in Case II are very close to the corresponding ones in Case I; i.e., no
significant harm was done by setting write = false in the second and third versions of Case II. In
both Cases I and II, the performance results under the scenario B → C → A are very close to the
corresponding ones under the scenario C → B → A. This is due to the observation that the values
of p and q in the former scenario are very close to the corresponding ones in the latter.
It is also interesting to see how the time savings dropped from 73.60% (Table 8.1, first row, case
of one modified event) to 68.56% (Table 8.6, case of WriteFirstVersion, second-to-last row) although
the value of q = 0.0108 is the same in both cases (see Table 8.2) and the average non-incremental
state space exploration time is roughly the same in both cases. This reduction in the time savings
is due to the reduction in the value of p from p = 0.999 (Table 8.1) to p = 0.9404 (Table 8.6).
Table 8.7 shows the average memory consumption (MB) for the non-incremental and incremental
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Case I (WriteEachVersion): In incremental state space exploration, read and write are set as follows:
read=false, write=true (1st version in each set).
read=true, write=true (2nd and 3rd versions in each set). Same data structure is used for INPUT and OUTPUT .
C → B → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Time Observations on
Time (sec.) Time (sec.) Savings (+) Incremental SSE
(read=false, (see caption or
write=false) of Case I) Overhead (-)
Version C (Counterexample 3) 121.738 133.209 -9.42% v = 0.999960
No speedup if read=false
Version B (Counterexample 2) 123.976 40.375 67.43% p = 0.9403, q = 0.0108
Version A (No Counterexample) 123.646 40.293 67.41% p = 0.9404, q = 0.0108
Sum of Versions C, B, and A 369.360 213.877 42.10% 42.10% overall savings
B → C → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Time Observations on
Time (sec.) Time (sec.) Savings (+) Incremental SSE
(read=false, (see caption or
write=false) of Case I) Overhead (-)
Version B (Counterexample 2) 123.976 136.166 -9.83% v = 0.999972
No speedup if read=false
Version C (Counterexample 3) 121.738 38.563 68.32% p = 0.9521, q = 0.0109
Version A (No Counterexample) 123.646 40.406 67.32% p = 0.9404, q = 0.0108
Sum of Versions B, C, and A 369.360 215.135 41.75% 41.75% overall savings
Case II (WriteFirstVersion): In incremental state space exploration, read and write are set as follows:
read=false, write=true (1st version in each set).
read=true, write=false (2nd and 3rd versions in each set).
C → B → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Time Observations on
Time (sec.) Time (sec.) Savings (+) Incremental SSE
(read=false, (see caption or
write=false) of Case II) Overhead (-)
Version C (Counterexample 3) 121.738 133.236 -9.44% v = 0.999960
No speedup if read=false
Version B (Counterexample 2) 123.976 38.914 68.61% p = 0.9403, q = 0.0108
Version A (No Counterexample) 123.646 38.942 68.50% p = 0.9403, q = 0.0108
Sum of Versions C, B, and A 369.360 211.092 42.85% 42.85% overall savings
B → C → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Time Observations on
Time (sec.) Time (sec.) Savings (+) Incremental SSE
(read=false, (see caption or
write=false) of Case II) Overhead (-)
Version B (Counterexample 2) 123.976 136.232 -9.89% v = 0.999972
No speedup if read=false
Version C (Counterexample 3) 121.738 37.183 69.46% p = 0.9521, q = 0.0109
Version A (No Counterexample) 123.646 38.875 68.56% p = 0.9404, q = 0.0108
Sum of Versions B, C, and A 369.360 212.290 42.52% 42.52% overall savings
Table 8.6: AODV case study: Time (sec.) for both the non-incremental and the incremental state
space exploration techniques. The ad-hoc network consists of 3 nodes arranged in a chain network
topology. MAXDEPTH = 9. Search strategy is BFS-ANS and the number of replications is 10.
The state space explorer does NOT terminate state space exploration if an assertion violation is
detected. AlreadyVisited stores the hash codes of the states that have already been visited. The
stateful search depends on the equality of the hash codes.
state space explorations for the experiments shown in Table 8.6. As shown in Table 8.7 for both
the WriteEachVersion and WriteFirstVersion cases, the average memory consumption of the non-
incremental state space exploration is roughly the same in the three versions. This is because the
state space explorer does not terminate state space exploration if an assertion violation is detected
as explained above. On the other hand, the extra memory overhead incurred by the incremental
state space exploration, which is also reported as a percentage (last column) of the corresponding
average non-incremental state space exploration memory consumption, increases from one version to
another in the WriteEachVersion case more than it does in the WriteFirstVersion case. This is because
write = true in the second and third versions in the WriteEachVersion case but write = false in the
second and third versions in the WriteFirstVersion case. In summary, WriteFirstVersion provided larger
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Case I (WriteEachVersion): In incremental state space exploration, read and write are set as follows:
read=false, write=true (1st version in each set).
read=true, write=true (2nd and 3rd versions in each set). Same data structure is used for INPUT and OUTPUT .
C → B → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Incremental SSE
Memory (MB) Memory (MB) Memory Overhead (-)
(read=false, (see caption
write=false) of Case I)
Version C (Counterexample 3) 74.193 77.657 -4.67%
Version B (Counterexample 2) 75.572 86.873 -14.95%
Version A (No Counterexample) 75.569 87.582 -15.90%
Maximum Memory Overhead of Incremental SSE in Versions C, B, and A 15.90% maximum overhead
B → C → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Incremental SSE
Memory (MB) Memory (MB) Memory Overhead (-)
(read=false, (see caption
write=false) of Case I)
Version B (Counterexample 2) 75.572 79.064 -4.62%
Version C (Counterexample 3) 74.193 85.647 -15.44%
Version A (No Counterexample) 75.569 87.582 -15.90%
Maximum Memory Overhead of Incremental SSE in Versions B, C, and A 15.90% maximum overhead
Case II (WriteFirstVersion): In incremental state space exploration, read and write are set as follows:
read=false, write=true (1st version in each set).
read=true, write=false (2nd and 3rd versions in each set).
C → B → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Incremental SSE
Memory (MB) Memory (MB) Memory Overhead (-)
(read=false, (see caption
write=false) of Case II)
Version C (Counterexample 3) 74.193 77.657 -4.67%
Version B (Counterexample 2) 75.572 86.767 -14.81%
Version A (No Counterexample) 75.569 86.764 -14.81%
Maximum Memory Overhead of Incremental SSE in Versions C, B, and A 14.81% maximum overhead
B → C → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Incremental SSE
Memory (MB) Memory (MB) Memory Overhead (-)
(read=false, (see caption
write=false) of Case II)
Version B (Counterexample 2) 75.572 79.065 -4.62%
Version C (Counterexample 3) 74.193 85.532 -15.28%
Version A (No Counterexample) 75.569 86.908 -15.00%
Maximum Memory Overhead of Incremental SSE in Versions B, C, and A 15.28% maximum overhead
Table 8.7: AODV case study: Average memory consumption (MB) for the non-incremental and
incremental state space explorations for the experiments shown in Table 8.6.
savings in time (Table 8.6) and a smaller overhead in memory (Table 8.7) than WriteEachVersion.
8.2 Directed Diffusion Case Study (Revisited)
We apply the non-incremental and the incremental state space exploration procedures to the J-
Sim simulation model of the Directed Diffusion [48] data dissemination protocol for wireless sensor
networks (Section 5.1).
The integer array representation of a state depends on the protocol-specific information such as
the packet headers and payloads, and each node’s interest cache entries and data cache entries. The
BeFS heuristic that we consider in the experiments is DD-4-BeFS.
We conduct the experiments in this section on a 4 CPU Intel Xeon 3.2 GHz machine running
Linux version 2.6.9 with 4 GB memory. We use Sun’s 1.5.0 04-b05 Java HotSpotTM Server VM
with 0.5 GB initial heap size and 2.5 GB maximum heap size.
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8.2.1 Experiments
Code changes that do not incur behavioral changes:
We first study the performance of the incremental state space exploration procedure in three different
scenarios: (i) a best-case scenario (q = 0): no events are modified, and (ii) two practical-case
scenarios (0 < q < 1): one event (the packet delivery event T4) or two events (T2 and T4) are
modified. We compare between the non-incremental and the incremental state space exploration
procedures in each of these three scenarios using the randomized search strategy DD-4-BeFS-ANS.
To isolate the savings gained (or overhead incurred) by the incremental state space exploration
procedure, the modified events, if any, are just “flagged” as modified but their implementations are
not changed. Again, this corresponds to code changes that do not incur any behavioral changes.
Table 8.8 gives the time needed to find an assertion violation (Counterexample 1 or 2 as explained
in Section 5.3) for different values of N and MAXDEPTH, where N is the number of nodes in
the wireless sensor network. In Table 8.8, “Non-inc. SSE” refers to Figure 7.3 with read = false
and write = false, while “Incremental SSE” refers to Figure 7.3 with read = true and write =
false. Before running the “Incremental SSE”, we had to execute Figure 7.3 with read = false
and write = true in order to generate the file that contains the state space graph; however, the
time needed for this intermediate step is not reported. For each experiment, we ran 10 replications.
Each replication has a different seed. The savings gained (or overhead incurred) by the incremental
state space exploration is shown as a percentage of the corresponding average non-incremental state
space exploration time. As shown in Table 8.8, the incremental state space exploration technique
can indeed provide time savings in the best-case scenario (q = 0) and the two practical-case scenarios
(0 < q < 1). For example, for the largest non-incremental state space exploration time (last row),
the incremental state space exploration technique was able to provide a time saving of 47.41% (or
equivalently a 1.90x speedup) with one code change (i.e., one modified event) that does not incur a
behavioral change.
In order to understand why the incremental state space exploration procedure was successful in
providing time savings, we show in Table 8.9 a breakdown of the average state space exploration
time spent in some selected operations taking the last row in Table 8.8 as an example. As shown
in Table 8.9, the costs of executing events (i.e., the sum of copying from the verification model to
the simulation model, executing the event handlers in the simulation model, and copying from the
simulation model to the verification model), computing hash codes, and checking the assertions are
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Search Strategy is Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false)
DD-4-BeFS-ANS Time (sec.) Time Savings (+) or Overhead (-)
(read=false, shown as a percentage of
write=false) Non-inc. SSE Time
No One Two
Modified Modified Modified
N MAXDEPTH Counterexample Events Event Events t
4 15 1 5.159 52.74% 36.85% 28.14% 0.1888
5 20 1 13.397 64.37% 48.78% 32.44% 0.1927
6 25 1 60.453 75.03% 56.23% 37.98% 0.1693
4 20 2 174.896 72.05% 47.41% 37.08% 0.0972
Table 8.8: Directed diffusion case study: Average time (sec.) for non-incremental state space
exploration. The savings (+) or overhead (-) of the incremental state space exploration is shown
as a percentage of the corresponding average non-incremental state space exploration time. The
wireless sensor network consists of N nodes arranged in a chain network topology. The state space
explorer terminates state space exploration if an assertion violation is detected. AlreadyVisited
stores the hash codes of the states that have already been visited. The stateful search depends on
the equality of the hash codes.
considerably high taking together more than 74% of the total average time in the non-incremental
state space exploration. In contrast, the times spent in these three operations in the incremental
state space exploration procedure are smaller than their counterparts in the non-incremental explo-
ration. Furthermore, other operations that are only done in the incremental state space exploration
procedure (e.g., reading from the input file and searching in INPUT ) take a comparatively small
amount of time (less than 16% of the incremental state space exploration time). Note that in this
particular example, t = 9.72%; i.e., the proportion of events that are tree is small. Furthermore,
p = 0.999; i.e., almost all of the searches in INPUT are successful. All these observations explain
why incremental state space exploration procedure provided time savings.
It should also be noticed that the times of the operations that do not appear in the simplified
necessary condition (e.g., inserting the hash code of a state in AlreadyVisited, inserting a state in
ToBeExplored, searching in AlreadyVisited, computing the BeFS tuple, and generating the enabled
events) are almost equal in both the non-incremental and incremental state space exploration tech-
niques. Furthermore, the sum of the times to search in AlreadyVisited, compute the BeFS tuple,
insert a hash code in AlreadyVisited, and insert a state in ToBeExplored is of the same order as the
sum of the times to search in INPUT and read from the input file in the incremental state space
exploration technique. This justifies the assumption that we made in Section 7.3.2.
In Table 8.10, we measure the memory overhead for each of the incremental state space explo-
ration experiments shown in Table 8.8 and report it as a percentage of the corresponding average
non-incremental state space exploration memory consumption. As shown in Table 8.10, for the
largest average memory consumption of the non-incremental state space exploration technique (last
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Counterexample 2 Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false)
N = 4 Time (sec.) Time (sec.)
MAXDEPTH = 20 (read=false, No One Two
DD-4-BeFS-ANS Search Strategy write=false) Modified Modified Modified
Events Event Events
Operation q=0 q=0.2919 q=0.4546
From V model to S model 18.787 2.288 7.409 9.936
Execute event handlers 57.945 7.528 26.895 33.053
From S model to V model 16.513 1.844 7.041 9.210
Compute a hash code 15.379 0.019 4.748 7.177
Verify an assertion 22.468 0.000 7.331 10.505
Read from input file 0.000 2.180 1.961 2.169
Search in INPUT 0.000 5.527 3.822 3.011
Insert in AlreadyV isited 1.196 1.367 1.187 1.172
Search in AlreadyV isited 3.130 2.921 2.976 3.012
Generate enabled events 2.852 3.499 3.036 2.858
Insert in ToBeExplored 5.161 6.197 5.530 5.464
Compute the BeFS tuple 0.906 0.965 0.872 0.869
Subtotal 144.337 34.335 72.808 88.436
Other operations 30.559 14.547 19.172 21.610
Total time 174.896 48.882 91.980 110.046
Speedup 3.58x 1.90x 1.59x
Number of executed events 1293732 124492 491101 649234
Table 8.9: Directed diffusion case study: Breakdown of the average state space exploration time
(sec.) spent in some selected operations. The example shown corresponds to the last row in Table 8.8.
p = 0.9999
Search Strategy is Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE (read=true, write=false)
DD-4-BeFS-ANS Memory (MB) Memory Overhead (-)
(read=false, shown as a percentage of
write=false) Non-inc. SSE Memory
No One Two
Modified Modified Modified
N MAXDEPTH Counterexample Events Event Events
4 15 1 9.392 -11.36% -10.44% -9.60%
5 20 1 34.772 -6.10% -5.38% -4.57%
6 25 1 158.955 -5.13% -4.38% -3.48%
4 20 2 317.640 -9.72% -7.98% -6.99%
Table 8.10: Directed diffusion case study: Average memory consumption (MB) for the non-
incremental state space exploration for the experiments shown in Table 8.8. The overhead (-)
of the incremental state space exploration is shown as a percentage of the corresponding average
non-incremental state space exploration memory consumption.
row), the largest corresponding memory overhead of the incremental state space exploration tech-
nique is only 9.72% of the average non-incremental state space exploration memory consumption.
Similar to our observations on Tables 8.3-8.5, the extra memory overhead of the incremental state
space exploration technique decreases with the increase in q. This is because we do not insert the
information of the modified events in INPUT ; hence, the larger the value of q the smaller the size
of INPUT .
Code changes that incur behavioral changes:
To further evaluate the incremental state space exploration technique, we evaluate its performance
in another scenario; namely, one in which the implementation of a new event is added. Similar
to Section 8.1.1, this corresponds to code changes that do incur behavioral changes. However, in
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Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Time Observations on
Time (sec.) Time (sec.) Savings (+) Incremental SSE
(read=false, (Write strategy or
write=false) is WriteFirstVersion) Overhead (-)
Example 1: Version B1 includes the events T0, T1, T3, T4, and T5. Version A1 adds T2.
Version B1 20.373 21.937 -7.68% v = 1.0
No speedup if read=false
Version A1 30.228 16.461 45.54% p = 0.7505, q = 0.1321
Sum of Versions B1 and A1 50.601 38.398 24.12% 24.12% overall savings
Example 2: Version B2 includes the events T0, T1, T4, and T5. Version A2 adds T2.
Version B2 18.933 20.532 -8.45% v = 1.0
No speedup if read=false
Version A2 27.732 15.093 45.58% p = 0.7545, q = 0.1326
Sum of Versions B2 and A2 46.665 35.625 23.66% 23.66% overall savings
Example 3: Version B3 includes the events T0, T1, T2, T3, and T4. Version A3 adds T5.
Version B3 18.291 19.337 -5.72% v = 1.0
No speedup if read=false
Version A3 30.392 18.534 39.02% p = 0.7623, q = 0.2783
Sum of Versions B3 and A3 48.683 37.871 22.21% 22.21% overall savings
Example 4: Version B4 includes the events T0, T1, T2, and T4. Version A4 adds T5.
Version B4 16.485 17.628 -6.93% v = 1.0
No speedup if read=false
Version A4 27.707 17.558 36.63% p = 0.7576, q = 0.2866
Sum of Versions B4 and A4 44.192 35.186 20.38% 20.38% overall savings
Table 8.11: Directed diffusion case study: Time (sec.) for both the non-incremental and the incre-
mental state space exploration techniques. The wireless sensor network consists of 4 nodes arranged
in a chain network topology. MAXDEPTH = 10. Search strategy is BFS-ANS and the number of
replications is 10. No assertion violations. AlreadyVisited stores the hash codes of the states that
have already been visited. The stateful search depends on the equality of the hash codes.
Section 8.1.1, the change was a modification of an existing behavior, but in this section, the change
is an addition of a new behavior.
We study four examples that are explained in Table 8.11. As indicated in Table 8.11, the
incremental state space exploration technique was able to provide up to 24.12% overall time savings
(or equivalently 1.32x speedup) with one code change (i.e., one added event) that does incur a
behavioral change. The corresponding memory overhead of the incremental state space exploration
technique is only 8.10% of the average non-incremental state space exploration memory consumption
as shown in the corresponding row in Table 8.12.
8.3 ARQ Case Study (Revisited)
We apply the non-incremental and the incremental state space exploration procedures to the J-Sim
simulation model of the Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) protocol (Section 6.1).
The integer array representation of a state depends on the protocol-specific information such
as the sequence numbers in the headers of the data and ACK packets, the values of SeqNoSent,
SeqNoExpected, NumDistinctDataMsgSent, and NumDistinctDataMsgReceived.
We conduct the experiments in this section using the same machine and settings that we used
in the directed diffusion case study (Section 8.2).
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Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Incremental SSE
Memory (MB) Memory (MB) Memory Overhead (-)
(read=false, (Write strategy
write=false) is WriteFirstVersion)
Example 1: Version B1 includes the events T0, T1, T3, T4, and T5. Version A1 adds T2.
Version B1 34.328 35.667 -3.90%
Version A1 47.666 51.527 -8.10%
Maximum Memory Overhead of Incremental SSE in Versions B1 and A1 8.10% maximum overhead
Example 2: Version B2 includes the events T0, T1, T4, and T5. Version A2 adds T2.
Version B2 31.676 32.958 -4.05%
Version A2 44.141 47.710 -8.09%
Maximum Memory Overhead of Incremental SSE in Versions B2 and A2 8.09% maximum overhead
Example 3: Version B3 includes the events T0, T1, T2, T3, and T4. Version A3 adds T5.
Version B3 36.507 37.599 -2.99%
Version A3 47.666 51.085 -7.17%
Maximum Memory Overhead of Incremental SSE in Versions B3 and A3 7.17% maximum overhead
Example 4: Version B4 includes the events T0, T1, T2, and T4. Version A4 adds T5.
Version B4 33.513 34.555 -3.11%
Version A4 44.141 47.256 -7.06%
Maximum Memory Overhead of Incremental SSE in Versions B4 and A4 7.06% maximum overhead
Table 8.12: Directed diffusion case study: Average memory consumption (MB) for the non-
incremental and incremental state space explorations for the experiments shown in Table 8.11.
8.3.1 Experiments
To evaluate the incremental state space exploration technique, we evaluate its performance in a
scenario in which code changes do incur behavioral changes. Specifically, we simulate the behavior
of a user who tries to implement the ACK packet delivery event T1 correctly. First, the user forgets
to make the sender check the sequence number in the ACK before sending a data packet causing
Counterexample 1, as explained in Section 6.3, to occur (we call this implementation Version B).
Following that, the user figures out the correct implementation, which requires checking the sequence
number in the ACK to determine whether a new data packet or a retransmission should be sent (we
call this implementation Version A).
Table 8.13 shows the state space exploration time under this scenario using both the non-
incremental and incremental techniques. For each experiment, we ran 100 replications. Each repli-
cation has a different seed. We distinguish between the two cases: Case I (WriteEachVersion) and
Case II (WriteFirstVersion) as explained in Section 8.1.1. As shown in Table 8.13, incremental state
space exploration is not able to provide any savings in the state space exploration time.
In order to understand why the incremental state space exploration procedure did not provide any
time savings, we show in Table 8.14 a breakdown of the average state space exploration time spent
in some selected operations taking the second-to-last row in Table 8.13 as an example. As shown
in Table 8.14, the costs of executing events (i.e., the sum of copying from the verification model to
the simulation model, executing the event handlers in the simulation model, and copying from the
simulation model to the verification model), computing hash codes, and checking the assertion are
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Case I (WriteEachVersion): In incremental state space exploration, read and write are set as follows:
read=false, write=true (1st version in each set).
read=true, write=true (2nd version in each set). Same data structure is used for INPUT and OUTPUT .
B → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Time Observations on
MAXDEPTH = 30 Time (sec.) Time (sec.) Savings (+) Incremental SSE
(read=false, (see caption or
write=false) of Case I) Overhead (-)
Version B (Counterexample 1) 7.478 8.283 -10.76% v = 0.923905
No speedup if read=false
Version A (Correct T1) 10.111 11.542 -14.16% p = 0.0500, q = 0.2498
Sum of Versions B and A 17.589 19.825 -12.71% 12.71% overall overhead
B → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Time Observations on
MAXDEPTH = 35 Time (sec.) Time (sec.) Savings (+) Incremental SSE
(read=false, (see caption or
write=false) of Case I) Overhead (-)
Version B (Counterexample 1) 22.351 24.304 -8.74% v = 0.929023
No speedup if read=false
Version A (Correct T1) 30.134 34.742 -15.29% p = 0.0239, q = 0.2499
Sum of Versions B and A 52.485 59.046 -12.50% 12.50% overall overhead
Case II (WriteFirstVersion): In incremental state space exploration, read and write are set as follows:
read=false, write=true (1st version in each set).
read=true, write=false (2nd version in each set).
B → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Time Observations on
MAXDEPTH = 30 Time (sec.) Time (sec.) Savings (+) Incremental SSE
(read=false, (see caption or
write=false) of Case II) Overhead (-)
Version B (Counterexample 1) 7.478 8.283 -10.76% v = 0.923905
No speedup if read=false
Version A (Correct T1) 10.111 10.495 -3.80% p = 0.0500, q = 0.2498
Sum of Versions B and A 17.589 18.778 -6.76% 6.76% overall overhead
B → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Time Observations on
MAXDEPTH = 35 Time (sec.) Time (sec.) Savings (+) Incremental SSE
(read=false, (see caption or
write=false) of Case II) Overhead (-)
Version B (Counterexample 1) 22.351 24.304 -8.74% v = 0.929023
No speedup if read=false
Version A (Correct T1) 30.134 31.581 -4.80% p = 0.0239, q = 0.2499
Sum of Versions B and A 52.485 55.885 -6.48% 6.48% overall overhead
Table 8.13: ARQ case study: Time (sec.) for both the non-incremental and the incremental state
space exploration techniques. Search strategy is BFS-ANS. The state space explorer does NOT
terminate state space exploration if an assertion violation is detected. AlreadyVisited stores the
hash codes of the states that have already been visited. The stateful search depends on the equality
of the hash codes.
not high taking together less than 51% of the total average time in the non-incremental state space
exploration. Furthermore, due to a relatively large value of q = 0.2499, an extremely small value
of p = 0.0239, and a relatively large value of t = 0.2517, more than 98% of the events are executed
in the incremental state space exploration procedure as shown in the last row of Table 8.14. The
measured estimates of the other values that appear in the third necessary condition (Section 7.3.2)
in a randomly chosen run, which would correspond to a small pilot study performed by the user
to provide a preliminary check on the effectiveness of incremental state space exploration, are as
follows: X = 31.08 µs, H = 11.88 µs, Y = 5.55 µs, L = 8.77 µs, and F = 2.95 µs. Clearly, the
third necessary condition is violated in this study. The J-Sim state space explorer outputs a message
informing the user that the third necessary condition is violated; hence, using the incremental state
space exploration procedure in this case study is discouraged.
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Version A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE
Correct T1 Time (sec.) Time (sec.)
MAXDEPTH = 35 (read=false, (read=true,
BFS-ANS Search Strategy write=false) write=false)
Operation
From V model to S model 2.543 2.563
Execute event handlers 4.770 4.850
From S model to V model 2.449 2.482
Compute a hash code 3.611 3.497
Verify an assertion 1.767 1.760
Read from input file 0.000 0.752
Search in INPUT 0.000 0.360
Insert in AlreadyV isited 0.792 0.793
Search in AlreadyV isited 1.748 1.747
Generate enabled events 1.911 1.954
Insert in ToBeExplored 1.071 1.097
Compute the BeFS tuple 0.000 0.000
Subtotal 20.662 21.855
Other operations 9.472 9.726
Total time 30.134 31.581
Speedup none
Number of executed events 318216 314473
Table 8.14: ARQ case study: Breakdown of the average state space exploration time (sec.) spent in
some selected operations. The example shown corresponds to the second-to-last row in Table 8.13.
Case I (WriteEachVersion): In incremental state space exploration, read and write are set as follows:
read=false, write=true (1st version in each set).
read=true, write=true (2nd version in each set). Same data structure is used for INPUT and OUTPUT .
B → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Incremental SSE
MAXDEPTH = 30 Memory (MB) Memory (MB) Memory Overhead (-)
(read=false, (see caption
write=false) of Case I)
Version B (Counterexample 1) 7.459 10.375 -39.09%
Version A (Correct T1) 8.970 15.065 -67.94%
Maximum Memory Overhead of Incremental SSE in Versions B and A 67.94% maximum overhead
B → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Incremental SSE
MAXDEPTH = 35 Memory (MB) Memory (MB) Memory Overhead (-)
(read=false, (see caption
write=false) of Case I)
Version B (Counterexample 1) 22.665 31.310 -38.14%
Version A (Correct T1) 27.921 47.675 -70.75%
Maximum Memory Overhead of Incremental SSE in Versions B and A 70.75% maximum overhead
Case II (WriteFirstVersion): In incremental state space exploration, read and write are set as follows:
read=false, write=true (1st version in each set).
read=true, write=false (2nd version in each set).
B → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Incremental SSE
MAXDEPTH = 30 Memory (MB) Memory (MB) Memory Overhead (-)
(read=false, (see caption
write=false) of Case II)
Version B (Counterexample 1) 7.459 10.375 -39.09%
Version A (Correct T1) 8.970 11.856 -32.17%
Maximum Memory Overhead of Incremental SSE in Versions B and A 39.09% maximum overhead
B → A Non-inc. SSE Incremental SSE Incremental SSE
MAXDEPTH = 35 Memory (MB) Memory (MB) Memory Overhead (-)
(read=false, (see caption
write=false) of Case II)
Version B (Counterexample 1) 22.665 31.310 -38.14%
Version A (Correct T1) 27.921 36.383 -30.31%
Maximum Memory Overhead of Incremental SSE in Versions B and A 38.14% maximum overhead
Table 8.15: ARQ case study: Average memory consumption (MB) for the non-incremental and




The amount of research on verification and validation (V&V) of simulation models is large and
considerably focuses on statistical techniques that compare the output of the simulation model with
the output of the real system (e.g., the method of simultaneous confidence intervals [8]). In this
section, we highlight some previous work that is closely related to ours. For further details on
verification, validation, and testing of simulation models, the interested reader is referred to [6].
9.1 Model Checking Network Protocol Implementation
Code
Our work on verifying the computerized simulation model of a network protocol using state space
exploration and protocol-specific properties is inspired by the previous work on model-checking
network protocol implementation code directly for C and C++ (e.g., CMC [67,68] and VeriSoft [38]).
Although CMC has been applied to model-check Linux implementations of networking code
(e.g., AODV and TCP), the major distinction between our approach and CMC is that CMC uses
protocol-independent properties in guiding the best-first search. It does so by attempting to focus
on states that are the most different from previously explored states. In contrast, our approach uses
protocol-dependent properties, inherent to the network protocol and the assertion being checked, to
guide a best-first search strategy towards finding an assertion violation faster.
Likewise, VeriSoft uses protocol-independent techniques, namely partial-order reduction (POR)
using the persistent and sleep sets [38]. POR is an approach towards alleviating the state space
explosion problem, and aims to reduce the size of the state space by exploiting the independence
relation between events. Independent events can neither disable nor enable each other, and enabled
independent events commute; i.e., result in the same state when executed in different orders. POR
is a selective search; i.e., at each state s, POR computes a subset τ (called a persistent set) of the set
of events enabled in s and explores only the events in τ (the other enabled events are not explored).
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A subset τ of the set of events enabled in a state s is called persistent in s if all events not in τ that
are enabled in s, or in a state reachable from s through events not in τ , are independent with all
events in τ . Informally, whatever one does from s, while remaining outside of τ , does not interact
with or affect τ .
Traditional algorithms for computing persistent sets exploit information that is typically inferred
by a static analysis of the code. However, as pointed out in [37], these algorithms suffer from
a fundamental limitation, namely determining this information with acceptable precision, in the
context of concurrent software systems executing arbitrary code, is often difficult or impossible.
In an attempt towards avoiding this inherent imprecision of static analysis, dynamic POR [37]
was proposed. The algorithm, which is called dynamic partial-order reduction, dynamically tracks
interactions between processes and then exploits this information to identify backtracking points
where alternative paths in the state space need to be explored.
In principle, dynamic POR can be combined with both shuﬄing and best-first search strategies.
Specifically, POR first determines which enabled events to explore, a shuﬄing procedure then shuﬄes
the sequence in which those events are executed, and a best-first search strategy finally determines
which of the successor states being generated can potentially lead to an assertion violation faster.
The idea of using best-first search heuristics to expedite the model checking process has been
explored in previous work (e.g., [31, 39, 41, 99, 115]). However, what distinguishes our work from
the previous work is that we study the use of protocol-specific heuristics in verifying the simulation
model. Moreover, a large part of our work focuses on a specific domain, namely routing and data
dissemination protocols for wireless ad-hoc and sensor networks, and attempt to discover effective
protocol-specific heuristics that enable a best-first search strategy to find assertion violations in less
time and space requirements than classic breadth-first and depth-first search strategies.
9.2 Conventional Explicit-state and Symbolic Model
Checking
In contrast to model-checking the implementation code (or the computerized simulation model) of a
network protocol directly, conventional explicit-state and symbolic model checkers (e.g., SPIN [47],
SMV [64], SAL [106], Murphi [27]) require that the system be first specified using a high-level
modeling language. For example, [82] presents the simulation and verification of the priority-ceiling
protocol (PCP) using SAL.
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In general, the process of describing the system in a high-level modeling language is time-
consuming, painstaking, and error-prone [68]. To deal with this problem, there has been some
work (e.g., [25,36,44,76]) on translating programming languages (e.g., Java) to the input modeling
languages of several conventional model checkers. The idea is to automatically extract an abstract
model out of an application written in C or Java and then use conventional model checking to an-
alyze this abstract model. However, this may not be always feasible because some features of C or
Java (e.g., memory allocation and bit operations) do not have corresponding ones in the destination
modeling language. Therefore, our approach of directly verifying the simulation model, which has
to be written by the user anyway for the purpose of performance evaluation, reduces the user’s effort
and avoids the limitations of the input languages of conventional model checkers.
Java PathFinder (JPF) [52,111] is a state-of-the-art general-purpose explicit-state model checker
for Java programs. We gave an overview of JPF in Section 4.4.1 and compared its performance
with the J-Sim state space exploration framework in Section 4.4.3. The results of the comparison
showed that our state space exploration framework in J-Sim can be significantly faster than that
in JPF, with respect to the time needed to find an assertion violation, unless a significant amount
of programming effort is done in JPF. As explained in Section 4.5, this result justifies the need
for building a framework for the verification of network simulation models in a network simulator
instead of using a general-purpose model checking tool since we believe that wireless network protocol
designers and simulation modelers will feel more comfortable using a network simulator as a single
integrated environment for both building a simulation model and verifying its correctness than using
a network simulator for building a simulation model and using another model checking tool (e.g.,
JPF) for verifying its correctness.
Bhargavan et al. provide in [16] a complete automated proof, using the SPIN model checker and
the HOL theorem prover, that no routing loops will be formed by AODV if all the nodes in the
ad-hoc network (a) always immediately detect when a neighbor restarts its AODV process and the
restart is treated as if all links to the neighbor have broken, (b) increment the destination sequence
number of a routing table entry to a destination when the route to that destination has expired or
broken, and (c) never delete routing table entries. In this thesis, we have shown that our state space
exploration framework in J-Sim can discover routing loops caused by violation of each of these three
conditions.
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9.3 Formal Analysis of Network Simulation
As far as formal analysis of network simulation is concerned, Verisim [14] was developed based on
a collection of pre-existing tools, namely ns-2 [103] and the MaC monitoring and checking frame-
work [55]. Verisim replaces the monitor component of MaC by ns-2 and uses the checker component
of MaC to verify user-defined properties on traces produced by ns-2. It should be noted, however,
that not all assertion violations may manifest themselves in a trace because ns-2 does not explore
all possible execution paths during a simulation run.
Towards giving formal semantics to simulation models and hence enabling the exploration of sev-
eral execution paths, a translation from the DEVS (Discrete Event System Specification) [116] mod-
eling paradigm to the Z-DEVS formalism, which combines DEVS, the Z specification language [97]
and first order logic, is proposed in [107]. (This is similar to translating programming languages to
the input modeling languages of model checkers that was discussed above.) The static properties of
the simulation model can then be analyzed with the Z/EVES theorem prover [83] while the temporal
properties can be analyzed using a model checker.
9.4 Neural Network/Machine Learning Approaches for
Validating Simulation Models
In [61], a neural network approach to the validation of simulation models is presented. Specifically,
a number of alternative simulation models train a neural network using multiple statistics (e.g.,
means, variances, autocovariances, etc.). Hence, the neural network learns to identify key features
of these statistics to belong to a specific simulation model. Following that, an experiment with
the real system is offered to the neural network. The network then outputs a probability vector,
indicating for every simulation model the probability that the data comes from the model. This
probability vector can be used to distinguish valid from invalid models.
Another machine learning technique can be found in [62] where Martens et al. make use of
concepts from machine learning and fuzzy set theory to define a resemblance relation for measuring
the degree of similarity between the input-output transformation of a simulation model and the
corresponding input-output transformation of the real system.
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9.5 Integrated Environments for Verifying Models
Examples of other software tools that provide an integrated environment, which allows the user to
both verify a model and use it to evaluate/predict performance, are TwoTowers [12] and Maude [22,
63].
Using TwoTowers, the user models a concurrent system as an algebraic term in EMPAr [11],
which is an extension of EMPA (Extended Markovian Process Algebra) [13] allowing for the speci-
fication of performance measures based on rewards. TwoTowers has three kernels: (a) an integrated
kernel can simulate an EMPAr specification and derive performance measures according to the
well-known method of independent replications, (b) a functional kernel generates a labeled transi-
tion system (LTS) of the EMPAr specification, and (c) a performance kernel generates a Markov
chain of the EMPAr specification. A version of the Concurrency Workbench of North Carolina
(CWB-NC) [23] can then analyze the LTS using different types of formal verification (e.g., model
checking to check temporal properties and state space exploration to check assertions). A Markov
Chain Analyzer (MarCA) [98] can conduct stationary and transient performance analysis on the
Markov chain where the performance measures are derived using the rewards expressed in the
EMPAr specification. TwoTowers has been used for analyzing several distributed algorithms and
networking protocols such as the alternating bit protocol, CSMA/CD, ATM switches, and QoS
protocols for Internet audio [1].
Maude [63] is a reflective language and system that supports both equational and rewriting logic
specification and programming. Maude can be used to create executable specifications for a wide
range of applications (e.g., other languages, theorem provers, concurrent systems). In fact, Maude
can be used to build language extensions for Maude itself. Particularly, Full Maude is implemented
in Maude as an extension of Core Maude1 [22]. Concurrent object-oriented systems can be specified
in Full Maude by means of object-oriented modules, which support objects, messages, classes and
inheritance. Object-oriented modules can then be executed and also model-checked with an on-
the-fly explicit-state Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) model checker [32]. Furthermore, Real-Time
Maude [70] is a language and tool supporting the formal specification and analysis of real-time and
hybrid systems. Real-Time Maude is implemented in Maude as an extension of Full Maude and
offers a wide range of analysis techniques, including timed rewriting for simulation purposes, state
space exploration to check assertions, and time-bounded LTL model checking.
The Real-Time Maude LTL model checker has been previously used in [69] for verifying the
1Core Maude is the Maude interpreter implemented in C++ and provides all of Maude’s basic functionality.
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AER/NCA active network protocol suite [53]. In a more recent case study, O¨lveczky and Thor-
valdsen [71] use Real-Time Maude to formally model the Optimally Geographical Density Control
(OGDC) algorithm [117] for wireless sensor networks, use the Real-Time Maude specification to per-
form all the simulation experiments done by the algorithm developers using ns-2 [103], and perform
further formal analyses which are beyond the capabilities of (traditional) simulation tools.
The major difference between our work and tools such as TwoTowers and Maude is that we
verify a simulation model that is written in an imperative language (namely, Java) rather than a
model that is written in a formal specification language.
9.6 Techniques for Analyzing the Correctness of Evolving
Software
In this section, we review the large body of work that is closely related to the goals of the incremental
state space exploration (ISSE) technique, namely developing techniques for analyzing the correctness
of evolving software. We first review the work in the context of model checking and then discuss
the work in the context of software testing.
9.6.1 Model Checking
Starting from the seminal work of Sokolsky and Smolka [96], there have been a few papers proposing
techniques to model checking incrementally. The techniques address checking properties for non-
recursive abstract models and checking safety properties of recursive software [24,46]. However, all
of these techniques focus on control-intensive properties (e.g., method x must never execute until
method y has terminated). The ISSE technique presented in this thesis focuses on data-intensive
properties (e.g., the absence of routing loops in AODV) where large concrete states need to be main-
tained to check properties, and changes are typically made to methods and functions that apply in
almost every state. Furthermore, the techniques presented in [24,46,60,96] work on abstract models
of programs (e.g., a labeled transition system, a control-flow graph) whereas our work focuses on
real code written in imperative programming languages that allow the manipulation of dynami-
cally allocated data. In summary, our focus is on checking data-intensive properties, especially for
object-oriented programs. In this domain, state space exploration has three characteristics: (1) pro-
gram states can grow large (and checking data-intensive properties typically requires entire concrete
states and not just abstractions); (2) operations, i.e., methods, apply in almost every state; and (3)
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execution of operations, computing the hash codes of states and checking the assertions can take a
significant portion of the state space exploration time.
Another related project on incremental computation for explicit state model checking is on
incremental heap canonicalization [66]. The idea is to have the model checker execute a heap
canonicalization algorithm (e.g., [49]) to transform a state s to a canonical representation that is
unique for all the states that are behaviorally equivalent to s but differ only in the memory locations
of heap objects. This canonical representation is then inserted in the hash table. The incremental
heap canonicalization algorithm would then ensure that small changes to the heap only result in
relatively small changes in the canonical representation. This allows the model checker to compute
the hash code of a state incrementally by only processing those portions of the state that are modified
in a transition. Hence, this project considers incremental computation between a pre-state and a
post-state of one transition in a state space exploration and not incremental computation between
two consecutive state space explorations.
Recently, there has been some work on incremental conformance testing [33]. In conformance
testing of communication protocols, the purpose of the tests is to determine whether an imple-
mentation of the protocol conforms to (i.e., has the same input/output behavior as defined by)
its specification. In incremental conformance testing [33], the goal is to generate tests that would
only test the modified parts of the implementation in order to check that they correctly implement
the modified parts of the specification. An underlying assumption is that the parts of the system
implementation that correspond to the unmodified parts of the specification have not been changed.
Another assumption is that before modifying the system specification, its implementation was tested
and found to be conforming to the original specification. This assumption is similar to our assump-
tion that the hash codes of the visited states that violate an assertion are not stored in OUTPUT .
However, the incremental conformance testing technique makes some other very different assump-
tions on the software evolution than those considered in our work, like the assumption that not only
the specification, but also the implementation can be modeled as a finite state machine.
The notion of incremental model checking has also been proposed in the context of bounded
model checking [17] that performs checking within a user-specified bound (e.g., bound on the length
of the execution). However, the focus in such techniques (e.g., [45]) is on incrementally increasing
the bound and not incrementally evolving code as in ISSE.
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9.6.2 Software Testing
The main approach to address evolving software in the context of testing is regression testing:
it checks that a later version of a software still passes the tests that a previous version passed.
Researchers have developed numerous methods to improve the basic regression testing.
What distinguishes regression testing from development testing is that in regression testing, an
existing suite of tests may be available for reuse. Since re-executing all tests on the modified version
of the software may consume prohibitively large amounts of time and resources, regression test
selection [40, 42, 43, 80, 118] chooses to run only some of the existing tests on the new version, thus
saving resources and speeding up the testing process by not running all tests. A key challenge is to
have safe selection; i.e., guarantee that tests that are not selected cannot reveal errors. (Another
challenge is to have precise selection; i.e., guarantee that tests that cannot reveal errors are not
selected.) The technique presented in [80] constructs control flow graphs for a procedure or program
and its modified version and uses these graphs to safely select tests that execute changed code from
the original test suite. Several techniques for test selection [73] record some additional information
from previous runs (e.g., code coverage and not only the fact that a test passed or failed) to enable
safe selection. Our work on ISSE is partly motivated by test selection techniques because we do not
post-process the states generated from the non-modified hit events and we do not re-execute the
non-modified hit non-tree or deepest events.
Test prioritization [34, 35, 51, 81] reorders the execution of (all or only selected) tests in order
to enhance their ability to meet some performance goal (e.g., reveal errors faster, thus reducing
the time that a developer has to wait to find failing tests for program changes). In the contexts of
software evolution and regression testing, test prioritization techniques can exploit information (e.g.,
test coverage) gained from the previous execution of test cases to obtain test case orderings. We
could also explore prioritization in the context of state space exploration: if a previous exploration
leads to an assertion violation for some execution sequence, then we could try that same sequence
(and its neighborhood) in the subsequent exploration. Another possible idea is to use insights gained
from the counterexamples discovered while exploring the state space of one version to devise a better
state ranking mechanism for exploring the state space of a subsequent version.
Impact analysis [2, 59, 72, 79] finds (statically or dynamically) which code changes could affect
which tests, thus aiding test selection. We could leverage impact analysis to improve how ISSE
determines what events are modified and need to be executed: ISSE currently uses event-level
granularity, but even when the code of some event changes, it does not necessarily mean that the
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execution would change for all possible input states.
Automatically decomposing system tests (often used in regression testing) into subsystem or unit
tests [74,84] also helps in speeding up regression testing: when a programmer changes some program
subsystem/unit, it is not necessary to rerun an entire, potentially time-consuming system test, but it
suffices to rerun a focused, rapid subsystem/unit test. For example, the technique presented in [74]
allows for (1) selecting a subsystem of interest in a given application, (2) capturing at runtime all the
interactions between such subsystem and the rest of the application, and (3) replaying the recorded
interactions on the subsystem in isolation. While these approaches are useful in regression testing,
it does not seem that they have a direct application in ISSE since executions in ISSE are already
fairly short and mostly exercise one program unit.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we conclude the thesis and provide suggestions for potential future research work.
10.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we present the design, implementation and performance evaluation of a state space
exploration (SSE) framework that enriches the set of verification and validation (V&V) software
tools available to network simulation modelers and protocol designers. Our framework uses state
space exploration to explore the (entire) state space created by a network simulation model and
check whether the model satisfies certain assertions that the real network protocol satisfies. We
make use of structural properties in the underlying state space of the protocol along two orthogonal
dimensions; the first uses a non-trivial simulation relation to prune the paths to be searched, and
the second is state ranking that determines whether a state is “better than” another in order to
enable the implementation of a best-first search (BeFS).
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework by verifying the simulation models of two
widely used and fairly complex network protocols: the Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)
routing protocol for wireless ad-hoc networks and the directed diffusion data dissemination protocol
for wireless sensor networks. Moreover, we verify the simulation model of a reliable unicast pro-
tocol: the Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) protocol. Experimental results show that the state
space explorer is able to find violations of an assertion within acceptable time and space require-
ments. Furthermore, BeFS heuristics that exploit properties inherent to the network protocol and
the assertion being checked can expedite the process of finding those violations by several orders of
magnitude. We study several BeFS heuristics for both AODV and directed diffusion, and provide
guidelines for good heuristics based on our results.
We compare the performance of our SSE framework to that of a state-of-the-art model checker
for Java programs, namely Java PathFinder (JPF). The results of the comparison show that the
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time needed to find an assertion violation by our state space exploration framework in J-Sim can
be significantly less than that in JPF unless a significant amount of programming effort is done in
JPF to make its performance close to that of our SSE framework.
We also present incremental state space exploration (ISSE), a technique that aims to provide a
speedup in the state space exploration time of evolving simulation models; i.e., simulation models
whose code changes from one version to another. A code change may or may not lead to a behavioral
change. We analytically obtain necessary conditions for the ISSE technique to provide a speedup in
the state space exploration time when compared to a traditional (non-incremental) SSE technique.
We applied the ISSE technique to our case studies. In two case studies (namely AODV and directed
diffusion), ISSE provided a speedup whereas in one case study (namely ARQ), it did not provide a
speedup because the necessary conditions were violated. The speedups in state space exploration
time come at a reasonable cost of memory overhead.
10.2 Future Work
A potential avenue for future work that extends the work in this thesis is to devise efficient heuristics
for each class of network protocols (e.g., routing protocols, MAC protocols, and transport protocols,
etc.) so that if the simulation model of a protocol belonging to a certain class is to be verified, the
user can use the appropriate heuristic for that class without having to start from scratch. In other
words, the heuristics will be class-specific instead of protocol-specific. Another avenue of future
research is state similarity. In this thesis, we have used only one way of defining similar states.
Future work can study the performance of different granularities of state similarity.
Our state space exploration framework in J-Sim can only find violations of assertions. One
possible extension to our work is to find violations of other temporal properties (e.g., liveness) or
prove the correctness of the simulation model of a network protocol.
Our work on ISSE can also be extended along several directions. One possible idea is to use
insights gained from the counterexamples discovered while exploring the state space of one version
of the simulation model to devise a better state ranking mechanism for exploring the state space
of a subsequent version. Another possible avenue for future work is to study whether or not, and
how, ISSE can help improve the scalability of the framework to explore the state spaces created by
larger and/or different network topologies. Finally, ISSE currently uses event-level granularity as the




In this appendix, we argue that each of the simulation relations that we used in our experiments in
Chapters 4-5 is indeed a simulation relation.
We first define a multiset automaton as a 4-tuple (Q,M, q0, δ) where:
• Q is a set of states.
• M is a set of messages.
• q0 is the initial state.
• δ is the transition relation, that is δ ⊆ Q× ({τ} ∪ (M × {!, ?}))×Q
We define B as a multiset of messages and define S = Q×B. We use the notation in Section 3.2.3.
Based on these definitions, we define the following transitions for q1, q
′










1 = B1 and (q1, τ, q
′
1) ∈ δ






1 = B1\{m} and (q1,m?, q
′
1) ∈ δ






1 = B1 ∪ {m} and (q1,m!, q
′
1) ∈ δ
Furthermore, we can define the following composite transitions for q1, q
′
1 ∈ Q; B1, B
′
1 ∈ B; and
m0,m1,m2, . . . ,mn−1,mn ∈ M where n ≥ 1:




1) ⇐⇒ ∃B0 ∈ B and ∃q0 ∈ Q such that
(q1, B1)
m0?−−−→ (q0, B0), and (q0, B0)
m1!−−→ (q′1, B
′
1). Note that a receive/send transition is
defined as a sequence of one receive transition and one send transition.




1) ⇐⇒ ∃B0,1, B0,2, . . . , B0,n−1 ∈ B
and ∃q0,1, q0,2, . . . , q0,n−1 ∈ Q such that (q1, B1)
m1!−−→ (q0,1, B0,1), (q0,1, B0,1)
m2!−−→ (q0,2, B0,2),
. . ., (q0,n−2, B0,n−2)
mn−1!
−−−−→ (q0,n−1, B0,n−1), and (q0,n−1, B0,n−1)
mn!−−→ (q′1, B
′
1). Note that a
broadcast transition is defined as a sequence of n send transitions.
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1) ⇐⇒ ∃B0 ∈ B and
∃q0 ∈ Q such that (q1, B1)





a receive/broadcast transition is defined as a sequence of one receive transition and n send
transitions.
Consider the binary relation R over S (i.e., R ⊆ S × S). For s1, s2 ∈ S; q1, q2 ∈ Q; and
B1, B2 ∈ B such that s1 = (q1, B1) and s2 = (q2, B2). We define R as (s1, s2) ∈ R ⇐⇒ q1 = q2
and B1 ⊆ B2.
We consider an assertion φ that depends on Q only. We claim that R is a simulation relation;
i.e., if (s1, s2) ∈ R then (1) s1  φ ⇐⇒ s2  φ, and (2) for each e ∈ ({τ} ∪ (M × {!, ?})), s1
e
−→ s′1






1 ∈ Q, B
′
1 ∈ B, and s
′






2) such that q
′
2 ∈ Q,
B′2 ∈ B, s
′
2 ∈ S, s2
e




2) ∈ R. In order to argue that R is a simulation relation, we
consider the following three cases:






1  φ ⇐⇒ s
′
2  φ.
Since B1 ⊆ B2, B
′
1 = B1 and B
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1  φ ⇐⇒ s
′
2  φ.
Since B1 ⊆ B2, B
′
1 = B1\{m} and B
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1  φ ⇐⇒ s
′
2  φ.
Since B1 ⊆ B2, B
′
1 = B1 ∪ {m} and B
′









Similar arguments can be made about broadcast and receive/broadcast transitions because they are
defined in terms of receive and send transitions.
The simulation models of AODV (Section 4.2) and directed diffusion (Section 5.2) can be easily
seen to be instances of the multiset automaton defined above where Q represents the protocol state
and the neighborhood information, and M represents the multiset of packets. Furthermore, in both
case studies, the event T0 is a broadcast transition, the events T1, T2 and T3 are internal transitions,
the event T4 is a receive/broadcast transition, and the event T5 is a receive transition. Moreover, the
simulation relations defined in Section 4.2 and Section 5.2 are instances of the simulation relation
R defined above. Note that the assertions used in both case studies do not depend on the multiset
of packets; i.e., depend on Q only. Hence, each of the simulation relations that we used in our
experiments in Chapters 4-5 is indeed a simulation relation.
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Appendix B
More Details of the AODV Case
Study
In this appendix, we provide the traces and the explanations of the three counterexamples of the
AODV case study (Section 4.3).
B.1 Trace and Explanation of Counterexample 1
Using a breadth-first search strategy (BFS-AC), the state space explorer found an assertion violation
in the J-Sim simulation model of AODV, whose trace is shown in Figure B.1.
The counterexample, shown in Figure B.1, can be explained as follows. State 1 is the initial
state. In state 2, n0 initiates a route request to the destination n2 by broadcasting a RREQ packet.
Similarly, in state 3, n1 initiates a route request to the destination n2 by broadcasting a RREQ
packet. In state 4, n1 receives the RREQ packet sent by n0 and since neither does it have a route
to the destination nor is it the destination itself, it rebroadcasts the RREQ packet. In state 5, n2
receives the RREQ packet sent by n1 in state 3 and since it is the destination itself, it responds by
unicasting a RREP packet after incrementing seqno2. In state 6, n2 receives the RREQ packet sent
by n0 in state 2 and since it is the destination itself, it responds by unicasting a RREP packet after
incrementing seqno2.
In state 7, n1 receives the RREP that is destined to n0 and forwards it to n0. In addition, n1
sets up a forward pointer to the node from which the RREP came (i.e., n2), thus establishing a valid
routing table entry to the destination n2 (note the change of the hop count field from ∞ in state 6
to 1 in state 7 and the change of the sequence number field from 0 in state 6 to 6 in state 7). In
state 8, n0 receives the RREP packet and establishes a valid routing table entry to the destination
n2. In state 9, the AODV process in n1 restarts and in state 10, n1 receives the RREP packet that
was sent by n2 in state 5 in which seqno2 was set to 4. n1 establishes a valid routing table entry to
the destination n2. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure B.1, nexthop0,2 = 1 but seqno0,2 > seqno1,2;
i.e., a routing loop is created.
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It should be noted, however, that if the restart of the AODV process at n1 in state 9 was because
of a node reboot, the link layer of n0 may be able to detect that the link between n0 and n1 was
broken causing the invocation of a broken link event handler, and preventing the routing loop from
taking place. Specifically, the simulation model of AODV in J-Sim supports a link layer mechanism
to detect broken links. The link layer (e.g., IEEE 802.11) detects a broken link (e.g., by the absence
of a link layer ACK each time a packet is transmitted to the next hop; or the failure to get a CTS
after sending an RTS each time a packet needs to be transmitted to the next hop and the retry
count exceeds the maximum retry limit). Upon detecting a broken link, the link layer notifies the
AODV process. In turn, the AODV process executes a broken link event handler. If the broken link
is closer to the destination than the source, the node attempts a local repair by sending a RREQ to
discover a route to the destination; otherwise, the node invalidates the routing table entries to all
the destinations that have become unreachable due to the broken link, and broadcasts a route error
(RERR) packet announcing the node IDs of all these unreachable destinations.
The simulation model of AODV in J-Sim also supports a network layer mechanism to detect
broken links. In the network layer mechanism (which is optional in both the AODV Draft (ver-
sion 11) [77] and the simulation model of AODV in J-Sim), each node has a neighbors list that
contains the node IDs of its neighbors. Neighboring nodes exchange HELLO packets to establish
and maintain the neighborhood information. Each entry in the neighbors list is associated with a
lifetime. On receiving a HELLO packet, a node creates an entry (or refreshes the lifetime of an
existing entry if one already exists) for the source node in the neighbors list. Periodically, every
HELLO INTERV AL seconds, a neighbor timeout event is triggered, causing the deletion of all
the entries in the neighbors list that have expired. According to the AODV Draft (version 11) [77],
if a node does not receive any packets (HELLO or otherwise) from one of its neighbors for more
than ALLOWED HELLO LOSS×HELLO INTERV AL, it should assume that the link to this
neighbor is currently lost and invalidate the routing table entries to the destinations that became
unreachable because of this broken link and broadcast a RERR packet. However, we discover that
the simulation model of AODV in J-Sim does not follow this part of specification. Specifically, in the
simulation model of AODV in J-Sim, if a node does not receive any packets (HELLO or otherwise)
from one of its neighbors for more than 1.5×ALLOWED HELLO LOSS×HELLO INTERV AL,
it deletes the neighbor’s information from the neighbors list without invalidating the routing table
entries to the destinations that became unreachable because of the broken link or broadcasting a
RERR packet. Furthermore, as stated in AODV Draft (version 11) [77], after a node reboot, a node
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waits for DELETE PERIOD. During this time, the node does not transmit any RREP packets,
and if it receives a data packet for some other destination, it should broadcast a RERR packet and
must reset the waiting timer to expire after the current time plus DELETE PERIOD. We found
that the simulation model of AODV in J-Sim does not follow this part of specification either. It was
shown in [15] that by the time the rebooted node comes out of the waiting phase and becomes an
active router again, none of its neighbors will be using it as an active next hop any more.
B.2 Trace and Explanation of Counterexample 2
The first error that we manually injected is not to increment the destination sequence number when
invalidating a routing table entry. In order not to get the same counterexample shown in Figure B.1,
we required that the counterexample should contain at least one state that is generated due to a
route timeout event because the route timeout event triggers the invalidation of a routing table
entry. Using a depth-first search strategy (DFS-AC), the state space explorer found the assertion
violation, whose trace is shown in Figure B.2.
The counterexample, shown in Figure B.2, can be explained as follows. State 1 is the initial
state. In state 2, n1 initiates a route request to the destination n2 by broadcasting a RREQ
packet. In state 3, n2 receives the RREQ packet sent by n1 and since it is the destination itself,
it responds by unicasting a RREP packet after incrementing seqno2. Furthermore, n2 inserts the
pair < n = n1, bidn = 1 > in its broadcast ID cache and establishes a valid reverse route to the
requesting node n1. In state 4, the single entry in the broadcast ID cache of n2 is deleted due to
a broadcast ID timeout event. In state 5, n1 receives the RREP that was sent by n2 in state 3.
Consequently, n1 sets up a forward pointer to the node from which the RREP came (i.e., n2), thus
establishing a valid routing table entry to the destination n2.
In state 6, n0 initiates a route request to the destination n2 by broadcasting a RREQ packet.
In state 7, n1 receives the RREQ packet sent by n0 and since it has a fresh enough route to the
destination n2, n1 responds by unicasting a RREP packet back to n0. In state 8, the route timeout
event takes place at n1 causing the invalidation of the routing table entry to n2 (note the change of
the hop count field from 1 in state 7 to ∞ in state 8) without incrementing the destination sequence
number. In state 9, n0 receives the RREP packet and establishes a valid routing table entry to the
destination n2. In state 10, n0 receives a RREQ packet sent by n1 and since it has a fresh enough
route to the destination n2, it responds by unicasting a RREP packet back to n1. In state 11, n1
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receives the RREP packet and since the destination sequence number field in the RREP packet is
equal to the destination sequence number field in the routing table entry to n2 and the hop count
field in the RREP packet is less than the hop count field in the routing table entry to n2, n1 accepts
the new offered route and establishes a valid routing table entry to the destination n2. Nevertheless,
as shown in Figure B.2, nexthop0,2 = 1 and nexthop1,2 = 0; i.e., a routing loop is created.
B.3 Trace and Explanation of Counterexample 3
The second error that we manually injected is to delete (instead of invalidating) a routing table entry
when its lifetime expires. In order not to get the same counterexample shown in Figure B.1, we
required that the counterexample should contain at least one state that is generated due to a route
timeout event. Using AODV-1-BeFS-AC, the state space explorer found the assertion violation,
whose trace is shown in Figure B.3.
States 1-8 of the counterexample can be explained as explained in the previous counterexamples.
In state 9, n0 receives a RREQ packet sent by n1 and since it has a fresh enough route to the
destination n2, it responds by unicasting a RREP packet. In state 10, the route timeout event takes
place at n1 causing the deletion of the routing table entry to n2. In state 11, n1 receives the RREP
packet, accepts the offered route and establishes a valid routing table entry to the destination n2.




State 1 Depth = 0
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network Empty
State 2 Depth = 1
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:0--dest:1)
State 3 Depth = 2
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:0--dest:1), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2)
State 4 Depth = 3
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2)
State 5 Depth = 4
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 6 Depth = 5
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=6; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1, BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4), RREP(src:2--dest:0--seqno:6)
State 7 Depth = 6
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=6 next=2, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=6; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1, BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4), RREP(src:1--dest:0--seqno:6)
State 8 Depth = 7
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=6 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=6 next=2, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=6; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1, BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 9 Depth = 8
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=6 next=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 2 seqno=6; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1, BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 10 Depth = 9
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=6 next=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=6; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1, BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
Figure B.1: AODV case study: Trace of counterexample 1 obtained using BFS-AC.
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Counterexample
State 1 Depth = 0
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network Empty
State 2 Depth = 1
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2)
State 3 Depth = 2
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 4 Depth = 3
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 5 Depth = 4
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
State 6 Depth = 5
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:0--dest:1)
State 7 Depth = 6
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:1--dest:0--seqno:4)
State 8 Depth = 7
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:1--dest:0--seqno:4)
State 9 Depth = 8
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
State 10 Depth = 9
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=1, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREP(src:0--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 11 Depth = 10
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=1, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=3 seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network Empty
Figure B.2: AODV case study: Trace of counterexample 2 obtained using DFS-AC.
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Counterexample
State 1 Depth = 0
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network Empty
State 2 Depth = 1
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=2; bid=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:1--dest:2)
State 3 Depth = 2
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:2--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 4 Depth = 3
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; BcastID: src=1, id=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
State 5 Depth = 4
Node 0 seqno=2; bid=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
State 6 Depth = 5
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREQ(src:0--dest:1)
State 7 Depth = 6
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=∞ seqno=0 next=0
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0), RREP(src:1--dest:0--seqno:4)
State 8 Depth = 7
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREQ(src:1--dest:0)
State 9 Depth = 8
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=1, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=1 seqno=4 next=2, RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREP(src:0--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 10 Depth = 9
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=1, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1; RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network RREP(src:0--dest:1--seqno:4)
State 11 Depth = 10
Node 0 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=1, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=2 hops=2 seqno=4 next=1, RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Node 1 seqno=4; bid=2; BcastID: src=0, id=1;
RTEntry: dst=0 hops=1 seqno=4 next=0, RTEntry: dst=2 hops=3 seqno=4 next=0
Node 2 seqno=4; bid=1; RTEntry: dst=1 hops=1 seqno=4 next=1
Network Empty
Figure B.3: AODV case study: Trace of counterexample 3 obtained using AODV-1-BeFS-AC.
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Appendix C
More Details of the Directed
Diffusion Case Study
In this appendix, we provide the traces and the explanations of the two counterexamples of the
directed diffusion case study (Section 5.3).
C.1 Trace and Explanation of Counterexample 1
Figure C.1 shows the trace of Counterexample 1, which can be explained as follows. State 1 is
the initial state. In state 2, n0 initiates a sensing task by broadcasting an INTEREST packet.
In state 3, n1 receives the INTEREST packet sent by n0, sets up an exploratory gradient whose
direction is set toward n0 (indicated by prevHop = 0 rate = 60.0 where 60.0 seconds is the data
rate of the exploratory gradient) and rebroadcasts the INTEREST packet. In state 4, n2 receives
the INTEREST packet sent by n1, sets up an exploratory gradient whose direction is set toward
n1 (because this is the node from which the INTEREST message is received) and rebroadcasts the
INTEREST packet. In state 5, n1 receives the INTEREST packet sent by n2 in state 4 and sets
up an exploratory gradient whose direction is set toward n2. However, n1 did not rebroadcast the
INTEREST packet because it recently resent a matching interest (in state 3).
In state 6, n3 receives the INTEREST packet sent by n2, sets up an exploratory gradient whose
direction is set toward n2 and rebroadcasts the INTEREST packet. In addition, since n3 is located
in the area specified by the INTEREST packet, it tasks its local sensors to begin collecting samples
and sends a DATA packet to each neighbor for whom it has a gradient (in this case, n3 has a gradient
to n2 only). In state 7, n2 receives the DATA packet sent by n3 in state 6 and, since the received
DATA packet does not have a matching data cache entry, n2 adds the received DATA packet to
the data cache (indicated by source = 3 in state 7) and resends the DATA packet to each neighbor
for whom it has a gradient (in this case, n2 has a gradient to n1 only). In state 8, n1 receives the
DATA packet sent by n2 in state 7 and, since the received DATA packet does not have a matching
data cache entry, n1 adds the received DATA packet to the data cache (indicated by source = 2 in
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state 8) and resends the DATA packet to each neighbor for whom it has a gradient (in this case,
n1 has a gradient to both n0 and n2). In state 9, n0 receives the DATA packet from n1. Since n0
has received this previously unseen event from n1, it positively reinforces n1 by sending a positive
reinforcement packet (denoted as POSREINFORCE) to n1. In state 10, n1 receives the positive
reinforcement packet sent by n0. Hence, n1 establishes a reinforced gradient whose direction is set
toward n0 (indicated by prevHop = 0 rate = 5.0 where 5.0 seconds is the data rate of the reinforced
gradient). In turn, n1 should positively reinforce its preferred neighbor. Assuming that all nodes
use the same data-driven local rule for determining the preferred neighbor, n1 will use its data cache
to determine the neighbor from whom it first received the latest event matching the interest. In this
case, n1’s preferred neighbor is n2; hence, n1 sends a positive reinforcement packet to n2.
In state 11, the data cache timeout event takes place at n2 causing the deletion of the data
packet received in state 7. In state 12, n2 receives the DATA packet sent by n1 in state 8 and, since
the received DATA packet does not have a matching data cache entry, n2 adds the received DATA
packet to the data cache (indicated by source = 1 in state 12) and resends the DATA packet to
each neighbor for whom it has a gradient. In state 13, n2 receives the positive reinforcement packet
sent by n1 in state 10. Hence, n2 establishes a reinforced gradient whose direction is set toward n1
(indicated by prevHop = 1 rate = 5.0). In turn, n2 should positively reinforce its preferred neighbor.
Using the same data-driven local rule for determining the preferred neighbor, n2 will use its data
cache to determine the neighbor from whom it first received the latest event matching the interest.
In this case, n2’s preferred neighbor is n1; hence, n2 sends a positive reinforcement packet to n1.
In state 14, n1 receives the positive reinforcement packet sent by n2 and establishes a reinforced
gradient whose direction is set toward n2 (indicated by prevHop = 2 rate = 5.0). However, a
loop is created in the reinforced path between n1 and n2; i.e., ( RPath(1, 2) ∧ RPath(2, 1) )
violating the loop-free assertion. Furthermore, the positive reinforcement packet did not reach the
data source causing a disruption in the reinforced path (i.e., the reinforced path does not include
the data source).
C.2 Trace and Explanation of Counterexample 2
Using the same initial state used in Counterexample 1, we show that a node reboot may also create
a loop in the reinforced path. In order not to get the same counterexample shown in Figure C.1, we
required that the counterexample should contain at least one state that is generated due to a node
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reboot event. Furthermore, in order to show that the assertion violation may still take place even if
the data cache timeout event does not happen (i.e., the data cache size is infinite), we disable the
data cache timeout event.
The counterexample, shown in Figure C.2, can be explained as follows. State 1 is the initial
state. In state 2, n0 initiates a sensing task by broadcasting an INTEREST packet. In state 3, n1
receives the INTEREST packet sent by n0, sets up an exploratory gradient whose direction is set
toward n0 and rebroadcasts the INTEREST packet. In state 4, n2 receives the INTEREST packet
sent by n1, sets up an exploratory gradient whose direction is set toward n1 and rebroadcasts the
INTEREST packet. In state 5, n3 receives the INTEREST packet sent by n2, sets up an exploratory
gradient whose direction is set toward n2 and rebroadcasts the INTEREST packet. In addition,
since n3 is located in the area specified by the INTEREST packet, it tasks its local sensors to begin
collecting samples and sends a DATA packet to each neighbor for whom it has a gradient (in this
case, n3 has a gradient to n2 only).
In state 6, n2 receives the INTEREST packet sent by n3 in state 5 and sets up an exploratory
gradient whose direction is set toward n3. However, n2 did not rebroadcast the INTEREST packet
because it recently resent a matching interest (in state 4). In state 7, n0 rebroadcasts the INTEREST
packet. In state 8, n1 reboots causing the deletion of all the entries in the interest cache. In state
9, n1 receives the INTEREST packet sent by n0, sets up an exploratory gradient whose direction
is set toward n0 and rebroadcasts the INTEREST packet. In state 10, n1 receives the INTEREST
packet sent by n2 in state 4 and sets up an exploratory gradient whose direction is set toward n2.
In state 11, n2 receives the DATA packet sent by n3 in state 5 and, since the received DATA packet
does not have a matching data cache entry, n2 adds the received DATA packet to the data cache
and resends the DATA packet to each neighbor for whom it has a gradient (in this case, n2 has a
gradient to both n1 and n3). In state 12, the gradient to n1 stored in the interest cache of n2 is
removed due to a gradient timeout event.
In state 13, n2 reboots causing the deletion of all the entries in the data and interest caches. In
state 14, n2 receives the INTEREST packet sent by n1 in state 9, sets up an exploratory gradient
whose direction is set toward n1 and rebroadcasts the INTEREST packet. In state 15, n1 receives
the DATA packet sent by n2 in state 11 and, since the received DATA packet does not have a
matching data cache entry, n1 adds the received DATA packet to the data cache and resends the
DATA packet to each neighbor for whom it has a gradient (in this case, n1 has a gradient to both n0
and n2). In state 16, n2 receives the DATA packet sent by n1 and, since the received DATA packet
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does not have a matching data cache entry, n2 adds the received DATA packet to the data cache and
resends the DATA packet to each neighbor for whom it has a gradient (in this case, n2 has a gradient
to n1 only). In state 17, n0 receives the DATA packet from n1. Since n0 has received this previously
unseen event from n1, it positively reinforces n1 by sending a positive reinforcement packet to n1.
In state 18, n1 receives the positive reinforcement packet sent by n0. Hence, n1 establishes a
reinforced gradient whose direction is set toward n0. In turn, n1 should positively reinforce its
preferred neighbor. Assuming that all nodes use the same data-driven local rule for determining
the preferred neighbor, n1 will use its data cache to determine the neighbor from whom it first
received the latest event matching the interest. In this case, n1’s preferred neighbor is n2; hence,
n1 sends a positive reinforcement packet to n2. In state 19, n2 receives the positive reinforcement
packet sent by n1. Hence, n2 establishes a reinforced gradient whose direction is set toward n1. In
turn, n2 should positively reinforce its preferred neighbor. Using the same data-driven local rule
for determining the preferred neighbor, n2 will use its data cache to determine the neighbor from
whom it first received the latest event matching the interest. In this case, n2’s preferred neighbor
is n1; hence, n2 sends a positive reinforcement packet to n1. In state 20, n1 receives the positive
reinforcement packet sent by n2 and establishes a reinforced gradient whose direction is set toward
n2. However, similar to counterexample 1, a loop is created in the reinforced path between n1 and
n2; i.e., ( RPath(1, 2) ∧ RPath(2, 1) ). In addition, the positive reinforcement packet did not reach




State 1 Depth = 0
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Network Empty
State 2 Depth = 1
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Network INTEREST(src:0--dest:1)
State 3 Depth = 2
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 0 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:2)
State 4 Depth = 3
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 0 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 1 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) INTEREST(src:2--dest:3)
State 5 Depth = 4
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 0 rate = 60.0) (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 1 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:2--dest:3)
State 6 Depth = 5
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 0 rate = 60.0) (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 1 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:3--dest:2) DATA(src:3--dest:2)
State 7 Depth = 6
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 0 rate = 60.0) (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 1 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 3
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:3--dest:2) DATA(src:2--dest:1)
State 8 Depth = 7
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 0 rate = 60.0) (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 2
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 1 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 3
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:3--dest:2) DATA(src:1--dest:0) DATA(src:1--dest:2)
State 9 Depth = 8
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: source = 1
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 0 rate = 60.0) (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 2
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 1 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 3
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:3--dest:2) DATA(src:1--dest:2) POSREINFORCE(src:0--dest:1)
State 10 Depth = 9
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: source = 1
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 0 rate = 5.0) (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 2
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 1 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 3
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:3--dest:2) DATA(src:1--dest:2) POSREINFORCE(src:1--dest:2)
Figure C.1: Directed diffusion case study: Trace of counterexample 1 obtained using BFS-AC
(continued next page).
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State 11 Depth = 10
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: source = 1
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 0 rate = 5.0) (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 2
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 1 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:3--dest:2) DATA(src:1--dest:2) POSREINFORCE(src:1--dest:2)
State 12 Depth = 11
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: source = 1
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 0 rate = 5.0) (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 2
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 1 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 1
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:3--dest:2) POSREINFORCE(src:1--dest:2) DATA(src:2--dest:1)
State 13 Depth = 12
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: source = 1
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 0 rate = 5.0) (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 2
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 1 rate = 5.0); Data Cache: source = 1
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:3--dest:2) DATA(src:2--dest:1) POSREINFORCE(src:2--dest:1)
State 14 Depth = 13
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: source = 1
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 0 rate = 5.0) (prevHop = 2 rate = 5.0); Data Cache: source = 2
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 1 rate = 5.0); Data Cache: source = 1
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop = 2 rate = 60.0); Data Cache: source = 3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:3--dest:2) DATA(src:2--dest:1) POSREINFORCE(src:1--dest:2)




State 1 Depth = 0
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Network Empty
State 2 Depth = 1
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Network INTEREST(src:0--dest:1)
State 3 Depth = 2
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:2)
State 4 Depth = 3
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) INTEREST(src:2--dest:3)
State 5 Depth = 4
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) INTEREST(src:3--dest:2) DATA(src:3--dest:2)
State 6 Depth = 5
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=60.0) (prevHop=3 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) DATA(src:3--dest:2)
State 7 Depth = 6
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=60.0) (prevHop=3 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) DATA(src:3--dest:2) INTEREST(src:0--dest:1)
State 8 Depth = 7
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=60.0) (prevHop=3 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) DATA(src:3--dest:2) INTEREST(src:0--dest:1)
State 9 Depth = 8
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=60.0) (prevHop=3 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) DATA(src:3--dest:2)
INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:2)
State 10 Depth = 9
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0) (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=60.0) (prevHop=3 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) DATA(src:3--dest:2) INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:2)
State 11 Depth = 10
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0) (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=60.0) (prevHop=3 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:2)
DATA(src:2--dest:1) DATA(src:2--dest:3)
Figure C.2: Directed diffusion case study: Trace of counterexample 2 obtained using DD-1-BeFS-AC
(continued next page).
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State 12 Depth = 11
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0) (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=3 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:2)
DATA(src:2--dest:1) DATA(src:2--dest:3)
State 13 Depth = 12
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0) (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:2)
DATA(src:2--dest:1) DATA(src:2--dest:3)
State 14 Depth = 13
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0) (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) DATA(src:2--dest:1)
DATA(src:2--dest:3) INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) INTEREST(src:2--dest:3)
State 15 Depth = 14
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0) (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=2
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=60.0); Data Cache: Empty
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) DATA(src:2--dest:3)
INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) INTEREST(src:2--dest:3) DATA(src:1--dest:0) DATA(src:1--dest:2)
State 16 Depth = 15
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: Empty
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0) (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=2
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=1
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) DATA(src:2--dest:3)
INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) INTEREST(src:2--dest:3) DATA(src:1--dest:0) DATA(src:2--dest:1)
State 17 Depth = 16
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: source=1
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=60.0) (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=2
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=1
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) DATA(src:2--dest:3)
INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) INTEREST(src:2--dest:3) DATA(src:2--dest:1) POSREINFORCE(src:0--dest:1)
State 18 Depth = 17
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: source=1
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=5.0) (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=2
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=1
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) DATA(src:2--dest:3)
INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) INTEREST(src:2--dest:3) DATA(src:2--dest:1) POSREINFORCE(src:1--dest:2)
State 19 Depth = 18
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: source=1
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=5.0) (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=2
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=5.0); Data Cache: source=1
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) DATA(src:2--dest:3)
INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) INTEREST(src:2--dest:3) DATA(src:2--dest:1) POSREINFORCE(src:2--dest:1)
State 20 Depth = 19
Node 0 Interest Cache: Empty; Data Cache: source=1
Node 1 Interest Cache: (prevHop=0 rate=5.0) (prevHop=2 rate=5.0); Data Cache: source=2
Node 2 Interest Cache: (prevHop=1 rate=5.0); Data Cache: source=1
Node 3 Interest Cache: (prevHop=2 rate=60.0); Data Cache: source=3
Network INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) INTEREST(src:1--dest:0) DATA(src:2--dest:3)
INTEREST(src:2--dest:1) INTEREST(src:2--dest:3) DATA(src:2--dest:1) POSREINFORCE(src:1--dest:2)
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